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Shannon Trosper Schorey: The Internet is Holy: New  
Religious Movements and the Fight for the Future of the Internet  
(Under the direction of Randall Styers) 
 
What can the intersection of information technology and religious creativity in 
contemporary culture reveal about the nature of modernity? Through close readings of three case 
studies (Open Source Scientology, the Missionary Church of Kopimism, and Jason Silva’s 
influential video series Shots of Awe), I show how the value and nature of information is highly 
contested and that religion has been a particularly important site in which debates about 
information and information access have been framed. Despite the differences in how each of the 
religious movements considered in this dissertation stages the debates about information, each 
demonstrates in a concrete way the impossibility of the binaries that are at the heart of the fragile 
myth of modernity (religion and science, religion and technology, religion and secularism). 
The religious movements considered here are hybrids.  Their religious creativity reveals 
important and surprising insights into the ongoing cultural development of the concept of 
religion, into changing cultural perceptions of technology, and into the brittle, mythic nature of 
modernity. These religious movements demonstrate how information access has been configured 
as a religious right and how the control and freedom of information has been used to legitimize 
and delegitimize new forms of religious expression. All parties formulate these debates in such a 
way that that they are actively transforming what the very categories of the religious and the 
secular might mean. In their fight over information flows on the internet, they are reworking the 
mythic contours of modernity. They undermine the modern myth of disenchantment, and they 
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I have sought to offer humanists a detailed analysis of  
a technology sufficiently magnificent and spiritual to  
convince them that the machines by which they are  
surrounded are cultural artifacts worthy of their attention  
and respect. 






A Question  
In the spring of 2012, I was finishing my master’s degree in the religious studies program 
at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Under the careful and generous guidance of my 
committee (Deborah Whitehead, Stewart Hoover, and Greg Johnson), I had completed a thesis 
that explored many of the legal and media disputes that resulted from “Scientology v. the 
Internet”—a colloquial name given to Scientology’s myriad struggles online. At the time, 
Scientology’s status as one of the most controversial new religious movements of the twentieth 
century had been cemented in popular culture and through the global media attention from 
broadcast news organizations and rogue collectives of internet activists. My thesis examined the 
power that citizen activism could wield against the perceived failures of social authority (the law, 
the media) and how that activism reflected contemporary understandings of religious pluralism, 
religious tolerance, and religious freedom.  
 Once that project was finished, a nagging question remained: why had an internet 
subculture (represented by the hacker collective Anonymous, who I will discuss in chapter one 
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below) been able to so quickly (and on such a large-scale) organize global support against 
Scientology? At my thesis defense, my committee asked exactly the right question: why had this 
passionate internet activism not been brought to bear against other secretive, esoteric religious 
organizations? This question stayed with me even as I believed, at the time, that I had moved 
away from my interest in Scientology and began my doctoral work at UNC Chapel Hill with the 
goal of studying religion and media in the United States more broadly. I watched with an eye to 
new religious movements online to see what might or might not change in the conflicts over free 
information and religious pluralism. I wondered, in a vague and unarticulated way, if part of the 
hostility toward Scientology came from a diffuse culture of information freedom that was shared 
by significant portions of the internet’s most active users.  
This chapter begins by positioning the development of my project out of questions raised 
at my thesis defense. I broadly outline the trajectory of my research question and the theoretical 
framework that drives my dissertation. I then identify the primary scholarly conversations that 
this project participates in. Next, I outline my approach to religion and media (in the section 
“Religion and/as Media”) as well as technology (“Technology, Agency, Actants”). The 
following two sections survey more specific sets of literature that provide important context for 
the location of this dissertation within religious studies and communication studies: the first 
considers new religious movements and media, while the second surveys religion and the 
internet. The purposes of these last two sections (“New Religious Movements Online” and 
“Religion and the Internet”) is to place my work in its proper context for the two subfields I am 
most in conversation with. I then consider how scholarly debates about information and 
information technologies, specifically, are relevant to scholarly understandings of how religion 
and technology are enmeshed in contemporary life. I end with a brief overview of my argument 
and a chapter outline.  
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The question—raised at my thesis defense—of the existence of a diffuse internet culture 
mobilized around the freedom of information stayed with me throughout my doctoral training. 
Then, in 2012, a significant new development occurred: the Missionary Church of Kopimism 
gained legal recognition as a religion, first in Sweden and then shortly thereafter in the United 
States. The leaders of this new Church were loosely connected to Pirate Bay, an infamous file-
sharing and copy-left website (“copy-left” refers to an activist position of anti-copyright). Media 
outlets mostly treated the Church in a fleeting way, as a funny joke—a clever hack. But I 
wondered if the group itself might offer some part of an answer to the question I had been asked 
at my defense.  
 As I pursued my doctoral studies, I learned of Jason Silva (Emmy-award winning 
National Geographic television personality), Kevin Kelly (co-founder of Wired magazine), 
Stewart Brand (an influential countercultural figure)—all significant media personalities who 
espouse a rhetoric of information freedom while offering metaphysical arguments in defense of 
free access, distribution, and information sharing. Copyright is wrong, they say, because it is 
immoral, unethical, and antireligious, a spiritual burden. Instead, they argue that information is 
sacred and animated—a living force whose very freedom of movement and distribution is central 
to the religious liberty of all humanity (never mind that they mostly used male pronouns and 
never acknowledge the uneven technological access among peoples of different races, classes, 
genders, and geography). I learned about a new group of Scientologists who, after leaving the 
Church for various reasons, had allied with Anonymous and adopted the trope of “Open Source 
Software” (detailed in chapter one) as their primary structuring metaphor. Information is sacred, 
this new group agreed with the Church of Scientology, but precisely because it was sacred, 
information should be free.  
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 I eventually began work at a software company, which sent me to one of the world’s 
largest and longest-running hacker conventions, where the technological director of 
MormonLeaks and FaithLeaks (Wikileaks-inspired non-profit organizations dedicated to 
exposing secretive religious materials online) spoke to a crowded room at “Skytalks”—a 
parallel, unofficial presentation track that hosted only the most controversial speakers. Recording 
equipment was not allowed in the room, and the line to speak to the presenter after the talk (an 
ex-Mormon who was clearly grieved by the subject matter of his own presentation) reached to 
the door. FaithLeaks and MormonLeaks represented the other part of this story: information 
freedom activism that, while important and interesting, did not demonstrate the same tensions 
and hybridity between religion and technology that the religious movements I will analyze here 
do. This last insight is a significant part of my argument, which I will now explain.  
The figures I have been introducing are all discussed in various parts of this dissertation, 
which I have come to recognize as a more exhaustive answer to a cluster of interests that 
generated from that single question posed many years ago. As my project developed in parallel 
with my scholarly training, I realized that what was at stake in Scientology vs. the Internet was 
much broader than the question of Scientology and religious pluralism online. I began to 
understand that debates over the value and nature of information, framed in the language of 
religion and religious knowledge, are key sites where the binaries of religion and science, 
religion and technology, and religion and secularism deconstruct—once examined close up, it is 
hard to imagine any easy separation at all. These binaries bolster the myth of secular modernity 
(as detailed in chapter four), and so my leading research question was also transformed: What 
can the intersection of information technology and religious creativity in contemporary culture 
reveal about the nature of modernity? 
  Through close readings of three particular case studies (Open Source Scientology, the 
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Missionary Church of Kopimism, and Jason Silva’s influential video series Shots of Awe), I show 
how the value and nature of information is highly contested, and that religion has been a 
particularly important site in which debates about information and information access have been 
framed. Despite the differences in how each of the religious movements considered in this 
dissertation stage the debates about information, each demonstrate in a concrete way the 
impossibility of the binaries (outline above) that are at the heart of the fragile myth of modernity.  
 
Conversations and Contributions 
This dissertation is primarily a contribution to two scholarly conversations: (1) 
scholarship that seeks to challenge the classical analysis of religion and media as separate 
ontological realms—and instead asserts that religion, media, and technology are co-constituted 
historically and socially constructed formations that influence one another; and (2) scholarship 
that explores the nature and assumptions of secular modernity, especially as secular modernity 
has been configured upon a relationship between science, technology, and religion that relies 
upon their separation and conflict (science and technology as forces of and for disenchantment, 
on the one hand, and religion on the other).  
 Two insights drive this dissertation. The first is that technologies do, in fact, have 
politics. Technologies and the technological communities that surround them are never neutral, 
but instead they are informed by their social, geographical, and historical circumstances. This 
dissertation will explore the role that religion—as a historical category and marker of historically 
informed ideas and practices—has played in technologically-focused debates about the freedoms 
of information.  
The second key insight is that new religious movements are not marginal to the study of 
religion and culture but instead offer particularly rich insights on broad cultural shifts affecting 
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the social networks of which they are a part. Since its emergence as a field of scholarship in the 
1970s, the study of NRMs has been guided largely by the attempt to collect and categorize the 
theologies, demographics, and organizational histories of new religions.1 This research agenda is 
usually defended by invoking the values of pluralism, as scholars of NRMs argue that such 
“content-centric” approaches help to raise the profile of marginalized and minority religions. 
Such a project is exemplified by Harvard’s Pluralism Project and guided by the assumption that 
more information will eventually (and somehow organically) foster a more empathetic, educated, 
and pluralistic America.2 The unfortunate consequence of this well-meaning approach is that it 
assumes that NRMs are only important insofar as they add to the diversity of religious life in 
America. Against this approach Hugh Urban has argued that NRMs can serve as cultural 
magnifying glasses that allow us to identify broader questions and anxieties precisely because 
they tend to cluster around evolving cultural boundaries.3 I follow Urban’s approach.  
 This project also seeks to contribute to scholarly discussions of media and religion more 
broadly in three ways. First, this dissertation will argue that digital spaces and the communities 
that form there are never inherently sacred, secular, or neutral. Instead, digital technologies and 
communities are structured by the social histories of which they are a part, and they contribute, 
in turn, to those social histories. Investigating how particular values emerge and the effects that 
                                               
1 See Eileen Barker, “The Scientific Study of Religion? You Must Be Joking,” in Cults and New 
Religious Movements: A Reader, ed. Lorne Dawson (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003), 7-25; 
Lorne Dawson Comprehending Cults: The Sociology of New Religious Movements (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1998); and Susan Palmer and David Bromley, “Deliberate Heresies: 
New Religious Myths and Rituals as Critiques,” in Teaching New Religious Movements, ed. 
David Bromley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 135-158.  
 
2 Diana Eck, A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” Has Now Become the 
World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2001). 
 
3 Hugh Urban, The Church of Scientology: A History of a New Religion (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011), 3-5. 
 
 7 
are produced when values are expressed in explicitly “religious” terms allows scholars to explore 
some of the socially creative ways in which discourses of the religious and secular are mobilized 
within contemporary technological culture.  
 Second, this dissertation will demonstrate how new information technologies have served 
as ideological and material resources for new religious movements and how, in turn, the 
theologies and practices of these new religious movements reveal widespread, though often 
obscure, social transformations that have accompanied the widespread adoption of these 
information technologies. The case studies considered in this dissertation illuminate a much 
broader set of historical and cultural trends in the United States in which religion and 
information technologies have co-produced new ways of understanding our social worlds.  
 Finally, this dissertation contributes to contemporary debates about religion and media—
as well as contemporary activism regarding the right to information in a world dominated by data 
exchange—by demonstrating that both technologies and new religions are crucial to our 
understanding of the evolution of “religion” in social worlds dominated by information 
technologies. Technology and religion are both in motion, and the hybridity of new religions in 
intertwining the two can be deeply illuminating. The case studies in this dissertation offer such a 
magnifying glass, allowing me to explore how binaries that sustain the myth of secular 
modernity (religion and science, religion and technology, subjects and objects) are myths 
themselves.  
 
“Religion” and/as Media 
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How have scholars understood the relationship between religion and media?4 Since at 
least the mid-nineteenth century, Americans have often ascribed “mystical powers” to electronic 
and information technologies in one of the most “pervasive cultural myths” of our national 
history.5 Resting on long-held Protestant and Anglo-American traditions of democratic practice, 
the idea that information circulation is valuable for its own sake has been taken for granted in the 
widespread adoption of new information technologies. Public descriptions of information 
technologies have been wrapped in normative languages of promise, progress, and liberation, 
justified by the ability of information technologies to transmit information instantaneously across 
wide geographical ranges.6 Spiritualists, Scientologists, Transhumanists, New Agers, and a 
variety of electronic rights activists fighting for the “future of the internet” all share in this 
cultural legacy, though how the notion of religion has served as a resource for each group varies.  
Religious studies scholars investigating the encounters of religion and media in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries have largely framed religion and information technologies as 
two separate modes of culture. They have asked such questions as: What does “genuine” 
                                               
4 Thanks to Oxford University Press for permission to reprint here revised portions of my chapter 
“Media, Technology, and New Religious Movements,” in The Oxford Handbook of New 
Religious Movements, vol. 2, eds. James R. Lewis and Inga Tøllefsen (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 264-277. 
 
5 Jeffrey Sconce, Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telegraphy to Television (Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000), 6. 
 
6 Sconce, Haunted Media, 7-11. 
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religious practice look like online?7 How do media technologies offer space(s) for religious 
practice or religious critique?8 How are information technologies used by religious people?9 
This perspective on the relation between religion and media is formulated precisely 
around the “and.” That is, it focuses on the adoption or rejection of media by religious people 
and organizations or on how new technological artifacts (apps, cell phones, etc.) are being used 
by religious people to update religious practice for new media (meditation or prayer apps, virtual 
temples, etc.). This line of questioning has produced some innovative, compelling scholarship, 
but it also tends to assume that religion is a phenomenon fundamentally separate from media 
culture. Religion is configured as an essentialized, transhistorical, transcultural, and sui generis 
category. At the same time, this line of questioning also frames information technologies as 
uniquely separate and inert modes of culture that act as neutral vessels of communication rather 
than as contingent political formations that organize human relations. Both technodeterminist 
and social-determinist scholarship make the error of assuming that one term on one side of the 
“and” must be active while the other must be acted upon with little or no resistance. The 
methodological choice to isolate “religion” from “media” ignores the realities of media 
saturation and incorrectly assumes that practice, structures, and discourse can be untangled to the 
extent that we can identify the dominant agent. 
                                               
7 For representative examples, see Douglas E. Cowan, Religion Online: Finding Faith on the 
Internet (New York: Routledge, 2004); and Christopher Helland, “Online Religion as Lived 
Religion: Methodological Issues in the Study of Religious Participation on the Internet,” 
Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet 1 (2005): 1-16. 
 
8 See Stewart Hoover, Religion in the Media Age (London: Routledge, 2006); and Heidi 
Campbell, Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds (New 
York: Routledge, 2013). 
 
9 For representative examples, see Morten Hojsgaard, Religion and Cyberspace (London: 
Routledge, 2005); and Rachel Wagner, Godwired: Religion, Ritual and Virtual Reality (New 
York: Routledge, 2012). 
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This dissertation seeks to demonstrate that religion and media, or religion and 
technology, are neither obviously nor easily distinct historical entities.  I investigate how 
specific, localized beliefs and practices of religion and media have always existed as hybrids and 
are only bifurcated into the separate categories of religion and media in a secondary effort of 
analysis and description by academics and journalists who work to identify and describe the very 
formations that they are caught in. The casual identification of religion and media as 
fundamentally separate is, therefore, a political act that relies on historically and culturally 
situated patterns of practice and thought that construct the religious and the secular as distinct.  
Although this project is rooted in the insights of Bruno Latour (as explained in chapter 
four), Jeremy Stolow has specifically called this approach to the study of religion and media the 
“and/as” approach—it is an attempt to analyze the relationships between religion and media in a 
way that includes but moves beyond the restrictions of the “and.” The goal of this approach is to 
raise questions about how the two categories (religion, media) intermingle, sometimes so much 
that they appear to have completely flipped roles.  Drawing attention to the ways in which 
religion has been enacted through texts, images, architecture, music, objects, markings, and 
bodies, Stolow argues “religion always encompasses techniques and technologies that we think 
of as ‘media’, just as, by the same token, every medium necessarily participates in the realm of 
the transcendent, if nothing else than by its inability to be fully subject to the instrumental 
intentions of its users.”10 Religion is mediated, Stolow argues, just as media slips beyond our 
control, intentions, and expectations. Is it really so surprising that the distinctions between the 
two categories also slip, in the vibrancy of cultural practice? To think of religion and/as media, 
then, is to ask: 
                                               
10 Jeremy Stolow, “Religion and/as Media,” Theory, Culture, and Society 22, no. 4 (August 
2005): 125.  
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[How] media and mediation constitute inherently unstable and ambiguous conditions of 
possibility for religious signifying practices, as well as their articulation with broader, 
public realms of religious belonging, to say nothing of the incorporation of religious 
regimes of discipline, virtuous conduct or ecstatic performance in embodied everyday life 
contexts, and in the cultivation of the self.11 
 
 It is necessary at this point to step back and define what I mean by the category 
“religion.” Rather than a transcultural or distinct phenomenon or formation, I understand religion 
as an assemblage or mobile trope that exists as a “real” social construct (by which I mean really 
felt and having real consequences) that has been wielded in specific locations to produce 
particular effects, but which is always rooted in a larger discursive pattern. Because the material, 
ideological, and political social practices of people on the ground are not born out of distinct and 
identifiable processes, no single theory can be nuanced enough to account for the range of 
creative religious life. 
Furthermore, the attempt to account for the totality of the content of religion risks 
mimicking nineteenth-century scholars’ efforts to collect and categorize all the world’s data. For 
some time now, the scholarly study of religion has engaged in a self-reflective conversation 
sparked by various efforts to historicize the term “religion,” the results of which have been to ask 
if the field can be coherent if the object around which it is organized is not stable. The strongest 
voices arguing for the abandonment of the notion of “religion” altogether have done so on the 
grounds of the category’s (1) uniquely European (and Christian) origins, (2) its long use in 
justifying colonialism and conquest, and (3) its tendency to reify in an essentialized, 
transhistorical and transcultural manner.12 
                                               
11 Stolow, “Religion and/as Media,” 125.  
 
12 See Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, or, How European Universalism 
Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); 
Jonathan Z. Smith, Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004); and Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). 
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 Though the importance of historicizing the term is clear, the resulting call to purify 
scholarship of “religion” is nonsensical. Abandoning this notion not only deprives us of a useful 
term of analysis, but also risks the re-colonialization of non-Western peoples who have adopted 
“religion” and refashioned the term according to their own strategies. To fail to recognize that 
religion’s deployment in colonialism has meant that at least two actors—the colonizers and the 
colonized—have engaged with and transformed the term only accomplishes a second erasure of 
the colonized. The assumption that the West somehow owns and controls the notion of “religion” 
and that the notion has never escaped the West’s logic implies also that non-Western peoples 
have had minimal agency or impact of their own, a move that re-asserts the colonial violence that 
many scholars seek to avoid.13  
Tisa Wenger draws attention to an example of how unexpected violence would occur if 
we were to get rid of “religion” entirely. She shows that Puebloan people were able to save their 
dance traditions from multipronged attacks by seeking the legal protections of religious freedom 
legislation. Through this case study, Wenger demonstrates the ways in which many indigenous 
traditions would be at risk of extinction had the tool of religious freedom not been available. In 
this way, the question of whether religious freedom is merely a rhetorical notion is not always 
answered with a simplistic “yes,” but must be re-situated to consider the ways in which 
marginalized groups have been able to use various legal strategies for their own survival. These 
strategies have consequences: for the Pueblo their deeply communal traditions—now legally 
protected as “religion”—were configured into something privatized, individualized, and optional. 
 Another common tactic by scholars of religion is to reaffirm the primacy of meaning-
making in definitions of religion. The argument here is that religion must affirm something about 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
13 Tisa Joy Wenger, Religious Freedom: The Contested History of an American Ideal (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017). 
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the fundamental nature of reality through the mode of meaning-making. Clifford Geertz, to offer 
one classic example, argues that symbols carry meaning as humans reaffirm and renegotiate 
these meanings through ritual activity. These meaning work to orient the individual, establishing 
their purpose, their confidence in that purpose, and their “moods and motivations.”14 Likewise in 
William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience, religion is affirmed because of what it 
does for individuals: it connects them to some deep form of meaning that orients the individual 
both to their immediate world and the cosmos.15   
 In this context, Talal Asad’s critique of the notion of “meaning” is instructive. Meaning, 
Asad argues, is produced, activated, and authorized according to relations of power. Symbols, 
therefore, do not carry meaning in and of themselves. Meaning is merely an epiphenomenon of 
the power relations within which the symbol emerges. Asad and Brent Nongbri both explore the 
cultural history of the term religion, and both urge us to move religious studies forward by 
asking new questions about the nature and use of the term rather than by attempting to eliminate 
the term altogether.16 Adopting this approach, in which scholars are attentive to the local 
deployments of religion as a mode of discourse and the myriad ways in which the notion of 
religion is both transformed and transformative within those contexts of deployment, allows us to 
ask important questions about the formation of social worlds and their attendant norms and 
material practices.  
                                               
14 Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Eight Theories of Religion, ed. Daniel L. 
Pals, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 260-291. 
 
15 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, ed. Matthew 
Bradley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
 
16 See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993); Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003); and Brent 





Technology, Agency, Actants 
I will now turn to theories of media and technology that have been particularly influential 
to this project. One popular approach has focused on the power of technology in shaping culture. 
Marshall McLuhan, for example, argues that technologies work directly to set the limits on the 
human range of consciousness, making certain forms of subjectivity only possible under certain 
technological conditions. McLuhan’s work, though, is built on a stilted understanding of 
cognitive psychology and the reception of technologies. There is little recognition in his 
arguments of the differences in how people think or respond to similar technologies, and hence 
he offers little opportunity to attend to resistance, multiplicities of use, or ambiguous reception.17 
Stuart Hall corrected this over-reach by focusing on practices of mediation, remediation, 
circulation, and reception. Arguing against scholars who had emphasized structural determinants 
over practices of reception and mediation, Hall highlighted how meaning is produced within 
circuits of production and consumption. Using the example of television, Hall argued that 
viewers were able not only to engage in varied responses to programming but that those 
differences also stemmed from their different social locations. Audiences are not homogenized 
but are instead located in different positions in relation to dominant social power. Viewers most 
closely aligned with the hegemonic culture are more likely to receive the programmer’s intended 
meaning and messages, while viewers in marginalized positions can read completely unintended 
meanings out of the same messages.18 
                                               
17 Marshall McLuhan, “The Medium is the Message,” in The New Media Reader, eds. Nick 
Montfort and Noah Wardrip-Fruin (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 193-210.  
 
18 Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in The Cultural Studies Reader, ed. Simon During 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 477-488. 
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Contemporary research has largely sought to push back against the claim that technology 
is an ontologically separate realm from other cultural or social forces, instead viewing 
technology as both engendered by and engendering various “forms of life.” In this view, 
technology is understood to be infused into the patterns of our daily lives as technological 
innovations function as ideas put into material practice.19 These material practices, in turn, have 
the capacity to radically alter cultural patterns by encoding and privileging certain forms of 
power over others.20  
One influential form of this argument assumes that media has reached a level of 
supersaturation in developed societies and that scholars can no longer imagine technology to act 
as a neutral tool but must instead account for the localized meaning-making potentials of a given 
technology within a specific historical and cultural context.21 It is the specified geographical, 
historical, and social context that mediates and materializes the relations between users and 
technology—accounting for the field of movement in which individuals, communities, and 
technological forms are negotiated. Robert Latham and Saskia Sassen foreground these 
negotiations by calling for a new, emergent object of study: “digital formations.” Digital 
formations are new sociotech relations that may be ontologically thought of as social “things,” in 
that they have coherence and endurance, but that are never static or fixed objects. Instead, digital 
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formations are shaped both by technological properties and by social contexts that work together 
to provide the conditions of possibility for activity online.22 
In the introduction to his edited volume Deus In Machina: Religion, Technology and the 
Things in Between, Stolow asks if it is still useful or even possible to continue to think about 
religion and technology as two ontologically separate entities. Drawing on the insights of Bruno 
Latour, Stolow argues that technology is not an ontologically separate mode of life, but that 
important boundary work has been done to differentiate it from other aspects of the social field. 
This boundary work requires constant maintenance and defense, and it also serves as an 
ideological cover for the production of hybrids, formations that by their very existence blur or 
otherwise transgress those boundaries. By drawing our attention to this discursive boundary 
work, Stolow and Latour highlight the ways in which nonhuman and human actants are always 
in relations of translation. Agency need not be placed on one side or the other of a simple 
conjunction but takes shape through multiple networked “statements” shared in the entangled 
webs of relations between humans and nonhumans.23 Gesturing to a long line of critical work in 
religious studies that has emphasized the political work of categories, Stolow asks us to “attend 
more closely to the modes of wonder-making” that shape and frame techno-scientific knowledge 
and practices in much the same way scholars of religion have looked at religion itself. What 
could happen, Stolow asks, if we allow such categories to “intermingle promiscuously”?24 
 
New Religious Movements Online  
                                               
22 Robert Lathem and Saskia Sassen, Digital Formations: IT and New Architectures in the 
Global Realm (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 3-9. 
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The media supersaturation of contemporary Western culture embeds individuals in a new 
context of mass media and information technologies. The study of new religious movements and 
media, in particular, has tended to highlight media supersaturation as an enchanting backdrop to 
religious creativity online. One significant portion of this literature describes new religions 
online as “hyper-real religions”—a simulacrum of religion shaped by popular culture and 
enabled by media structures (further explained below). I will first survey a representative sample 
of this literature before providing an alternative perspective.  
On a practical level, media supersaturation means that popular culture, along with its 
counterparts of advertising and commodification, is increasingly used as a resource for religious 
practice and belief. Products created for secular entertainment, such as the “Star Wars” or 
“Matrix” films, are sometimes actively adopted by groups that assert that these works produce 
“real” religious effects for their members, either metaphorically or as actual manifestations of the 
sacred. Other movements, like the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster or the Missionary 
Church of Kopimism, mobilize popular culture and religious discourse as part of their efforts to 
satirize certain forms of privilege given to religious groups (but not to secular ones). An 
increased scholarly awareness of the interplay among capitalism, popular culture, and religion 
online has produced important new work that attempts to think through issues of ownership, 
intention, sincerity, strategy, and political satire as each relates to new articulations of religious 
beliefs and practices entangled with media structures. 
Attention to the interplay among these forces is not new, but the new religions emerging 
in this context provide a rich opportunity to consider how the resources for religious practices 
and meaning making have always been negotiated. The extraordinary creativity of new religious 
movements pushes us to shift from classifying individuals primarily as consumers of religion and 
to reimagine them as active “prosumers.”  Prosumers (a portmanteau of “professional” or 
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“proactive” and “consumer”) are consumers who remix commodities to create new things, which 
are then released back into public circulation. Prosumption is an interactive, generative, and 
creative practice of consuming and remixing resources to actively forge new possibilities from 
the materials originally received, a process that occupies the middle ground between passive 
consumption and totally new invention. 
The language of prosumption relates closely to another body of scholarly literature that 
describes online religion in terms of “branding.” This literature uses the notion of branding (the 
mechanism through which a name, icon, motto, and mythos work together to orient a product 
within the mind of a consumer in a distinctive fashion) to understand the struggle of religions to 
promote themselves and succeed in the American religious marketplace online.25 A major 
assumption underlying this perspective is that information technologies have been central to the 
development of the contemporary American religious marketplace by providing a platform for 
the dissemination and access to alternative religious practices and worldviews.26  
Since its publication in 2012, Adam Possamai’s edited volume The Handbook of Hyper-
Real Religions has had a significant impact on scholarly discussions of NRMS, offering one of 
the first sustained discussions of many of these themes. Hyper-Real Religion is an attempt to 
theorize the boundaries between popular culture and religion with attention to religious and 
spiritual authority, reception, and meaning-making in various contemporary religious practices. 
Although Hyper-Real Religion deals with case studies as diverse as the Otherkin, the Church of 
the Jedi, and Evangelical responses to tabletop role-playing games, in her preface Eileen Barker 
                                               
25 Mara Einstein, Brands of Faith: Marketing Religion in a Commercial Age (London: 
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situates the project within the context of NRM studies and growing scholarly attention to new 
forms of spirituality that challenge traditional notions of religion.27 
Possamai adapts the name of this paradigm from Jean Baudrillard’s concept of the hyper-
real, but Possamai is also eager to reinterpret Baudrillard. Possamai extends Baudrillard’s notion 
of the hyper-real to engage the boundaries between “popular culture” and “religion.” Possamai 
defines “hyper-real religions” as the mode of new religions that mobilize popular culture as a 
central meaning-making resource, writing that hyper-real religions can be understood as a 
“simulacrum of religion created out of, or in symbiosis with, commoditized popular culture 
which provides inspiration at a metaphorical level and/or a source of beliefs for everyday life”.28 
Central to hyper-real religion is an ability to use popularly “profane” imagery, language, and 
resources in order to both “[discover and create] sacred space in cyberspace.”29 
 Danielle Kirby critiques the hyper-real framework by arguing that it treats participants as 
static consumers of popular culture, missing how these individuals are constantly involved in 
processes of negotiation with their chosen religious texts. Using Discordia, the Church of the 
SubGenius, and the Temple of Psychic Youth as her case studies, Kirby emphasizes “remixture,” 
the copying, pasting, borrowing, and mixing of religious texts in a playful and ongoing process. 
Far from seeing religious textual materials as closed, static documents given in their perfected 
                                               
27 Eileen Barker, “Preface,” in Handbook of Hyper-Real Religions, ed. Adam Possamai (Leiden: 
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form through divine revelation, these movements put editing and playing with religious source 
materials at the center of their relationship to texts.30 
 Kirby’s conclusions echo an important body of research that examines how the changing 
materiality of digital texts is leading to new forms of religious practice and an emphasis on open, 
collective, and dynamic religious truth. Scholars working outside of the hyper-real religions 
paradigm, for example, have emphasized the performativity and communal practices central to 
many communities that blur popular culture and religion online. Martin Geoffroy argues that 
“hyper-real religions” might be more productively thought of as “integral religions,” which he 
defines as a performance religion of networked individuals who communicate through an 
interface about questions of ultimate meaning. Alternatively, Graham John and Chiara Baldini 
find the language of “assemblage” more useful. In their work analyzing the festival environment 
of Boom—a music festival that promotes the “neomystical” and that began in the full moon 
dance parties of Goa, India, in the 1970s—they describe the festival as a moving assemblage of 
techniques that include pharmaceuticals, music, and religious ideology. John and Baldini argue 
that individuals who participate at the festival act primarily as prosumers, repurposing the 
various interactions of each assemblage to “maximize the typically private encounter with the 
numinous” while at the same time optimizing their participation in the public dance.31 
I argue instead that scholarship that recognizes the complex interplay between religion 
and media and that urges methodological and theoretical pluralism is able to be more nimble and 
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Mysticism, Visionary Arts and Portugal’s Boom Festival,” in Handbook of New Religions and 
Cultural Production, eds. Carole Cusack and Alex Norman (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 527.  
 
 21 
to bring us closer to the questions I am most interested in as a scholar of religion—questions 
about genealogy, about cultural formation, and about the mediations of social life. 
Overemphasizing the physical and structural capacities of technologies places agency solely on 
the side of technology and collapses people (users, audiences, etc.) into a homogenized block 
capable only of undifferentiated reception. Ironically, this approach also ignores the ambiguities 
within technology’s structural potentials by assuming that technological capacities work in only 
one way, rather than recognizing that certain technologies can often be used in unanticipated 
ways.  
The study of new religious movements is especially well positioned to advance the 
conversations about religion and media and particularly religion and the internet, but it cannot do 
so if scholars assume that new religions are somehow uniquely “hyper-real.” Instead, the field of 
NRM studies should be recognized as being well suited to investigate the political work of 
categories while working at the same time to unsettle traditional classification schemes. Some of 
the most common questions NRM scholars have worked with over the past few decades—What 
is “new” about new religions? Are they religious at all? What are the consequences of such a 
categorization? What are the sociocultural mechanisms by which such decisions are 
authorized?—make clear the field’s commitments to thinking through the dynamics of scholarly 
classification. 
In a similar vein, NRMs themselves have been doing much of the work of unsettling the 
“clear” cultural distinctions among religion, the internet, and media technologies more generally. 
The so-called hyper-real religions such as Jediism and the Church of the SubGenius push at our 
culturally received boundaries among capitalism, fiction, and religion and mark the triumph of 
the prosumer. The Missionary Church of Kopimism, a NRM that claims file sharing as its most 
sacred religious practice, reflects both the contemporary use of the categories of religion to 
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critique the political sphere and the ways in which the information age itself has become subject 
to narratives of sacralization. Contemporary scholarship on media, religion, and culture must 
take these blurred practices of intersection and negotiation as the first step in developing a 
framework with which to understand religion in an age dominated by the internet and 
information technologies.  
 
Religion and the Internet  
If new religions and the media have often been analyzed in terms of the “hyper-real,” 
how have scholars envisioned the study of internet and religion more broadly? To answer this 
question, I will briefly survey the major trends in literature attending to religion and the internet 
in religious studies before considering how the history of the internet in particular has been 
presented in communication studies and computer science. I end this section by highlighting a 
set of alternative histories of the internet that highlight how new religions, the counterculture, 
and computer culture have been intimately entangled. I understand my project to be a 
contribution to this last set of literature that posits alternative histories of religion and the 
internet.  
In 2005 Morten Hojsgaard and Margit Warburg described the history of the field of 
religion and the internet as having been characterized by two distinctive and successive waves. 
The first wave (from the late 1990s to the early 2000s) was characterized by a fascination with 
the newness of internet technologies. The preferred methodology was meta-content analyses of 
the web (such as projects that asked how many websites were dedicated to “sex” rather than 
“religion”). Scholars applied quantitative methods to understand who was using the internet and 
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how. Undergirding scholarship in this first wave was a shared sense of techno-determinism in 
which information technologies were cast as wielding either utopic or dystopic potentials.32  
By the early 2000s this technological determinism was tempered by a more realist 
perspective: technologies were reconfigured as mechanisms that would not likely be the sole 
determinants of social change. Researchers began to adopt longer historical and sociological 
approaches to the study of religion and the internet and began to contextualize quantitative data 
more thoroughly within social history. This second wave of research worked to overturn the 
techno-determinism of the first, as scholars widely came to the conclusion that “the internet does 
not generate religion, only people do”.33 In particular, this second wave was characterized by 
calls for a heterogeneous set of methodological and theoretical tools as questions of use brought 
attention to the variety of ways in which individuals responded to, used, and understood the 
internet.34  
A clear example of this second-wave thinking appears in the article, “Virtually Religious: 
New Religious Movements and the World Wide Web,” in which Douglas E. Cowan and Jeffrey 
K. Hadden emphasized a theoretical approach that distinguished between “religion online” and 
“online religion” in ways that privileged the ability of reified “religion” to determine the uses to 
which technology was put.35 First advanced by Christopher Helland, “religion online” was 
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initially a term used to describe the strategies through which established religious traditions used 
the internet as a tool for disseminating information and communicating with active 
practitioners.36 The term “online religion” was adopted to signal the use of the internet as a 
virtual arena for religious participation and performance—highlighting the ways in which virtual 
rituals and cyber-pilgrimages were transforming the ways in which religion was practiced in a 
digital age.37 
Such a framing led Cowan and Hadden to focus primarily on the contributions of online 
religion, highlighting questions about the interrelation between online and offline religious 
practices. In their introduction, they asked: 
How is online participation in religious ritual or liturgy similar to these practices 
in real life? In what ways does it differ? How do the different technological and 
meta-technological factors associated with religious observance in cyberspace 
enhance or constrain the experience? Does the Internet offer unique opportunities 
for religious evolution, or merely more advanced versions of strategies already 
deployed?38 
 
Online religion/religion online has since been reimagined by scholars to function more like a 
spectrum in which online religion/religion online serve as opposite poles of digital religious 
practice rather than absolute or fixed categories.  
If the first wave of research on religion and the internet can be understood as primarily 
dominated by a technological determinist approach and the second as an attempt to resituate the 
internet as a “tool” in multivalent use, the contemporary field of inquiry can be understood as a 
collective effort to mark some type of middle ground. Finding resources in the works of 
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poststructural and postcolonial theorists like Bruno Latour, Homi Bhabha, and Landon Winner, 
this third wave of research has sought to nuance the ways in which religion and digital 
technology are already imbricated. There has been an important turn to “hybrids,” ambiguities, 
and “third spaces,” and scholars have mined the insights of recent philosophy of technology and 
science.  
Research following this model discusses the internet and religion in terms of third spaces, 
distributed materialities or subjectivities, and co-constitutive histories and locations. This shift 
has been due in part to the opening of the field to methodological and theoretical approaches 
borrowed from cultural studies, the philosophy of technology and science, communication 
studies, and legal studies in addition to the field’s more traditional sociological analyses. To 
better attend to that interdisciplinary conversation, I will now shift to consider what a religious 
studies perspective could add to histories of the internet that have been largely produced by 
scholars in communication studies and computer science.  
Until recently the history of the internet was largely narrated around a series of major 
technological developments, moving from the creation of Arpanet, to the Trans Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol, and finally to CERN’s public release of the “worldwide web” in the 
early 1990s. This history focused on the role of the United States while emphasizing the research 
and funding efforts of military and higher education systems to account for the internet’s 
creation. But contemporary efforts to explore alternative histories of the internet and religious 
practices online have the capacity to reshape the broader conversation about religion and 
technology.39 
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Martin Elton and John Carey have argued that the failure of traditional histories of the 
internet to account for early online end-user services has caused scholars to both overemphasize 
the contributions of the United States and to obfuscate the early intersections between 
commercial and government entities that were always at work behind the development and use 
of the infrastructure.  In their “Prehistory of the Internet,” Elton and Cary argue that pre-web 
online end-user services significantly fostered the Internet’s growth by giving an early platform 
to non-specialist users. Although the internet was still the nearly exclusive domain of research 
scientists and engineers, these end-user services made space for now-crucial commercial services 
like banking, conferencing, forums, and e-mail to take hold. Elton and Cary argue that 
recognizing these hidden actors helps modify the classic formula that describes the development 
of the internet as a narrative of hardware advances, allowing us in turn to identify how 
negotiations among a complex network of commercial, government, and research entities 
contributed to the online world we have inherited. Making these negotiations clearer, they argue, 
helps anchor contemporary discussions of important issues such as government surveillance, 
privacy, and anonymity online into a longer historical context that is implicated with the 
infrastructure of the internet itself.40 
This dissertation also seeks to contribute to another set of alternative histories that 
contextualize the imagination of what personal computers do (and what they are) against the 
backdrop of the American counterculture of the late twentieth century. Exploring the relations 
between secular and spiritual or religious discourses that emerged out of the American 
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counterculture since the 1960s, these histories demonstrate how a number of new religious 
movements reflect important developments in hacker culture.   
For example, Dorien Zandbergen’s essay “Silicon Valley New Age” offers an alternative 
history of the counterculture as it developed in the San Francisco Bay area. Highlighting the 
thought of Timothy Leary, Ken Kesey, Aldous Huxley, and Stewart Brand, Zandbergen 
reimagines the computer as an inherently countercultural symbol rather than a Cold War weapon. 
An early “hacker ethic” emerged among California engineers whose lives were shaped both by 
major military demands and by the counterculture. These engineers designed computer 
technology as a pathway for “authentic” personal empowerment:. As Zandbergen states it, 
“‘Hack your own reality’ [was] a technophile transformation of the New Age idea that we create 
our own reality.”41  
Zandbergen offers this alternative history as a corrective to narratives in religion and 
media scholarship that argue that digital technologies are marked by intrinsic spiritual 
characteristics that demonstrate a “natural affinity” with certain forms of spirituality (such as 
neopaganism). Instead, Zandbergen argues, religious imaginaries and technological development 
often form in one another’s images. She adopts a genealogical approach to explore some of the 
specific mechanisms leading to this discourse of “natural affinities.” What is shared between 
neopagan forms of religiosity and digital technologies is not a natural affinity, Zandbergen 
concludes, but a “specific expression of a social cultural climate that has a longer history of 
celebrating spirituality through high tech, and in which science and technology have become 
natural forces of life”.42  
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Working parallel to this process of coevolution are discourses that simultaneously 
secularize the sacred and sacralize technology.  As Zandbergen states, “the sacred self is 
sacralized and imagined as a function of the computer.”43 The resulting discourse of 
“cyberspirituality” is characterized by the utopic expectation that digital technologies will 
eventually provide the means for humans to experience direct, total, and authentic spiritual 
communication. In this utopian dream, the Internet is often imagined as the final platform in 
which all knowledge will come to rest, transforming into the very “instantiation of the collective 
higher consciousness that [many pagan and New Age] spiritual seekers...envisioned.”44 
In a similar manner, Andrew Fergus Wilson and Alexandra Boutros seek to revise our 
understanding of the relationship between the growth of the internet and marginalized religions. 
Wilson explores how the apocalyptic visions of various online communities are disseminated, 
censored, and accessed to explore how communication technologies simultaneously empower 
and disempower alternative, new, and marginalized religious sensibilities. Wilson argues that the 
internet allows for the rapid proliferation of a “global cultic milieu” because its infrastructure 
provides for the relatively free and rapid transmission of knowledge—even when that knowledge 
is stigmatized.45 Alexandra Boutros makes a similar argument in “Virtual Vodou, Actual 
Practice,” where she claims that media technologies accomplish important work in fostering 
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religious pluralism simply by providing access to alternative or marginal religious perspectives 
through the internet’s open sharing structure.46 
This dissertation has been fundamentally informed by scholars working at the 
intersection of technology and new religious movements. By detailing the histories and contexts 
of the religious people I introduce in chapters one through three, it is my goal to add yet another 
“alternate history of the internet”—one that highlights the role of religious creativity in debates 
about the freedom and control of information online.  
 
Mythinformation 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to scholarly debates about the value and nature of 
information, especially as that literature intersects with the language of religion. Debates about 
religion and the internet are not the only discussions relevant to our understanding of how 
religion and technology are enmeshed in contemporary life. A parallel conversation that focused 
on the sacrality of information shows that the notions of religion, “data,” and “information” have 
intermixed over a much longer history. Johanna Sumiala argues that since the late nineteenth 
century Americans have increasingly lived in a “network society” in which everything is always 
in circulation.”47  The term “informationalism” (coined by Manuel Castells) calls our attention to 
the ways in which the global economy now largely depends on access to, and the ability to 
manipulate, information.48 But this leads to a basic question: what, exactly, is information? 
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Media historian Lisa Gitelman shows that some of the earliest colloquial uses of the term 
“information” in the seventeenth century referred to that which was given before analysis or 
hypothesis. But the act of identifying what “counts” as data is always an act of classification.49 
The very work of classification, therefore, conceals the truth that information, like religion, is 
always contingently produced by decisions rooted in political, cultural, and historical contexts. 
Allied with Gitelman’s argument that scholars should attend to the concrete ways in 
which data is produced, Geoffrey Bowker (Professor of Informatics) uses nineteenth century 
descriptions of bee colonies (which were thought to be led by kings because females of any 
species were seen as incapable of leadership) to highlight how cultural assumptions feed the 
interpretation and identification of data.50 Bowker argues that our contemporary tendency to read 
data everywhere and in everything generates an implicit ontology in which all differences are 
reducible to the same basic units of life: “data.” Because the consequence of such an ontology is 
that if something cannot be measured it does not exist, the political implications of this ontology 
of data cannot be overstated.  
English literature scholar Ellen Gruber Garvey explores the ideology of information at 
work among nineteenth century American abolitionists.  With their belief that information could 
be extracted and used to moralize, these abolitionists used press information about the slave trade 
to produce their own pamphlets highlighting the “simple facts” about the violence that such trade 
generated.51 
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Information is both a highly abstract concept and fundamentally material in nature. This 
dual nature of transcendence and imminence has led to several influential communications 
scholars finding resources in religious language to explain cultures articulated around 
information. Ken Hillis has followed this line of thinking by arguing that the very performance 
of an online search—the most performed activity online—works to sacralize information on a 
daily basis.52 The act of search has re-made us into searchers, and the ritual act of search 
sanctifies information into reality itself: if Google doesn’t find it, it either doesn’t exist or doesn’t 
matter. Hillis thus uses religion as a metaphor to understand how humans relate to information in 
the current information age. He describes the geeks as a priestly class and the unknown workings 
of technology as “magic,” and he explains our inability to question both the history of 
information and search by claiming that we do not question the sacred but only attend to it 
though ritual. Hillis’s argument here also echoes the classic argument of the leading cybernetics 
researcher Norbert Wiener in God and Golem, where Wiener argued that information would 
eventually come to stand in for the Christian God.53 Wiener’s objective was to put forward a new 
secular ethics.  
 Langdon Winner has also used religious terminology to describe what he calls 
“mythinformation,” the “religious belief” in the total transformative power of information over 
humanity. Calling mythinformation our new “prosperity gospel,” Winner argues that our 
dependence on computer technology demands the existence of such a powerful mythos because 
of the major social changes information technologies has caused. Because the global economy 
depends on the control and management of information, we require a mythos to justify the huge 
                                               
52 Ken Hillis, Michael Petit, and Kylie Jarrett, Google and the Culture of Search (New York: 
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53 Norbert Wiener, God and Golem, Inc.; A Comment on Certain Points Where Cybernetics 
Impinges on Religion (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1964). 
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sacrifices that attend the rise of new information technologies (the deskilling of labor, sustained 
and cyclical disruption of job loss to robotics, and the advancement of surveillance 
technologies).  
Winner wants us to focus as well on the ways in which mythinformation is inherently 
paradoxical, because of its complex set of assumptions: (1) people are bereft of knowledge, (2) 
information is knowledge, (3) knowledge is power, and (4) access to knowledge will lead 
instantaneously to increased democratic or social power. But, Winner argues, in this myth  
“information” actually refers only to electronic information. Geeks, hackers, and other cultures 
of code that emphasize this mythos do not advocate that libraries or universities can do the same 
thing.54 
Information, like religion, is a contested category. Because it is both rooted in material 
processes (data transfer, electricity, server farms) and highly abstract (it is everywhere, and yet 
often invisible and its logics difficult to discern), some influential communications theorists have 
found religious language to provide useful metaphors to describe contemporary cultures and their 
relations to information. This dissertation, however, departs from that trajectory. I take seriously 
the constructed and contested nature of information, but rather than use religious language to 
better understand information I analyze how contests over the value and nature of information 
reveal important legacies of religious thought in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.   
 
Thesis and Outline 
Information and religion are categories that are actively constructed and radically 
entangled. This dissertation investigates three sites in which debates about information access 
have been framed through debates about the value and nature of religious knowledge. Though 
                                               
54 Wiener, God and Golem. 
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there are important differences in how this debate is staged by each of the religious movements 
considered here, each gives valuable, tangible evidence of the impossibility of the ontological 
separation between information and religion, technology and religion, secularism and religion, 
and subject and object. What can the intersection of information technology and religious 
creativity in contemporary culture reveal about the nature of modernity? It reveals, as Bruno 
Latour has argued, that we have never been modern.55 
Chapter one will introduce an illuminating conflict among contemporary Scientologists.  
While the hacker collective Anonymous and the Church of Scientology waged a war across the 
internet, Anonymous also became an ally to former and independent Scientologists who were 
otherwise cut off from their key religious texts. Beginning in the 1990s, many independent 
Scientologists adopted the rhetoric of Open Source Software, particularly as they re-defined their 
own theological understanding of the nature of information and information access. The conflict 
and tensions among Scientology, Anonymous, and Open Source Scientology have had a number 
of important repercussions on issues of copyright, religion, and information flows online.  
This opening chapter provides much of the historical background that shapes my project 
by exploring competing definitions of the nature of information. I introduce the hacktivist 
collective Anonymous, which represents an important aspect of internet culture that promotes a 
distinctive and highly influential perspective on the freedom of information.  This chapter 
analyzes primary source materials from the Church of Scientology and Open Source 
Scientologists to demonstrate how Scientology continues to adopt scientific and technological 
advances. These competing beliefs about information—and the accompanying values of open 
access, modification, and distribution—fuel Scientology’s struggles online.  Finally, this chapter 
will also consider the concrete and practical effects at stake in these debates over the freedom of 
                                               
55 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
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information and the freedom of religion through an analysis of how copyright law is entangled in 
this conflict about information and religion. 
The second chapter moves forward to introduce the Missionary Church of Kopimism 
(MCK), a new religious movement that believes copyright is a cosmic evil and that information 
freedom is a religious right. I explore how the MCK is not an anomaly (it is not a joke nor “a 
clever hack”, as some media coverage has argued) but instead representative of the confluence of 
two distinct ideologies whose entanglement has been largely unrecognized: the hacker ethic and 
the Protestant Ethic.  
 As a new religious movement, Kopimism illuminates a broader ethics of information 
access that has been formed in the shadow of Western religious history. New religions like the 
MCK are worthy of study precisely because they allow us to identify broader concerns and 
anxieties that may otherwise remain obscure because these new religions tend to cluster around 
the experimental boundaries of a changing culture. Because of the MCK’s explicit claims to 
information freedom as a religious value, this chapter also explores an important new 
formulation of “religion” in an era of information technology. To date there has been very little 
scholarly analysis that brings together hackers, the freedom of information, and religion together 
as a significant cultural assemblage. In my analysis I make a double movement of connecting 
this case study to previously “recognized” religious traditions (Protestant Christianity), while at 
the same time asserting that this material also merits scholarly attention beyond the boundaries of 
those traditions.  
Chapter three explores how an important public figure in media circles, Jason Silva, 
carries these themes even farther in asserting that information itself is fundamentally sacred. This 
chapter focuses on Silva’s highly successful video project Shots of Awe. Silva is not a member or 
a leader of a new religious movement, but his video series espouses a vision of technology and 
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religion quite similar to that of the Open Source Scientologists and Kopimists. Silva’s success 
and public visibility are a testament to the market for his religiously-inflected, corporate-ready 
perspectives on the power of technology to enchant an (assumedly) disenchanted world. As his 
configuration of the nature of information veers toward gnosticism, he also demonstrates, more 
vividly than the other case studies considered here, what is at stake in an enchanted, but 
disembodied, worldview.  
In chapter one and two I argue, in part, that the information freedom commitments of 
Anonymous, Open Source Scientologists, and the Kopimists extend out beyond these groups.  
Silva exemplifies these tendencies. First, he inherits, and build upon, the same countercultural 
understandings of information that we can see at work in the ideologies of Anonymous, Open 
Source Scientology, and Kopimism. Second, Silva’s explicit reliance on a form of gnosticism 
helps to demonstrate the trajectory of this discourse—in particular, Silva demonstrates how some 
ways of thinking about the nature and potency of information serve to divide the body from the 
mind (reconceived here as the realm of information and information flows). As I detail how Silva 
uses (and builds upon) the ideas of Timothy Leary and Erik Davis, I will also use Philip J. Lee’s 
Against the Protestant Gnostics to explore how Silva’s explicit use of the category of gnosticism 
further demonstrates the legacy of particular Protestant religious notions on discourses of 
information freedom.  
The final chapter pulls these case studies together to consider how the language of 
secularization and re-enchantment has been at work in each of them. I analyze this language by 
highlighting some of the key scholarly literature exploring the intertwined roles of magic, 
secularization, enchantment, and technology. I also return to my argument that new religions 
provide important insight into broader cultural change, launching my discussion from a Red Hat 
corporate event and the writings of Wired magazine co-founder Kevin Kelly. I end with an 
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analysis of the writings of Bruno Latour and Jason Josephson-Storm, adding my case studies to 
the conversation about modernity, science, and religion that they have been participating in.  
Seven years ago I left Boulder wondering about a diffuse culture of information freedom. 
My training there prepared me well for UNC, but the research for this dissertation has led me 
down avenues I couldn’t have imagined and to questions that I didn’t know how to ask. How do 
technologies structure our social worlds? How do technologies inherit cultural assumptions, 
weaving those legacies into the communities that surround them? How do new religions actively 
re-imagine both technologies and the very category of religion itself? What can the intersection 
of information technology and religious creativity in contemporary culture reveal about the 
nature of modernity? These are the questions that have driven this project. Over the next five 
chapters I hope to do justice to the scholars, mentors, and conversation partners who have helped 





Open Source Scientology 
 
 
This is useful knowledge. With it the blind again 
see, the lame walk, the ill recover, the insane become  
sane and the sane become saner. By its use the thousand  
abilities Man has sought to recover become his once more. 
  – Scientology: A History of Man (1952) 
 
 
Knowledge is Free 




“Message to Scientology” 
 
 In January 2008, the Church of Scientology (CoS) filed a Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) violation against YouTube.56 The claim included a request for the removal of 
leaked material internal to the Church, an interview with popular actor Tom Cruise. The request 
went viral. This was not the first DMCA request the Church had issued—they had made many 
similar requests and employed various other tactics to remove secret, internal documents from 
                                               
56 Thanks to Brill Press for permission to reproduce my article “LRH4ALL: The Negotiation of 
Information in the Church of Scientology and the Open Source Scientology Movement,” in 
Handbook of Scientology, ed. James R. Lewis (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 341-359, which has been 
modified in this chapter.  
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unsanctioned release on the internet since the mid-1990s.57 What made this claim special, then, 
was not the content, nor the tactic, but rather the response.  
 Within two weeks, by mid-January, an anonymous user in 4chan (an infamous 
anonymous messaging forum that has since become well-known for its status as an organizing 
board for internet trolling activity) posted an initial rallying cry: “I think it's time for /b/ to do 
something big. People need to understand not to f*k with /b/, and talk about nothing for ten 
minutes, and expect people to give their money to an organization that makes absolutely no 
f*king sense...It's time to use our resources to do something we believe is right. It's time, /b/.”58 
One week later a new video was posted to YouTube, this time appearing under a close clone of 
the Church’s own name (“Church0fScientology”). This video, titled “Message to Scientology,” 
featured a digitized male voice that began to speak in a slow, methodological clip. “Hello, 
leaders of Scientology,” the automated voice began. “We are Anonymous.”59 The voice, 
accompanied only by fast-passing storm clouds and the sounds of a high-pitched wind tunnel, 
continues: 
Over the years, we have been watching you. Your campaigns of misinformation; 
your suppression of dissent; your litigious nature, all of these things have caught 
our eye. With the leakage of your latest propaganda video into mainstream 
circulation, the extent of your malign influence over those who have come to trust 
you as leaders has been made clear to us. Anonymous has therefore decided that 
your organization should be destroyed. For the good of your followers; for the 
good of mankind; and for our own enjoyment, we shall proceed to expel you from 
the Internet and systematically dismantle the Church of Scientology in its present 
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The video ends with a simple declaration: “Knowledge is free.”61 
This was a significant moment in the history of the internet, in part because “Message to 
Scientology” (which in 2018 has had close to 5.5 million views on just the originally posted 
video alone) did two things. First, it marked the beginnings of the first significant collective, 
global, organized actions of the hacker-activist (“hacktivist”) organization Anonymous, which 
has since become perhaps the most famous hacker collective. Second, the video organized these 
efforts around policing the internet—and the freedom to share, access, and distribute information 
throughout the internet—from perceived abuse by a religious organization with an alternative 
understanding of what information is and does.  
Hugh Urban has argued that Anonymous “presents itself as the inverse image of 
Scientology”—that its decentralized, hydra-headed, and fluid coalition of loosely linked and 
sometimes fleeting alliances between individual hackers and geeks has formed directly in 
opposition to Scientology’s hierarchical, centralized, bureaucratic, and highly controlled 
organization.62 Anonymous’s efforts, which I will explore below, resulted in a significant global 
campaign against the Church that continues (in a more fractured form) today. Indeed, in an early 
bid to divert supporters away from Anonymous, the Church attempted to fake several YouTube 
videos that used the same aesthetic type but highlighted the ills of other major religions (either to 
divert Anonymous’s ire toward these better-established religions (particularly the Mormon or 
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Catholic Church) or to discredit Anonymous as more generally anti-religious.63 These efforts did 
not succeed.  
This chapter will serve to establish much of the historical background that informs all of 
my case studies in this dissertation.  In it, I will trace early and competing definitions of 
information as well as introduce the hacktivist collective Anonymous.  Anonymous exemplifies 
a significant movement within internet culture that seeks to protect the freedom of information 
from competing interpretations of what information is and should be.  In addition, in this chapter 
I will analyze primary source materials from both the CoS and a group known as Open Source 
Scientologists to demonstrate how Scientology continues to mimic and adopt scientific and 
technological advances.  I will explore how competing beliefs about information—and the values 
of open access, modification, and distribution—fuel Scientology’s struggles online.  Finally, I 
briefly detail how current articulations of copyright law pose a unique challenge for esoteric 
religious knowledge online.  
 
Scientology: Money, Information, and Spiritual Advancement  
The Church of Scientology is an esoteric movement that fiercely protects secret religious 
materials. The Church argues that secrecy is essential to their religious freedom, comparing it to 
the belief in Resurrection for Protestant Christians.64 It makes this argument upon the basis that 
secrecy is necessary for Scientologists to be able to travel upon the “Bridge to Total Freedom.” 
                                               
63 Anonymous, “Anonymous Message Regarding Fake Videos,” March 7, 2008, video, 1:25, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d06oINVcqYc&lc=z13rizpjbwu3ilc0v23jj10zut2phzlsi.  
64 “Questions and Answers: Religious freedom, copyright law, and trade secret protection on the 
Internet,” Church of Scientology International, accessed October 6, 2018, 
http://theta.com/copyright/qa.htm#four.  
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The Bridge is the central religious practice of Scientology. It is a graded spiritual journey in 
which the Scientologist advances though auditing sessions. In an auditing session, Scientologists 
are questioned by Church leadership on a variety of questions meant to identify “engrams,” or 
troubling memory traces that cause spiritual and intellectual disfunction.65  
Auditing is based upon Hubbard’s theory of Dianetics—a “new science” (as detailed in 
his book series Dianetics) that he hoped would completely replace psychotherapy.66 In the 
system of Dianetics, the human mind is composed of an analytical mind and a reactive mind 
which are in tension with one another. The analytical mind functions as a “flawless computer” 
(as discussed below), but it is prevented from working appropriately by the reactive mind, which 
houses hundreds or thousands of hidden “engrams.”67 Through auditing, engrams are 
methodologically identified and removed by the “auditor” (the Church leader), allowing the 
Scientologist receiving the auditing to move forward upon the Bridge, attaining various stages of 
spiritual enlightenment. Movement through the graded levels of the Bridge eventually lead the 
Scientologist to the Eighth Dynamic (thereby achieving a version of godhood and reaching the 
apex of spiritual advancement—sometimes loosely compared to Buddhist nirvanas).68 
Initiation to each new level of the Bridge occurs through auditing, but each auditing class 
has its own associated financial cost. For all Scientologists, the goal of auditing is to reach the 
state of “Clear,” in which all engrams have been identified and removed. For the select few who 
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reach Clear in this lifetime, the remaining (and most advanced) levels of the Bridge are called the 
Operating Thetan (or “OT”) levels. Achieving the various stages of OT signal that the 
Scientologist in question has advanced and supernatural powers, realizing their “own immortality 
as a spiritual being.”69 Attaining Clear is a process that can take several years per level and cost 
(accumulatively) several hundreds of thousands of dollars, and the OT levels have associated 
higher costs per session.  
Officially, the Church of Scientology maintains that auditing sessions do not have set 
financial costs.70 Because of the relatively short history of their religion (founded in 1950), the 
Church stresses that donations for auditing and spiritual training are the primary ways by which 
they are able to function and grow, and that “training donations” are similar to tithing systems 
within Christian traditions.71 The Church argues that financial donations are the primary method 
of funding “because it is the most equitable,” and that all funding goes back into the community, 
per the requirements of a non-profit organization.72 Each new level of the Bridge to Total 
Freedom gives Scientologists access to esoteric religious materials—information that is crucial 
for their spiritual advancement. By securing essential teachings behind a paywall connected to 
initiation levels, those who cannot afford to pay for auditing classes are left to donate time and 
labor, a practice that has resulted in several accusations from ex-members that the Church 
participates in human slavery and trafficking.73  
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 The Church, in return, argues that the financial donations for esoteric materials is for the 
spiritual protection of all humankind. The Church likens the level of importance of this 
hierarchical practice to the fundamental position of the belief in the Resurrection to Protestants 
and the pro-life beliefs of Catholics, believing premature exposure to secret materials (exposure 
that occurs before the proper level of training is reached) presents a major destructive force on 
that Scientologists spiritual development, further pushing away Scientology’s ultimate goal of 
spiritual enlightenment for all peoples on the planet.  
In order to protect these materials, the Church has aggressively used legal protections, 
copyrighting sensitive religious material and suing independent Scientologists and other online 
users who attempt to distribute these materials online. The Church imagines its use of legal 
protections to secure secrecy as a major mark of the success of religious freedoms in the U.S., 
stating that “trade secret and copyright laws are the secular vehicle to protect the core religious 
precepts of the Church” and that “when these trade secret rights and copyrights are violated, so 
are the First Amendment rights of all Scientologists.”74 Publicly, the Church is adamant that 
access to secret materials is not based upon financial donation but rather by invitation only. 
However, the qualifications needed to be invited is left mostly unknown to the general public, as 
the Church only goes so far as to explain: “To gain access to these materials, more is expected of 
                                                                                                                                                       
73 For representative examples, see: Elspeth Reeve, “Scientology: Slave Labor, Beatings, and an 
FBI Investigation,” The Atlantic, February 7, 2011, 
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a Scientologist than spiritual advancement. Access is not automatic, nor is it dependent solely 
upon donations. It is by invitation only.”75 
These are the arguments that the Church used to protect their esoteric materials online, 
and this was the context in which Anonymous declared war upon the Church.  
 
Anonymous vs. Scientology  
Four days after the release of “Message to Scientology,” Anonymous disseminated a 
second video on YouTube, this time aimed at the mainstream news media. Titled “Response to 
the Media,” this new video featured the same mechanical voice, which now argued that 
Scientology had successfully manipulated an otherwise legitimate legal system and that 
mainstream news media had succumbed to the politics of religious pluralism in its coverage of  
Scientology as a legitimate religion.76 The video argued that  it was now Anonymous’s duty to 
hold Scientology in contempt: 
Dear News Organizations. We have been watching your reporting of Anonymous’s 
conflict with The Church of Scientology. As you said, the so-called Church of 
Scientology, have actively misused copyright, and trademark law, in pursuit of its own 
agenda. They attempt, not only to subvert free speech, but to recklessly pervert justice to 
silence those who speak out against them…Their activities make them an affront to 
freedom. Remember, all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do 
nothing...This is not religious persecution, but the suppression of a powerful, criminal 
fascist regime. It is left to Anonymous.77  
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Why did Anonymous take this stance? Why establish their role as the primary policers of 
Scientology online? It is not just that they disliked the organization, nor that they believed media 
and legal authorities had failed.  Instead, the answer lies in how central the issue of information 
access is to both Scientology and Anonymous’s worldviews; they are diametrically opposed to 
one another over the thing each values the most, the freedom of information.  
“Response to the Media” portrays the internet as a the ultimate enlightenment tool—
“This information [about the Church’s crimes] is everywhere,” the video states, “it is your duty 
to expose it…Google is your friend.”78 The resulting “Project Chanology” (the name given to 
Anonymous’ organizing efforts against Scientology) marked the largest global collective action 
against Scientology that the organization has ever experienced. Within two weeks of the posting 
of “Message to Scientology” and “Response to the Media” on YouTube—on February 2, 2008—
150 people gathered to protest Scientology in Orlando, Florida, with several additional protests 
occurring in parallel across the United States. Eight days later, on February 10, approximately 
7,000 protesters gathered in a coordinated 100 cities worldwide. Images of Anonymous protest 
signs went viral. “Religion is free,” one sign read, “$cientology is neither.” 
In order both to maintain their identity as Anonymous offline and to prevent personal 
retaliation from the Church against protestors (Scientology was, at the time, especially known for 
their surveillance of critics), Anonymous protestors donned Guy Fawkes masks in the streets. 
The masks hid their identities, but also helped symbolically organize the movement around the 
freedom of information. The mask was very purposely borrowed from the popular movie V for 
Vendetta in an effort to evoke the symbolism of the movie’s anti-hero as the unofficial mascot of 
the protests (interestingly enough, Time Warner owns the rights to the image and gets a portion 
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of the profits from each mask sale).79 A ten-issue comic book and 2005 film adaptation, V for 
Vendetta is the story of an anonymous revolutionary, “V,” who single-handedly (and violently) 
overthrows a totalitarian government that has effectively controlled and censored its opposition. 
V is the ultimate anti-hero; working alone he saves individuals from corrupted government 
officials through his knowledge of guerrilla fighting tactics, computer hacking and technology 
skills, and genius-level recall of literary, historical, and philosophical materials. V works above 
all else to release information from authoritarian control (understood broadly as censorship) and 
to convince “the people” to “think for themselves,” making decisions according to their own free 
access to information.80  
By adopting this iconic mask as the face of their organization, Anonymous was able to 
harness the charisma (and audience) of the original series, communicating most of the broad 
strokes of their own philosophical and methodological perspective through the use of a singular 
image. Anonymous in name and face, the Guy Fawkes mask served as a potent symbol for the 
battle against censorship and the empowerment of the people through anarchy and the complete 
freedom of information. 
The website “Operation Clambake” (xenu.net) serves as a major web hub for Project 
Chanology. Established in 1996 as a Norway-based non-profit, the site devotes a great deal of 
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80 The Wachowski Brothers, V for Vendetta, DVD, directed by James McTeigue, Warner Bros. 
Picture Limited, 2005. 
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time and web space advocating the right of all peoples to practice their own religions, including 
Scientology. The conflict over Scientology thus does not concern Scientology’s beliefs but the 
Church’s practices of control—control of information, control of finances, and control of its 
members. The website’s name (“Operation Clambake”) further echoes three simultaneous 
images or notions, all of which are explained on the website in further detail: (1) a reference to 
one of the claim of L. Ron Hubbard (the founder of Scientology) that humankind evolved from 
clams; (2) “clam” as a slang term for money, as the clam “reference [is] in this context the high 
cost for Scientology”; and (3) a humorous reference to a traditional clambake in which clams are 
steamed in an outdoor party-like setting.81 
In a notable twist, Operation Clambake—again, one of the central hubs for Project 
Chanology—does not entirely dismiss Hubbard as an insincere criminal. The site instead tells the 
story of a simple charlatan who, through an over-active imagination and the desire to be popular, 
succumbed to his own psychosis in believing his Church was real. Under the header 
“Brainwashing Bites Back,” the site details an account of the ways in which Hubbard fell victim 
to his own scheming, imagination, and delusions of grandeur so that “what started out as a mass 
confidence trick backed up with brainwashing became a monstrous and insane organization with 
fantastic, fanatical ideals.”82 In this way the Church of Scientology is portrayed as a monster 
religion, a delusional scheme that has forgotten its own con and convinced itself it is a religion, 
and it is because of these erroneous religious convictions that the Church is so difficult to stop. 
Scientology, Operation Clambake argues, hides behind “the protection afforded it by 
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copyright laws in a way that copyright laws were not designed to address,” and the hackers who 
break these laws in order to leak confidential and copyrighted Scientology documents are 
restoring justice in the face of a failed legal authority.83 The members of Anonymous claim to be 
motivated by public duty and “care for their fellow men,” and they claim to understand and 
willingly break copyright laws because they are “acting out of conscience and out of high human 
ideals.”84 By allowing lay Scientologists access to full transparency about Scientology 
teachings—by releasing information from the Church’s grasp—they seek to offer Scientologists 
the freedom to understand what it is they are buying. In this way Operation Clambake 
understands itself to work as a dismantling mechanism for the Church-run bait-and-switch con 
by revealing “the switch part of the bait-and-switch fraud…[and letting] people know in advance 
the trick that is going to be pulled on them about five years and $30,000 later.”85 In fact, ex 
Scientologists (apostates who no longer believe or in any way identify as Scientologists, but wish 
to access secret Church materials for their own interests) and independent Scientologists (those 
who have either been forcefully “disconnected”—the CoS term for excommunication—or have 
otherwise left the Church of Scientology but still identify as practicing Scientologists) confirm 
using Scientology materials that have been distributed online through Project Chanology’s 
efforts.86 A third set of dissenters, who I will introduce later in this chapter, are the Open Source 
Scientologists. These are a vocal subset of independent Scientologists who advocate for an “open 
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source” approach to Scientology, modeled off of the Open Source Software movement, which 
advocates for transparency and the freedom of access of information. Open Source Scientologists 
believe that “open sourcing” their religion will ensure that all those who identify as 
Scientologists can access the tech that is central to their religious beliefs and practices.87 
Other Project Chanology websites echo these sentiments but frame them in a more 
internal rhetoric familiar to only Anonymous members. Using an aesthetic strategy of the “lulz” 
(a slang term for laughing-out-loud), Anonymous often interprets their project of leaking 
Scientology documents as having an additional layer of meaning beyond destruction of a 
financial con—it is, quite simply, an effective and humorous way to troll.88 Through leaking 
Scientology documents, Anonymous understands itself to be “closely mirroring the Church's 
own ‘Fair Game’ policies which it uses to justify…trolling of anyone who crosses them 
including its own members.”89 
Although Project Chanology is still underway (making it the longest running Anonymous 
operation in history), Anonymous seems to believe that they are winning the war. In a long list of 
“CoS Fails” and “Anon Wins” Anonymous quantifies their victory in a number of ways, 
including increased attention and support from legal and media authorities. Anonymous lists 
positive coverage of Project Chanology in a number of high-profile magazines, newspapers, and 
news agencies (including “ZOMG! positive reports from FAUX NEWS of all people”) and 
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celebrates their success at re-focusing and encouraging media authorities to “print the truth more 
and more often.”90 
The greatest indicator of success for Anonymous by far is the widespread availability of 
copyrighted and secret Scientology documents across the internet. Internally, Anonymous 
defends their breaking of copyright law by reference to the “Hacker’s Manifesto.”91 Also called 
“the Conscience of a Hacker,” “The Manifesto” is a short essay published in the mid-1980s in 
the hacking journal Phrack that attempts to introduce the nonhacker to the hacker’s motivations 
and psychology. Written by “the Mentor” after an arrest, the essay is often considered to be one 
of the founding documents for the hacking subculture and serves as an ethical orientation for 
new hackers.92 “The Manifesto” details the lack of imagination and challenge in the everyday 
world and inverts the criminal act of hacking into a celebratory act of discovery and education. 
In particular, Anonymous members quote the following as the definitive defense for their 
criminal actions:  
Yes, I am a criminal. My crime is that of curiosity. My crime is that of judging 
people by what they say and think, not what they look like. My crime is that of 
outsmarting you, something that you will never forgive me for. I am a hacker, and 
this is my manifesto.93  
                                               
90 “Project Chanology,” Encyclopedia Dramatica. “ZOMG” is popular internet slang from the 
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http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=7&id=3 .  
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the movie.  
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The hacktivist activities of Anonymous against the CoS have been met with positive public 
attention and reciprocity. Operation Clambake was one of the first sites to publish secretive OT 
documents and was itself subject to a DMCA takedown notice. OT documents are high-level 
esoteric documents that correspond to graded levels of Scientology itself, available only to the 
initiates that have reached those levels.94 Although Google complied, they also chose to archive 
the DMCA request in their “Chilling Effects” hub, a portal that informs the public about the 
nature of material that has been removed due to legal threats. Google also posted an explanatory 
note in the locations where the OT materials were removed, further prompting readers to explore 
the Scientology requests compiled in the Chilling Effects hub. Eventually, Google restored all 
original links. Today, all of these materials are publicly available and rank highly in Google 
search algorithms (i.e. they are often on the first page of Google results for their related search 
inquiries.  
 Today many former Scientologists report that when they had been members of the 
Church they had been instructed by leadership to avoid the internet at all costs, a sure indicator 
that Anonymous has gone a long way to accomplish the goals set forth in Project Chanology. 
Scientology’s continued struggle to protect its esoteric teachings in a world filled with 
information technology and a popular, albeit often implicit, ethics of information access and 
distribution is well documented.95 The Church continues to expound an understanding of 
information that describes information as both sacred and under threat. That is, the CoS believes 
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that sacred information, in the form of discrete data, must be carefully defended from both 
entropy and misuse (a theology that I examine below). Since the late 2000s, however, a new, 
schismatic movement of former members of CoS has embraced a competing understanding of 
the nature of information and how it is best managed. This group identifies itself as Open Source 
Scientology and challenges the Church’s definition of information. Open Source Scientologists 
argue that sacred data should not be secret and need not be protected from change and misuse. 
Instead, they believe information is something that is living and dynamic and that benefits from 
open access, modification, and distribution.  
 By analyzing Open Source Scientology, we can see the ways in which Scientology 
continues to mimic and adopt scientific and technological advances and also consider an 
important emerging discourse in which the authority and definition of sacred texts is changing. 
In distinction to the CoS’s Cold-War-era understanding of information, Open Source Scientology 
is influenced by a counter-cultural conceptualization of information that understands the flows of 
data to be a process or organism with transformative power. While the counter-cultural 
dimensions of this understanding of information are further explored in chapter three, this 
chapter will demonstrate that these competing beliefs about information—and the accompanying 
values of open access, modification, and distribution—fuel Scientology’s struggles online. It is 
this competing understanding of what information is and how humans should relate to 
information that has given rise to new forms of practice and belief for the Scientologists who 
have left the Church but still practice their religion outside of the Church’s official reach. They 
have taken up this competing understanding of information, a notion central to Scientology 
theology, as they work online to restructure and reform their tradition. 
 Definitions of information have been a core issue of concern for Scientology since the 
CoS’s establishment in the early 1950s. The CoS emerged in the cultural environment of the 
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Cold War and reflected the contemporary American government’s concerns with surveillance, 
secrecy, and defense (detailed below). This milieu made information control a seemingly natural 
and central activity of Church efforts.96 L. Ron Hubbard echoed contemporary cultural 
understandings of information and information machines in his writings for the Church, often 
borrowing terms from computer science to describe the human mind and its supernatural 
potentials.  
 Modeling their reforming aesthetics on the open source software giant Linux, Open 
Source Scientologists retain the Scientologist belief in the transformative power of information 
while reflecting the alternative values of computer scientists and programmers who participate in 
open source and copyleft activities (copyleft indicating the moral and ethical opposition to 
copyright policies, at least in their current formulation). Open source communities believe that 
the informational “source code” of any given project should be left available for all to readily 
access and modify as they see fit. Rather than believing that information must be rigidly 
controlled, Open Source Scientologists believe that information is a dynamic sacred force and 
should therefore be accessible and open to all. Borrowing especially from open source software 
aesthetics, these independent Scientologists believe that Scientology’s “technology” should be 
completely accessible for use, modification, and distribution without the oversight of the Church 
of Scientology.  
 Although their numbers are relatively small, Open Source Scientologists’ arguments for 
the free and open access, use, modification, and distribution of information echo those of cyber 
activists worldwide. Scientology’s impact on the formation of current internet architecture 
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(detailed below) and its status as one of the most controversial NRMs in contemporary America 
means that Scientology–in both its CoS and Open Source varieties–provides an important 
window onto greater shifting cultural understandings of information, authority, textual control, 
and ownership. 
 Open Source Scientologists believe that adopting the practices and aesthetics of open 
source computer programming will usher in a spiritual reformation of Scientology technology 
and spiritual practices in much the same way that the Protestant Reformation changed 
Christianity. For the members of these communities, the medium of the internet has become a 
crucial revolutionary force. Beyond the obvious benefits of providing access to esoteric spiritual 
resources and community-making, the internet serves them as a living illustration of the power of 
free access to information to act as a check against corruption and spiritual deception. 
 Technology has served Scientology as a set of resources, negotiated within a larger 
network of material practice, that makes possible specific forms of culture and lived religion. 
Accordingly, the relations among technology, politics, and culture move in multiple directions. 
Technological innovations are politics put into material practice, which, in turn, have the 
capacity to radically alter cultural and social patterns as they encode and privilege certain forms 
of power and power relations.97 Technologies are thus both the result of politics and the 
foreclosure of an imagination of the future; they are a central component of the “conditions of 
social and moral life” organizing our lives.98 The practices and beliefs of Open Source 
Scientologists have found metaphorical and structuring resources in open source software, the 
internet, and emerging new formation technologies. As Erik Davis has argued, new technology 
                                               
97 Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High 
Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 3-19, 22. 
98 Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 6. 
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has the potential to create new gods.99 For Open Source Scientology communities, these 
technologies are imbricated in a radical restructuring of the relationship between Scientologists 
and information itself, a relationship that has been at the very center of Scientology doctrine and 
practices since the movement’s inception in the early 1950s. 
 
The Church of Scientology and Information Control 
Scientology has long struggled with the issue of whether and how to control distribution 
of information about the religion’s practices and techniques. In February 1965 L. Ron Hubbard 
released an internal policy letter within the CoS entitled “Keeping Scientology Working” 
(KSW). The letter condemned “non-standard” Scientology beliefs and practices, blaming these 
practices for divisions within Scientology. The CoS quickly adopted KSW and formulated 
around it a series of policies condemning “non-standard” Scientology beliefs and practices. KSW 
would be re-printed at least two times over the coming decades when internal tensions rose in the 
Church. By its third reissue in 1980, Hubbard used the policy letter to justify efforts to purge 
Scientology of practices and beliefs unauthorized by Church executives, adding that: 
Neglect of this [Policy Letter] has caused great hardship on staff, has cost 
countless millions and made it necessary in 1970 to engage in an all-out, 
international effort to restore basic Scientology over the world. Within 5 years 
after the issue of this [policy letter], with me off the lines, violation has almost 
destroyed orgs…Therefore, actions which neglect or violate this policy letter are 
HIGH CRIMES.100  
 
At the heart of KSW is a mandate that Scientology technology must always be practiced 
according to official CoS guidelines. Also known by Scientologists simply as “the tech,” 
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“Scientology technology” refers to the practices of auditing and spiritual advancement outlined 
by L. Ron Hubbard throughout Scientology scriptures. The CoS International, the self-defined 
“mother Church” of the CoS, defines the tech broadly as “the methods of application of the 
principles” of Scientology.101 The mandate in KSW to guard against non-standard tech, which 
was couched in the language of the correct relationship of Scientologists to the science and 
technology of Hubbard’s “discoveries,” signaled the re-assertion of official Church control over 
the proliferation of adaptations and interpretations of Scientology practice that had emerged from 
the lived practices of Scientology since the early 1950s.102  
Implicit in KSW was Hubbard’s struggle with a growing movement of independent 
Scientologists, individuals who had become convinced of the efficacy of Scientology practices 
but disillusioned with the hierarchy and insistence on control. Calling these practices and 
individuals “aberrant” and “suppressive,” Hubbard insisted up to his death in 1986 on the need to 
protect Scientology from “improper” use.103 
Hubbard feared that the spread of non-standardized tech would render Scientology 
unworkable, contaminating and sabotaging the spiritual health of the entire universe by burying 
Hubbard’s “true” and “original” discoveries under a campaign of misinformation. Hubbard’s 
authority as the sole arbiter and manager of Scientology’s doctrines, texts, and practices was 
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central to the KSW policy. The letter exemplifies the struggles between Church authority and 
lived religion more broadly in early Scientology. Hoping to sway disgruntled members to his 
side, Hubbard worked in KSW to balance his own explanations of the universal scientific 
validity of his discovery of Scientology with assertions of his personal authority over the ways in 
which that science could be duplicated. 
 To alter CoS beliefs or practices in any way, Hubbard argued, was to participate in a 
practice known in Scientology circles as “squirreling.” Squirreling, defined as “going off into 
weird practices or altering Scientology,” was, for Hubbard, an act of disinformation that 
obfuscated the true tech under “bad data.”104 It was not only a disciplinary problem, but also 
mirrored what Hubbard saw as an existential problem. Corrupted or bad data was, according to 
Scientology, the single greatest spiritual and psychological threat to humans. Hubbard’s auditing 
methods focused on correcting bad data that has been erroneously recorded in the brain to restore 
the mind to a state of “Clear.”105  
Since 1965, squirreling has been categorized as an egregious crime against the Church, 
punishable by excommunication and shunning. The CoS’s broad definition of squirreling has 
caused many members to leave voluntarily, becoming independent Scientologists who position 
themselves as disillusioned with hierarchy and what they see as mismanagement of the tech since 
Hubbard’s death.106 The issue of non-standard tech, however, is more complicated than 
suggested by this familiar story of a religious movement’s attempt to assert control over 
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contested scriptural interpretations and practices of dissent. Instead, KSW represents an 
important moment in what might be called the information wars of Scientology, in which 
disagreements over the meaning of information itself marked serious fault lines within the 
movement.  
 
Scientology and the Cold War: Computer Mind, Thetan Soul 
The Church of Scientology’s approach to information about its teachings developed in 
the context of the Cold War. Building on L. Ron Hubbard’s approach to heterodox movements 
within Scientology, the CoS adopted a theory of information that reflected contemporaneous 
beliefs (reflected in popular texts like Norbert Weiner’s 1950 The Human Use of Human Beings, 
discussed below) that information unmoored from centralized control would suffer entropy, 
drifting from an original purity to become dangerous misinformation. 
 The tech, in practice, is largely about the control and correct behaviors of Scientologists 
in their relationship to information. The CoS has long held that its core teachings should be 
protected under a veil of secrecy precisely because premature exposure to the content of those 
teachings would cause irreparable spiritual harm to the uninitiated.107 Outside of the Church, 
independent Scientologists have spent much of their efforts seeking out and disseminating these 
same teachings, in the process re-thinking the potential of information alone to cause 
transcendent and immediate effects on their spiritual lives. In the five decades since KSW was 
first issued, a small but growing number of these independent Scientologists have adopted 
internet and computer technologies in their efforts to decentralize and reform Scientology. Their 
understanding of what information is and how information works has changed along the way, in 
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step with contemporary shifts in computer science and largely in response to the rise of internet 
technologies.  
Since his first presentation of Dianetics to the American public in 1950, Hubbard tied his 
vision of the Scientology technology to a concern with the relationship between humans and 
information. Borrowing on the cultural capital afforded the sciences in America during the Cold 
War, Hubbard celebrated the computer as the ultimate information machine and used computer 
programming language to describe the evolutionary movements of the thetan as it worked its 
way through the Bridge to Total Freedom.108 Like many of his contemporaries, Hubbard 
celebrated the liberatory potential of an imagined perfect computer, capable of fantastically 
complex problem-solving and the eventual instantiation of a social utopia. Hubbard co-opted 
computer programming rhetoric and aesthetics to describe the Scientology program, tapping into 
the cultural valence of the perfect computing machine by locating it centrally in his theology: 
“What would you want in a computing machine?” Hubbard asked in Dianetics: the Modern 
Science of Mental Health, “The analytical mind is not just a good computer, it is a perfect 
computer.”109  
 Hubbard described the human brain as the “perfect computer” or information machine. In 
his rendering of the mind, information (or “data”) is input into the brain through sense simulation 
and then processed to solve problems. Engrams, or negative or false recordings captured by what 
Hubbard identified as the “reactive mind,” were “bad data” that prevented the otherwise “perfect 
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computer” from producing the correct result.110 Although analogizing the human mind to the 
computer was a common metaphor at the time Hubbard was writing, he was adamant that he was 
speaking literally. The mind is a computer, Hubbard argued again and again, and it can, and 
should, be restored to its perfect state through the removal of engrams.111  
 Hubbard believed that the correct functioning of information processing separated 
humans from animals. When the mind is given bad data, Hubbard argued, it “short circuits,” 
causing humans to react rather than analyze and blurring the distinction between themselves and 
animals. Similarly, all errors in thought, Hubbard explained, were always simply the result of 
insufficient or erroneous data. This implied that all answers produced by the computer mind are 
always as right as they possibly can be given the data provided.112 By 1953, Hubbard had 
introduced Scientology as a spiritual science capable of removing engrams through processes 
called “auditing,” eventually resulting in the restoration of the computer mind to its original, 
perfect state of “clear.” Directly borrowed from computer sciences, Hubbard described clearing 
as a process akin to that of clearing a calculator: 
The analytical mind, when the reactive mind has been restimulated and exhausted 
by artificial means, instantly clears itself. This can be considered to make new 
circuits and computations available. The action does not change in any slightest 
degree the basic personality of the individual, but delivers to that personality a 
clear mind relieved of harmful emotional content and an organism which is no 
longer anxiously telegraphing information about false, but nevertheless real,  
pain.113 
 
 As Hugh Urban has argued, the CoS’s dominating concern for secrecy, surveillance, 
control, initiation, and universality stems from both the cultural norms of upper-middle class 
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white America of the 1950s and far older European esoteric and hermetic traditions.114 Emerging 
in the American west in 1952, the Scientology was born in a nation whose relationship to big 
science was still evolving in the wake of Cold War nuclear technology and the emerging 
critiques of the ecology movement. Scientology identifies with a utopian and unrestrained 
celebration of big science, going so far as to describe itself as a universal scientific method as 
well as the ultimate religion. It promised that humanity could reach its full potential with the 
proper “application” of “standardized religious technology.”115  
 Hubbard’s concern over the corrupting presence of bad data was common in the cultural 
climate of the Cold War. At the same time as Hubbard was issuing lectures about the dangers of 
negative data, mathematicians Norbert Wiener and Claude Shannon were working on the 
problem of entropy and the natural degradation of information in the developing field of 
cybernetics. Wiener and Shannon also believed in the transformative power of information, 
which they defined as the content of the feedback loop existing between humans and their world. 
In Wiener’s view, information cycled serially through stages of reception, use, adaptation, and 
output, serving as the main arbiter of our relationship to the world and directly influencing our 
quality of life, but always suffering loss through natural processes of degradation.116 
 Although concerns over entropy dominated the field of cybernetics for much of its first 
decade, by the end of the 1950s Wiener had begun to re-articulate the theory and definition of 
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information by focusing on process rather than storage.117 He increasingly described information 
as an organism that, because it was a process rather than a discrete entity, worked through 
growth and escape. Information, he claimed, naturally breaks national boundaries and efforts at 
control. Hence, the attempts of Cold War political agents to control information through secrecy 
and bureaucracy would not only ultimately fail but would also contort the proper development of 
information through dissemination adaption.118  
 Wiener’s understanding of information as an organic process reflected larger cultural 
transformation in the American imagination of the nature of information. By the late 1960s, 
science was the target of multipronged attack arising from an increasing public awareness of 
environmental destruction, the ethical transgressions of scientists (in, for example, the “medical 
experiments” of Nazi scientists), and the specter of the atomic bomb. Bureaucratic, authoritative, 
and hierarchical ways of knowing were challenged by countercultural experiments attempting to 
change how the world was known. The American counterculture often articulated these 
experiments through a rhetoric of disease and cure, claiming that American society was radically 
sick and required treatment at its very core.119 Information and its control had been central to the 
Cold War ethos, but the very same computer programmers and engineers who had been 
employed by the military to keep information under control began to articulate new values 
concerning the nature and potential of information. Information, they claimed, was something 
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powerful, something transformative—a mobile process that benefited from the values and 
practices of open access, modification, and distribution. 
 
Open Source Scientology: Countercultural Visions of Information  
 An increasing amount of scholarly attention has been paid in recent years to the ways in 
which computer technologies and the American counterculture became entwined in the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s.120 The San Francisco Bay area became an important site in this development 
both because the most influential computer engineers and programmers involved in early 
computer culture lived in the area and because it was an important pilgrimage site for activists, 
hippies, poets, and dropouts. Through these decades, the San Francisco area fostered an 
environment that melded spiritual and technological pursuits towards many of the common goals 
of the counterculture: the search for a utopian, equal society free from the shackles and maladies 
that were understood to be plaguing mainstream America. 
 Sociologist Robert Wuthnow identifies the American counterculture, in part, as a 
movement deeply marked by the departure from “home dwelling” religions of the 1940s and 
1950s to the “seeker spirituality” of the 1960s and 1970s.121 Increasingly influenced by the co-
optation of Eastern traditions and a disillusionment with bureaucracy, hierarchy, and “the 
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system,” “seeker spirituality” emphasized the decentralized journey of an individual seeking 
metaphysical truths that conformed with one's own internal sense of “authenticity.” Seekers 
placed an emphasis on an anti-authoritarian journey that was also an individualized expression of 
one’s inner self. Seekers informed one another on their journeys, creating and experimenting 
with radical new ways of organizing social life. Communal living, new religious movements, 
sexual and gender experimentation, and anti-capitalist environmentalism all were highlighted by 
these seeker spiritualities.   
 The image of the seeker as anarchic individual relied in large part on its rejection of a 
Cold War vision of “systems.” McCarthy-era policies emphasized citizens’ reliance on rational, 
functional systems for nurturance and protection. The military industrial system was especially 
emphasized as a locus for security, stability, and power. As the Cold War ramped up in intensity, 
the economic systems underlying the United States became increasingly dependent on military 
industry, and the systems of instrumental rationality and the military became conflated. As Todd 
Gitlin writes, “Science was mobilized by industry, and capital was channeled by government as 
never before.”122 By 1960 such an emphasis was placed on science and the university that 
America became the first nation in the world to have more college students than farmers. 
Science, as Ira Chernus writes, “became our faith.”123  
The counterculture responded to that faith alternatively by abandoning it or intensifying 
it. Theodore Roszak identifies two dominant tendencies that shaped countercultural approaches 
to technology, one that believed it to be dystopian, and one that believed it to be utopian.124 The 
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former advocated the complete abandonment of science and its technological counterparts, often 
urging a return to the earth and an emphasis on the “natural,” the “organic,” and the “holistic.” 
Techno-revisionists, on the other hand, believed that technology could provide the path to 
utopian futures. Their vision of technology emphasized individual liberation through accessing 
networked, communal relations.125 They highlighted the personalizing effects and structures of 
technology, arguing that individuals could use technology to express and liberate themselves 
while also connecting to other humans in a more egalitarian way through networked 
communities.  
Later as the first digital spaces emerged on the worldwide web, many of the programmers 
and engineers involved in the counterculture adopted the techno-revisionist logic to envision 
virtual spaces as the first loci of truly egalitarian communication. Virtual technologies, they 
thought, would be the first tool humankind could use to overcome all of the social problems of 
meat spaces (the racialized, gendered, and classist readings of the bodies of Others that prevented 
egalitarian communication between peoples in the physical world).126 Digital technologies 
opened the portal to a cyberspace that everyone to entered on equal footing, allowing the 
discovery of an imagined pure and authentic subjectivity. (This theme is explored at greater 
length in chapter three.)  
In 1968 Stewart Brand’s popular counterculture magazine, the Whole Earth Catalog, 
advocated for the liberating potential of technology to realize social utopia, pointing to the ways 
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in which information alone could liberate the seeker.127 Like Hubbard, Brand believed that the 
proper information, received at the right time, had total transformative power. But Brand also 
believed that Moore’s Law—the demonstrated pattern of technology to store greater and greater 
amounts of information at a rapidly cheaper cost—was demonstrative of the utopian nature of 
information itself and would eventually culminate in a world radicalized by the imminence of 
information.128 Today Brand is credited for the popular tech-activist slogan “information wants 
to be free,” and the Whole Earth Catalog has been described as advocating a “new Jeffersonian 
democracy based, not upon equal distribution of land, but upon equal access to information.”129  
 Brand succeeded in creating an alternative vision of computing that depicted information 
technologies not as weapons of the cold war, but as personal computers capable of empowering 
individuals to act as engineers of the counterculture. The use of the personal computer, now 
conceived as an amplifier of an individual's ideas, became in and of itself a countercultural act.  
The Whole Earth Catalog advocated for this “tool centric” worldview, arguing that technologies 
would allow for a fully democratic and decentralized evolution of society. The counterculture’s 
scorn for centralized authority,” Brand wrote, “provided the philosophical foundations of not 
only the leaderless Internet but also the entire personal-computer revolution.”130 
It is this countercultural conceptualization of information as a process or organism with 
total transformative power and its accompanying values of open access, modification, and 
distribution, that fueled the Church of Scientology’s struggle with its online opponents. And it is 
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this anarchical understanding of the nature of information and how humans should relate to 
information that has given rise to new forms of practice and belief among Open Source 
Scientologists. 
 Open Source Scientologists often conceptualize the internet in ways that echo Brand and 
other countercultural computer scientists. Demographically, they are most often ex-members of 
the CoS who maintain that the Scientology tech works even if the Church has become corrupted. 
Their continued belief in the efficacy of auditing methods, the importance of definition and 
clarity of word use, and the ability of the Scientology tech to advance their spiritual lives leads 
these ex-members to seek Scientology practices and resources outside of official Church control. 
 Despite the CoS’s efforts to use intellectual property laws to guard its esoteric scriptures, 
independent Scientologists have had great success in accessing an astonishing amount of secret 
religious material online. Since the hacktivist Project Chanology began in 2008, resources from 
within the CoS have been distributed, mirrored, and scattered across the internet, producing a 
massive collection of information. Popular websites like Xenu.net, TruthAbout-Scientology.com, 
and whyweprotest.net are central stops in net rings that provide the public with instantaneous 
access to a broad range of material, including copies of confidential teachings such as the 
controversial OT materials, internal memos, government affidavits, international news coverage, 
and personal staff files (including L. Ron Hubbard’s birth and death certificates). 
 Yet the turn to the internet can also be complicated for independent Scientologists. These 
sites are often run by people explicitly categorized by the CoS as “suppressive persons” (or sps) 
and represent a transgression not only against loyalties to the Church but also against the ideals 
of information control at the heart of official CoS practices. Ex-Scientologists routinely report 
that internet use is adamantly discouraged within the CoS, not only because of the possibility of 
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accessing advanced esoteric materials but also because of the net’s propensity towards “black pr” 
(negative information spread by suppressive persons during disinformation campaigns).131 
 Much of the independent Scientology activity online consists of advertisements for 
independent auditing services and training because these practitioners are working to build 
reputations, paying clientele, and new lineages of authority for control of the tech. Yet a vocal 
subset of independent Scientologists use these networks for another purpose. These are Open 
Source Scientologists, who believe that “open sourcing” Scientology will allow all of humanity 
to access the materials they need to spiritually advance across the Bridge to Total Freedom.132 
 Free and open-source software (FOSS) is a method of software production, 
dissemination, and code architecture that relinquishes control over the behavior of the recipient 
of the software as a basic condition of access.133 Once software code has been produced and 
handed off to the user, the user is free to modify, distribute, and change the code without fear of 
legal repercussions. Members of FOSS communities reverse the popularly imagined relationship 
between authority and technology. Rather than linking technological advancement to the control 
of the technology by elites (such as engineers, computer scientists, and professionals), they 
believe that technology will be better advanced by the promotion of the fast and spontaneous 
innovation that results from communal participatory construction and adaptation of the code. 
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They re-imagine the FOSS platform itself, rather than experts’ control, as central to the success 
and development of technology.134 
 FOSS programmers often tie this belief that software code is best improved through 
communal participation to the promotion of human freedoms around knowledge production and 
access. The ability to work directly with the code, it is believed, is a freedom that cultivates self-
expression, education, and citizen activism.135 These freedoms translate into a moral imperative 
of hard work, collaboration, and social advancement, as these communities interpret the very 
freedom of adaptation and play as “a necessary precondition for a world where ‘software doesn’t 
suck.’”136  
Open Source Scientologists understand Scientology technology using the terms of the 
FOSS software community. They see Scientology tech as the source code for spiritual evolution 
and argue that Scientology can only succeed if Scientologists adopt an open access approach to 
the tech. One of the leading advocates for Open Source Scientology, Geir Isene, draws explicit 
connections between software and Scientology tech based on his biography. Isene’s authority 
among independent Scientologists is based both on his claim to have been a high-ranking 
Scientologist in his 25 years in the Church and on his experience as a computer professional. He 
claims to have left the Church in 2006 after mounting public controversies caused him to 
conduct his own online research into the movement despite the Church taboo against internet 
use. Since then, Isene has drawn on his experiences with free and open source software to make 
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Scientology open source, arguing that it is time to “stop the technology of L. Ron Hubbard from 
being dragged down by misapplication and the ensuing bad pr.”137 
 Implicit in the Open Source Scientology movement is a suspicion that the professional 
guardians of Scientology tech have been secretly and inappropriately altering it for their own 
purposes. These suspicions often focus on David Miscavige, the contemporary leader of the CoS 
and the Chairman of the Religious Technology Center. The Religious Technology Center is the 
CoS organization dedicated to policing the illegal dissemination of Scientology texts and is the 
primary organization responsible for copyright and trademarking Scientology materials. Open 
Source Scientologist posting under the pseudonym TRUTH, for example, argues that making the 
original materials open source “would be awesome because it would allow humankind to study 
Scientology without Miscavology’s [sic] influence/alteration in the tech.”138 Blaming Miscavige 
and other CoS leaders for a secretive and controlling approach to information (which, as we have 
seen, started with Hubbard) allows Open Source Scientologists to argue that their versions of 
Scientology are more original and “authentic” than those of the present-day Church. 
 Practitioners involved in the Open Source Scientology movement believe that adopting 
FOSS methodologies would preserve the sacrality of Hubbard’s technology, which they see as 
the source code of Open Source Scientology, while simultaneously allowing each individual to 
alter the code according to their own spiritual needs. This double movement of preservation and 
alteration, bound up in narratives of authenticity, allows these Scientologists to claim that their 
tech is authentic in both its source (the original tech of L.R. Hubbard) and its liberation from 
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corrupt authority. In other words, once the tech has been freed from corrupt influences, Open 
Source Scientologists believe it will continue to advance. Open source advocate with the 
pseudonym “MostlyLurker” illustrates this point vividly when celebrating the liberatory potential 
of FOSS not only for individual Scientologists, but for the tech itself: 
[FOSS would mean] No more hidden data lines. Everything available to be used, 
evaluate[d] or discarded as one sees fit. That way errors could be corrected… 
Also in the Open Source Software, with every new release there is usually a list of 
new features, improvements, corrected bugs… No efforts by developers and users 
to misrepresent or hide anything. This will make it possible for Scientology to 
grow and evolve too.139  
 
This assumption that open source architecture works as a natural check on corrupting authorities 
is one shared by both traditional FOSS communities and Open Source Scientologists. Activist 
scholar Lawrence Lessig, for example, argues that open code does not allow for a singular stable 
target of regulation but instead presents a mobile network. In other words, FOSS works as a 
check on regulatory power because it inevitably involves voluntary adoption. Users “take only 
what they want.”140  
For FOSS communities, the corrupting authority is usually government or commercial 
control, but in Open Source Scientology, corruption comes from the official Church.  Mark 
Patterson, a vocal proponent for Open Source Scientology, described this process: 
We are in a new era. One can call it ‘Open Source Scientology’. If you had asked 
me in 1995 about whether or not Linux, an open source operating system for 
computers, could be any good, I would have answered ‘absolutely not!’ There is 
no real central control, and everyone who contributes to it is not paid, but does it 
for free, and it is free to use by anyone who wants to use it. Of course it is crap! 
The Open Source movement in software is the most improbable thing I have ever 
heard of – and yet it works. Linux is the standard operating system for powerful 
computer servers. You can get it for free, or you can pay money to a company that 
standardizes it and tests it, and will support it for you – your choice. But it is free. 
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And it is free from serious corporate or government influence… We are at the 
stage now where the only option for Scientology is open source. This is anathema 
to purists, and I know Ron would have issues with this, but Ron’s been dead for 
25 years, and the top-down totalitarian method of keeping the tech in has not  
worked.141 
 
Open Source Scientologists’ argument that the Church has corrupted the original tech echoes the 
language of the Protestant Reformation. Both movements argued that the individual, if presented 
with access to information (whether the text of the Bible or Hubbard’s tech), can lead their own 
spiritual life more authentically than when they instructed by external authorities in what to do 
and believe. Open Source Scientologists believe that an information architecture based on FOSS, 
combined with the instant access of internet search engines, will allow practitioners to reassert 
control over their spiritual lives.  
Open Source Scientologists broadly claim that their belief in the freedom of information 
has explicit doctrinal precedent within Scientology. Most often cited is L. Ron Hubbard’s 
famous quote from his 1965 essay “My Philosophy”: “The first principle of my own philosophy 
is that wisdom is meant for anyone who wishes to reach for it. It is the servant of the commoner 
and king alike and should never be regarded with awe.”142 Combining this quotation with 
Hubbard’s assertion, “The work was free. Keep it so,” Open Source Scientologists often argue 
that an open source relationship to information was always at the heart of the CoS, even if it 
could not be effectively realized early on.143 
 
Pirate Religion 
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The struggle between the Church of Scientology and Open Source Scientologists reflects 
not only larger concerns in Scientology over the nature of information, but also shifting cultural 
imaginations of information, authority, textual control, and ownership. FOSS is fundamentally 
about organizing a new kind of relationship to information. For L. Ron Hubbard and the CoS, 
information has been embedded in Cold War values of control, manipulation, and graded access. 
For Open Source Scientologists, the sacral power of information remains intact, in that the 
confidential materials and the tech are still totally transformative and lie at the heart of 
Scientology belief and practice, but information has been re-imagined as organic rather than 
static. Information, according to Open Source Scientologists, grows with adoption and 
modification rather than decaying from an onslaught of entropy when removed from precise 
control. These contrasting beliefs mirror larger cultural shifts in how we think about information, 
including religious information, in the context of emerging new digital technologies. 
 At the heart of Open Source Scientology lies a double movement of preservation and 
alteration bound up with narratives of authenticity. Restructuring their relationship to the tech 
allows these Scientologists to argue that their movement is inherently more authentic than the 
Church, demonstrating that, while approaches to modification of religious texts may be changing 
in the information age, the belief in textual authority remains. As J.R. Lewis has shown, 
independent Scientologists have shifted their strategies of legitimation from ones that privilege 
the rhetoric of science (the primary legitimization strategy of the CoS) to locating spiritual 
authority solely in the writings of L. Ron Hubbard. This shift, Lewis argues, has helped 
independent Scientologists critique the CoS while turning to the internet and mass digital 
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technologies as a means to access Hubbard’s materials despite the Church taboos against internet 
use.144 
 There is still much work to be done on the question of what Open Source Scientology can 
tell us about our changing cultural context more broadly. How does Open Source Scientology 
change our understanding of what kinds of values, aesthetics, and worldviews are likely to be 
celebrated online, and which will be patrolled for their transgressions? Contrasting Open Source 
Scientology with the Church of Scientology’s attempts to use copyright protection to control the 
distribution of its esoteric materials online gives us new insight into Scientology’s contemporary 
struggles. It allows us to better understand the competing definitions of information that are at 
stake between various parties and to better understand what how these competing interests 
inform internet citizenry practices more broadly. 
Beginning with what is now an infamous altercation with alt.religion in the mid-1990s, 
the CoS has aggressively employed copyright and trade secret litigation against internet users 
who attempt to publish, duplicate, and access confidential Scientology materials online. This 
effort at online censorship has become so central to Church priorities that an affiliated 
organization, the Religious Technology Center, was established in 1996 to protect the tech from 
internet “abusers.” Calling these confidential religious secrets “advanced tech materials,” the 
CoS has argued for the removal of sacred information from the internet on the grounds that the 
materials “are not only copyrighted and trade secrets but also confidential religious texts.”145 
This claim has produced a number of major copyright and intellectual property lawsuits 
involving the attempted application of the rhetoric of religious rights to the evolving medium of 
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the internet and to intellectual property law, resulting in a prolonged struggle between freedom 
of information activists, internet users, and the CoS that has been colloquially labelled 
“Scientology v. the Internet.”146 
In his essay “God Save this Honourable Court,” Jonathan Z. Smith argued that it is in the 
bleak offices of the Internal Revenue Service that some of the most important political 
consequences of the term “religion” have been accomplished. Always careful to call our 
attention to the ways in which the category “religion” is reflective of historical, cultural, and 
political contests, Smith argued that it is in the deceptively anonymous act of deciding whether 
an organization qualifies for tax-exempt status that the U.S. government worked to declare some 
religious movements authentically real and some not.147 
Yet increasingly, for new religious movements a different branch of the government is 
doing this work, one equally mundane and, perhaps, equally insidious. Over the past two decades 
copyright law has become an important ground on which new religious movements battle for 
legal protections and rights.148 At stake in these battles is the control over access to religious 
doctrine and practice, the legally sanctioned suppression of “heretical” movements, and changing 
definitions of “scripture” in an information age.  
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 Legal historian and former intellectual property lawyer Thomas Cotter has argued that 
over the past 50 years American and Western European courts have witnessed a dramatic 
increase in the use of copyright to censor minority religions. The dominant pattern in these cases 
follows this scenario:  
Group 2 breaks off from Group 1, reproduces/adapts/distributes Group 1 religious texts 
(either for practice or critique), while in the meantime the original group, Group 1, will 
file for copyright infringement successfully, and despite the defendants having claimed 
the need to use the texts for religious practice.149 
 
This process positions the secular authority of the state to act as heresiologist with the ability to 
discount some religious movements as inauthentic. Given this power to grant or deny access to 
the written forms of sacred texts and the resulting larger consequences of the state’s role in 
constructing and maintaining both the public and private limits of religious practice in the forms 
of property and ownership, intellectual property legislation is an important emerging arena in the 
broader public and legal negotiation of media, markets, money, and “religion” in the West.  
The origins of copyright legislation are closely linked to the rise of Protestant 
Christianity. Among other things, the Reformation led to the mass distribution of the Bible and 
the subsequent loss of control of the text, with a dramatic proliferation of vernacular translations. 
By 1529, England’s King Henry VIII attempted to stem this proliferation through the 
Proclamation Enforcing Statutes Against Heresy, which forbade the dissemination and 
possession of heretical works. Henry employed the Stationer's Company guild to police the 
statute; in return the guild received the exclusive rights to publish certain texts. Copyright battles, 
in this way, were an important part of the complex chapter of early modern European history in 
which “religion” came to be defined as increasingly privatized and increasingly subject to the 
logics of the marketplace.  
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Underlying these historical developments is an important relationship between how 
citizens of liberal modernity think about scripture not only in terms of access and ownership, but 
also in terms of materiality. The “book” has long served as one of the primary anchors by which 
we popularly envision scripture, but as we move further into a new “information age” we witness 
new ways of relating to texts and textuality as the digital transmutes this materiality from the 
personal book to the public virtual forum. Technologies afforded by present digital and internet 
architectures are reshaping the ways humans relate to sacred traditions in dramatic ways that are 
not entirely new, but which have for the most part not yet been adequately explored by scholars.   
Copyright considerations are further complicated when we recognize that the Church of 
Scientology is an esoteric religion—insider knowledge is reserved for, and granted to, members 
of the organization that are elite in some way.  Esoteric knowledge is generally understood either 
to be too dangerous for the uninitiated or too complex to be successfully (and correctly) grasped 
by the untrained mind.150 Scientology is unique in that virtually all members become initiates of 
sacred knowledge when they enter the Church. Initiation to each new level of spiritual training 
within the Church occurs through a process called “auditing.” It takes several years and cost 
several hundreds of thousands of dollars to successfully complete the process. At each level a 
new layer of secret religious material is unveiled, building on the Scientologist’s preparation in 
previous training levels to be able to receive this new information with the appropriate spiritual 
foundation. The Church likens this hierarchical practice to the acceptance of fundamental beliefs 
among Christians (such as belief in the resurrection of Jesus for Protestants or pro-life beliefs for 
Catholics), arguing that premature exposure to secret materials presents a major impediment to 
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proper spiritual development, further pushing away Scientology’s ultimate goal of spiritual 
enlightenment for all peoples on the planet.151 
The Church of Scientology maintains that auditing sessions do not have set financial 
costs. Because of the relatively short history of the religion, the Church stresses that donations 
for auditing and spiritual training are the primary ways by which the Church is able to function 
and that these training donations are similar to tithing within Christianity.152 The Church also 
explains that donations are the primary method of church funding “because it is the most 
equitable” and that all funding goes back into the community (following the requirements of a 
non-profit organization).153 In a somewhat contradictory turn, though, the Church also details a 
number of free and public services available to those who are not able to afford donations for 
services or training, suggesting that financial donations are indeed required to progress to the 
more advanced levels of spiritual training.154 
The Church of Scientology states that their use of legal actions to maintain secrecy is a 
major mark of the success of religious freedoms in the U.S., stating that “trade secret and 
copyright laws are the secular vehicle to protect the core religious precepts of the Church” and 
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that “when these trade secret rights and copyrights are violated, so are the First Amendment 
rights of all Scientologists.”155Access to secret materials is by invitation only, although the 
criteria for that invitation is left mostly unknown to the general public as the Church only goes so 
far as to explain: “To gain access to these materials, more is expected of a Scientologist than 
spiritual advancement. Access is not automatic, nor is it dependent solely upon donations. It is by 
invitation only.”156  
The church’s emphasis on the secrecy of its religious information reflects important 
preoccupations of a 1950s Cold War America. The Church of Scientology has encapsulated, and 
in many ways, calcified these American norms within the Church’s structure. While outsiders 
may see these rules of secrecy and hierarchy as a form of censorship, the Church appears to 
understand these principles through the lenses of safety, security, and the application of a 
spiritual science. With the rise of the internet and new digital technologies, the Church of 
Scientology has been unable to keep their secrets secret, and even though the Church has been 
recognized as a religion for First Amendment purposes, it has struggled to obtain copyright and 
trademark protection of its internal religious materials. Today the Church has only succeeded in 
slowing the dissemination of Church materials online through the use of these laws. Given 
Cotter’s insight that copyright law is increasingly used to police religious dissent, it is worth 
pausing to briefly consider some of the details of these cases.  
Since 1995, Scientology has participated in at least seven major lawsuits related to 
copyright infringement.157 Hugh Urban charts the most important copyright battles involving 
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Scientology in The Church of Scientology. These are too complex to describe at length here, but 
what is significant is that esoteric religious materials were presented as evidence in an ongoing 
civil case between the Church and an ex-Scientologist (spanning from 1980 to 2002). These 
materials were eventually marked for public consumption at the clerk’s office by a judge in the 
mid-1980s. Despite attempts by the Church to jam access through the brute force of hundreds of 
photocopy requests (thereby keeping the documents occupied and therefore not accessible to the 
waiting public), the Los Angeles Times was able to obtain OT materials and make them public in 
1985.158 After this ordeal the Church changed legal tactics, forgoing a defense based on religious 
harm to one based on economic harm. In 1999 the Church argued that “its advanced tech 
materials are trade secrets precisely because they are so expensive.”159 
Unfortunately, by 2009 any success the Church had in keeping their esoteric materials 
secret was undone through a highly public feud with the popular online encyclopedia Wikipedia. 
Wikipedia’s arbitration council had found that numerous editors using difficult to track IP 
addresses were repeatedly editing hundreds of articles across the site in a concerted propaganda 
and disinformation campaign.160 They had edited articles so that Scientology was bolstered, 
while anything the Church didn’t like (psychology, for example) was edited in a negative light. 
In a 10-0 decision, the council voted to permanently ban all users with IP addresses associated 
with Scientology. Until this point, Wikipedia had never banned anyone.  
Scientology’s actions on Wikipedia are a prime example of what some scholars call 
“information terrorism.” New religious movements scholar Massimo Introvigne defines 
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information terrorism as a verbal “terrorist” strategy of disseminating information “aimed at 
damaging or destroying” an individual, movement, or corporate entity with defamation, 
perception management, spamming, lying, or systematic copyright infringement.161  Introvigne 
argues that information terrorism is especially relevant to the scholarly study of NRMs online, as 
NRMs are already familiar with many of the strategies of information terrorism from the 
American cult wars and anti-cult movements of the twentieth century. For Introvigne, this reality 
means that groups with better technology and technological skill sets can create social 
hierarchies online in order to win the “information overload” game; they can cut through the 
information overload of the Web so that their messages rise to the front pages. 
Copyright infringement is a particularly effective strategy of information terrorism 
precisely because it can render the most important assets of a corporation meaningless.162 Over 
the past fifty years, American and European courts have witnessed a dramatic increase in the use 
of copyright litigation in the effort to censor minority religions as courts enforce copyright 
protection over the right to reproduce, adapt, or distribute texts for religious practice. As more 
NRMs are subjected to copyright litigation, either because they use it or because groups seeking 
to control them do, information terrorism will become an increasingly important lens through 
which to understand the politics of religious pluralism online. 
Finally, the tension between the CoS’s efforts to maintain its esotericism and Project 
Chanology’s wide distribution of secret Scientology materials across the internet have led some 
scholars to question the ethical legitimacy of using those materials in scholarship. Sociologist 
and new religious movements scholar Jeffrey K. Haden has argued that the decision by some 
scholars to validate Project Chanology by using secret texts that have been disseminated online is 
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paramount to denying constitutional protections for Scientology.  Haden states: “To deny a 
religious group the right to protect its esoteric knowledge, indeed its most sacred texts, runs 
contrary to history and the American experience. It constitutes a denial to that group the 
protection of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution.”163 Yet as 
Hugh Urban argues in The Church of Scientology, the alternative is simply to pretend that these 
materials are not available, even as other movements (Anonymous, ex-Scientologists, 
independent Scientologists) use them for new purposes. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to move our reflection on these questions forward by introducing 
competing understandings of the nature of information that have been particularly influential in 
American culture since the mid-twentieth century.  The hacker collective Anonymous—an 
organization that is in important respects an inverse to the Church Scientology—became a close 
ally for independent Scientologists who were otherwise cut off from their religious scriptures. 
Beginning in the 1990s, Open Source Software served as a structuring metaphor for a number of 
important independent Scientologists. These conflicting ideologies of information and access 
have led to a surprising intersection where the claims of esoteric religion and the legal structure 
of copyright and trade mark law run up against demands for the free flow of all information.    
The following chapter will build on the histories and contested perspectives on 
information set out here to explore how some of these perspectives are at work—in a new 
form—in the theology of the Missionary Church of Kopimism, a new religion that claims digital 
piracy as its most sacred religious practice. The Missionary Church of Kopimism is useful for 
this project because it is so heavily influenced by the ideologies of Anonymous and Project 
                                               
163 Jeffrey K. Hadden, quoted in Douglas E. Cowan, “Contested Spaces,” 255.   
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Chanology—indeed, many Kopimists are active members of Anonymous. Chapter two will 
explore how the notion of “religion” continues to evolve in an era of information technologies, as 
I examine how a number of the hacker values that form the foundation of Project Chanology 





Jesus is My Co-Pirate 
  
 
[Hackers represent] a much larger  
spiritual challenge to our time. 
  — Pekka Himanen, Hacker Ethic  
 
 
What is Kopimism? You probably already are one.  




A Pirate Wedding  
A young man, donned in black robes and wearing the Guy Fawkes mask of Anonymous, 
stands center stage at the 2012 Share Conference in Belgrade. It has been four years since 
“Message to Scientology,” and Anonymous has become an infamous hacker organization with 
several high profile, parallel, and fractured projects and sub-groups.164 What continues to tie the 
collective together is a loose, moral orientation toward the freedom of information. The Guy 
Fawkes mask, highly distinctive in Anonymous street protests and online avatars, has become 
the best-selling mask on the retail website amazon.com.165 This young man wears the mask and 
                                               
164 For a general history of Anonymous’s growth since Project Chanology, see Gabriella 
Coleman, E. Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous (London: 
Verso, 2014). 
 
165 See Nick Bilton, “Masked Protesters Aid Time Warner’s Bottom Line,” The New York Times, 
August 28, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/technology/masked-anonymous-
protesters-aid-time-warners-profits.html; and Nick Carbone, “How Time Warner Profits from the 
‘Anonymous’ Hackers,” Time, August 29, 2011, http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/08/29/how-
time-warner-profits-from-the-anonymous-hackers/ . 
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speaks through a computer—typing so that the now familiar voice of “Message to Scientology” 
and “Response to the Media” rings out new words, words speaking in real time to an audience of 
several hundred programmers, activists, and engineers. While most of Anonymous is overtly 
atheist, basing their ethical arguments for information access and distribution on claims that 
make no reference to the category of religion, this man is different. He is not a member of 
Anonymous, but rather an officiant of a new religious movement that shares many of the same 
values as Project Chanology—freedom of information, anti-surveillance, policies of open access, 
a flare for masks—but that does so in such a way that evokes the language of religion explicitly. 
This man is a Kopimist, and he is officiating the first Kopimist wedding.  
 “We are here to announce a new pair of noble peers,” the man announces (through his 
laptop speakers). “Copying of information is simply right,” he continues, “dissemination of 
information is ethically right…Do you want to share your love, your knowledge, and your 
feelings with [the bride] as long as that information exists?”166 He gently lifts a computer 
motherboard wrapped in a red ribbon between the bride and groom. The groom, dressed in 
elaborate pirate regalia, kisses the bride. The bride is dressed, rather fabulously, like an extra 
from the Ed Wood classic Plan 9 From Outer Space. The audience cheers.  
In the previous chapter, I introduced these questions by examining competing 
understandings of information that have been particularly influential in American culture since 
the mid-twentieth century. I then explored how Anonymous—an organization that is in many 
ways the inverse of Scientology—became a close ally for independent Scientologists who were 
otherwise cut off from their religious texts. I then considered how the notion of Open Source 
Software served as a structuring metaphor for a number of independent Scientologists beginning 
                                               
166 “File-Sharing Church’s First Marriage: Noble Peers Encouraged to Mix DNA,” RT News, 
May 8, 2012, https://www.rt.com/news/church-kopimism-first-wedding-762/.  
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in the 1990s, especially as they re-defined their own theological definitions of information and 
information access and distribution. Finally, I highlighted some of the practical effects the 
tensions among Scientology, Anonymous, and Open Source Scientology have had on the 
architecture of the internet itself. 
This chapter introduces the Missionary Church of Kopimism—a new religious movement 
built around the beliefs that copyright restrictions are a cosmic evil and that information freedom 
a religious right. I will first introduce the Missionary Church of Kopimism (MCK), before 
turning to consider how the MCK is not an aberration, but instead representative of an important 
friction or conflict between two distinct ideologies: the hacker ethic and what Max Weber called 
the Protestant Ethic. The study of new religions like the MCK is valuable precisely because they 
exemplify broader contemporary concerns and anxieties that may otherwise remain obscure.  
Exploring the ideology of the MCK can shed valuable light on significant issues that 
contemporary scholars of religion have often ignored. I will detail how the Protestant 
Reformation haunts contemporary technological communities, of which the MCK is a part. The 
most important effect of the legacy of the Protestant Reformation upon these communities has 
been the broadly Protestant idea (detailed below) that texts and religious knowledge ought to be 
available for everyone to interpret individually. This ethical commitment has been re-inscribed 
as a sacred religious practice for Kopimism. Echoes of the Protestant Reformation are found 
amongst the Kopimists, technological communities, and the hacker ethic. 
 As a new religious movement, Kopimism unveils a broader ethics of information access 
that is historically formed by enduring tropes in Western religious history. Because of the 
MCK’s explicit claims to information freedom as a religious value, this chapter also traces out an 
important new formulation of “religion” in an era of information technology. Like the prior 
chapter on Scientology, my objective is not to identify something “authentically” religious (or 
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not religious), but rather to understand how the notion of religion is deployed and activated by 
the groups I will examine here, the Kopimists and the authors of the Hacker Ethic (distinct from 
the hacker ethic, both of which I will introduce below).  
To date there has been very little scholarly analysis that has recognized the community of 
hackers, the freedom of information, and the rhetoric of religion together as a significant cultural 
assemblage. My objective in this chapter is to engage in a double movement: (1) connecting this 
case study to previously “recognized” religious traditions and themes (from Protestant 
Christianity), while at the same time (2) demonstrating that these new communities are also 
worth scholarly attention in their own right. My hope is that this investigation will be a useful 
contribution to religion and media studies, as it offers a new perspective and an easily 
overlooked case study.  
I will begin by introducing the MCK in more detail. I will then place MCK theology 
within its historical and cultural contexts. Protestant understandings of materiality, access, and 
information deeply influence Kopimism. These understandings are further shaped by a semi-
cohesive set of secular moral, practical, and ideological commitments first popularly identified 
by Steven Levy as the “hacker ethic.” By tracing the formation of an ethics of circulation that 
builds on Protestant assumptions and commitments while claiming to be secular, post-Protestant, 
and, at times, anti-religious, I highlight the need for religious studies scholars to interrogate the 
bifurcation and deployment of the categories of religion and the secular in communities that 
share many of the same commitments as Kopimists, including particularly religiously-inflected 
corporate perspectives emerging out of Silicon Valley (and further investigated below in chapter 
three). 
In these efforts my work is indebted to Kathryn Lofton’s 2017 Consuming Religion. In 
that text, Lofton examines central aspects of popular culture through the lens of religious studies 
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not because those phenomena are somehow essentially religious, but because the people 
participating in them deploy the term “religion” to self-describe their own activities.167 What is at 
stake for my project, then, is not a question of what religion might be, but rather of how the 
rhetoric of religion is deployed, activated as a resource, and reconfigured as a living discourse. 
Though academic debates about how to define religion persist, Lofton’s insight is that “religion” 
as a category and a form of life is not solely produced and managed by scholars, but rather takes 
on new contours in the discourses, practices, and collective imaginings of people who deploy the 
term to identify who they are, what they are doing, and how they are connected to the world 
around them.168 
The great difficulty with this methodology is that it is impossible fully to understand what 
people mean when they use the term religion.169 As I will argue, the Kopimists are informed by 
twentieth century American discourses of a hacker ethic, which has been formulated, in turn, in 
opposition to a popularized understanding of Weber’s Protestant Ethic. Kopimists and the 
authors of the Hacker Ethic position themselves, to an interesting and significant degree, by how 
they understand the role of Martin Luther in history. This chapter, then, demonstrates how 
important themes from the Protestant Reformation, particularly the Protestant work ethic (very 
broadly conceived), have a surprising continuing legacy both in rhetoric and in distinctive 
material practices (including the material practices of information access, distribution, and 
sharing). 
 
A Note on Terms  
                                               
167 Kathryn Lofton, Consuming Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 1-4. 
168 Lofton, Consuming Religion, 3.  
169 David Chidester, “Featured Review Essay: Disrupting Religion,” Journal for the Sociology of 
Religion 78 (July 2018): 380. 
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Recent scholars of secularism have made a wide range of arguments detailing that the 
“religious” and the “secular” are not, in fact, distinctly opposite cultural formations but are better 
understood as interlocked and formative of one another.170 In chapter four below, I will focus on 
the relationship between secularism and religion (particularly in discourses about technology and 
dis/enchantments), but even in the present chapter it is important to clarify what I mean by these 
two concepts. For my purposes here, I will draw on secularism studies that focus on American 
religious history and that have carefully detailed how modern Western secularism inherits 
cultural attitudes and values from both the Reformation and the Enlightenment. These scholars 
demonstrate that secularism has, in many ways, been configured by Protestant thinkers who 
imagined a world animated by individuals rather than collectives and that diffusely Protestant 
ways of being (and social norms) have been re-imagined as secular standards.171  
In my analysis of the religious influences that shape my objects of study in this chapter, I 
will use the very broad term “Protestant,” because of this trajectory in secularism studies, 
because of the explicit references within the Hacker Ethic to Protestantism (including references 
to Martin Luther and Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic), and because of the implicit effort to 
structure the Kopimist religion on standards of “religion” deeply informed by Protestant 
Christianity.172 I use this term in a very broad fashion, both to acknowledge the dynamic 
                                               
170 For representative examples, see Tracy Fessenden, Culture and Redemption: Religion, the 
Secular, and American Literature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Janet R. 
Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, Secularisms (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); and John 
Lardas Modern, Secularism in Antebellum America: With Reference to Ghosts, Protestant 
Subcultures, Machines, and Their Metaphors; Featuring Discussions of Mass Media, Moby-
Dick, Spirituality, Phrenology, Anthropology, Sing Sing State Penitentiary, and Sex with the New 
Motive Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
 
171 Kathryn Lofton, “Secular Shadowboxing,” Critical Research on Religion 1 (July 2013): 218. 
 
172 For more on the history of how “religion” as a category was established on Protestant 
standards, see Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); and Tomoko 
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influence of Protestantism and the irreducible variety of theologies, norms, and practices of 
Protestantism. My goal is to explore how discourses about hackers and discourses about 
Protestants have interwoven in Kopimist thought both in ways that are surprising (because of the 
easily imagined gulf between hackers and Protestants), but also in ways that are unsurprising—
the complexly interconnected nature of Protestant and secular ideologies in American history 
deeply shape cultural perspectives on technology and information.173  To be clear, “Protestant” 
and “secular” are not synonymous terms nor indicate synonymous cultural formations. 
For the purposes of this chapter, I define “hackers” using Gabriella Coleman’s definition 
of hackers as computer aficionados who share a passion for technological systems and a 
commitment to information freedom (see below for further detail).174 Though there is no singular 
“hacker ethic,” I use that term to refer to the loose set of ethical and social norms shared among 
hackers in the US (and especially at MIT) as they were first identified by Steven Levy who 
coined the term in his 1984 book Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution, and further 
codified in Pekka Himanen’s 2001 The Hacker Ethic, and the Spirit of the Information Age. (I 
offer further rationale for this terminology below.)175 In this chapter, hacker ethic refers to 
Levy’s configuration of a diffuse set of ethical and practical hacker commitments, while Hacker 
Ethic refers to the text of the same name. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in 
the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 2005). 
 
173 Christopher Kelty, has, in fact, thought Hackers:Protestants, but not in the ways that I detail 
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174 Gabriella Coleman, Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy, 3. 
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I am also using these terms (hacker ethic, Protestant, etc.) in the vein of the 
anthropologist Web Keane, treating each as “expressing a general cluster of ideas, practices, and 
social forces.”176 They refer to social practices, ideas, and habits that are contested, historically 
mobile, and loosely congealed. Like Keane’s Christian Moderns, while this chapter “is about 
historical phenomena, it is not, except at moments, intended as a work of historical explanation 
as such.”177 Indeed, the hacker ethic does not inherit a neat or strict legacy from Protestantism, 
but Protestantism and the Protestant Work Ethic are significant cultural resources that the 
Kopimists and authors of the Hacker Ethic draw on to understand and position themselves in the 
world. It is, in other words, not an accident that the Hacker Ethic and its dictates for living are 
defined in close parallel to Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic. Indeed, the Hacker Ethic is explicitly 
formulated as an extension of the Protestant Ethic for a new, later stage of capitalism.178 (These 
elements of connection are considered below in the sections “Hacker Ethic” and “Protestantism 
as a Usable Past.”) 
The influences I seek to trace here cannot be understood in a clear, linear, or reductive 
fashion. The discourses, movements, and influences under investigation are multiple in every 
instance. Rather than providing a comprehensive picture of what is at work, my case study in this 
chapter instead focuses on significant and culturally robust articulations of the ways in which 
religion and the secular are being (re)imagined.  
To better understand the interaction of these influences, I employ the concept of “fantasy 
echo” developed by historian Joan W. Scott and further elaborated by critical theorist Bruno 
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Perreau. Like echoes in a cave, the hacker and Protestant ethics are mutual influences that 
borrow and build on the resonances of one another. These resonances then “sound” in variously 
strengthened ways, appearing in punctuated locations and moments in time. Identifying the 
origins of influence by means of an “original” echo is of no use, because echoes are by definition 
reverberations rather than original sources. This notion of history-as-echo frees us to disregard 
the search for origins, for causes, and for stable translations of phenomena between time and 
place.179  
By thinking about historical and cultural influence in terms of echoes rather than 
lineages, I am able to de-emphasize questions of causality and bypass the problematic tendency 
to render history as a series of identifiable and sequential causes and effects. This chapter is, 
instead, about the ways in which certain configurations of the hacker ethic—the deeply 
entrenched values of open access and anti-surveillance, the celebration of remixture and copying 
of data, a set of aesthetic and affective commitments that emphasize a highly playful, semi-
ironic, but also utopian worldview that envisions an open information world to be a 
fundamentally better world—draw on, are informed by, and extend Protestant assumptions about 
freedom, autonomy, agency, materiality, and human identity.  
 
A Funeral for Copyright  
In 2007 several members of Sweden’s popular anti-copyright organization Piratbyrån (the 
Pirate Bureau) gathered around a Walpurgisnacht (“Witches’ Night”) bonfire.180 Energized by 
                                               
179 Bruno Perreau, Queer Theory: The French Response (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2016).  
 
 
180 In German folklore, Walpurgisnacht is believed to be the night when witches hold a raucous 
meeting with the Devil on the Brocken Mountain. In Sweden and across Western Europe, 
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the mischievous atmosphere attached to traditional Walpurgisnacht celebrations, the small crowd 
watched as the May Queen placed four piles of books ritualistically across the ground. “Today,” 
she announced, “we will finally put an end to the so-called ‘file-sharing debate.’” She lifted a 
burning torch in her hand. The books surrounding the Queen were all of the remaining physical 
manuscripts of Copy Me, an anthology of philosophical, technological, and legal essays debating 
the ethical and material merits of copyright restrictions. The texts had been compiled and printed 
from the forums and webpages of the Piratbyrån’s website, as part of an ongoing effort to wrest 
the conversation from copyright monopolies. The texts were ritualistically staged to represent the 
end of these debates. The Queen led those gathered in a funeral for copyright.   
“This book,” the Queen continued, “is the only enduring and burnable document from 
[these conversations]. By destroying that document, we will sweep out the old and frozen 
positions, and make room for new ones. Hereby we burn, in four book-fires, four conceptual 
opposites.”181 She placed the torch upon one of the piles, “legal/illegal,” she announced. The 
torch touched the second pile: “here/there.” The third: “free/charge.” And, finally, the fourth pile 
was lit, “art/technology/life.” The Queen looked again at the crowd. “We are now done with 
[these divisions, as they] are already collapsing.”182 The books smoldered and turned to ash in the 
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flames. The Queen, collecting ash from each of the four piles, threw the ash into the wind. “The 
file-sharing debate is hereby buried!” she exclaimed. “When we talk about file-sharing from now 
on it is as one of many ways to copy… not whether it is right or wrong. Winter is pouring down 
the hillside. Make way for spring! Make way for spring!”183 
This funeral for copyright marked a significant early moment for a small but evocative 
group of digital rights activists who believe that information, and information access, is sacred. 
Many of those who attended would later become the first members of the Missionary Church of 
Kopimism. By 2012, the MCK had formalized, developing branches in 18 countries within three 
months of its legal recognition as a religion by the Swedish government. Christopher Carmean, a 
leading figure of the United States branch of the MCK, attributed the Church’s rapid global 
growth to a widespread, though implicit, acceptance of the values and philosophies underlying 
Kopimism among youth on the internet today.184 “I like to think that the church has brought a 
philosophical dialogue to issues of copyright and data sharing that people generally take for 
granted,” Carmean argues. “I think that there is an expanding number of people holding the 
beliefs of Kopimism without even calling themselves Kopimists, and that’s why the church 
began in the first place.”185  
Founded by a nineteen-year-old philosophy student, Isak Gerson, Kopimism claims 
digital file sharing (or copying) as its central religious practice. Global media coverage was 
playful but quick to dismiss the MCK as a satirical attempt to use religious rights protections to 
wage war against anti-piracy policies, in the process conflating the semi-ironic flair of the 
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Kopimists with the tongue-in-cheek political activism of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti 
Monster.186 Much was also made in the media of the fact that legal recognition of the MCK had 
coincided with a series of widespread protests against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and 
the Protect IP Act (PIPA), bills before the United States Congress that had attempted to 
aggressively extend the scope of copyright protection. Popular media interpreted Kopimism as a 
strategic move in the war on digital piracy, highlighting the failed initial efforts of the MCK to 
be recognized as a religious organization by the Swedish government (they only succeeded on 
their third application). 
Kopimists, in turn, passionately defended their claim that their religion was neither ironic 
nor sophistic legal strategy. Kopimist leaders argued that the principles of Kopimism were 
already widely (though perhaps implicitly) adopted by many internet users. The MCK, they 
explained, was merely providing a formal language for a latent spiritual reality already present in 
the twenty-first century.187 
Described in The Atlantic as a global “new religion of file-sharers,” Kopimists take their 
name from “copy me” and celebrate digital file sharing (sometimes known as “piracy”) as their 
most sacred practice, swearing to defend it as their fundamental religious right.188 “Kopimi”—
“copy me” in English—is a term first used on pirate forums in the early 2000s as a shorthand 
way to celebrate and invite others to file-share, legally or not. Since its adoption by Kopimists, 
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kopimi has become an affirmation of faith as much as a directive. Now signaled on websites by a 
singular “K,” kopimi is intended to promote a worldview that celebrates a dynamic relationship 
between humans and information (understood as an animated, living force) in which both parties 
benefit from the unrestricted and organic movement of information in the world.  
The Kopimist “K” is often accompanied by the “sacred symbolism” of the pictorial 
depiction of the keyboard configuration “ctrl C + ctrl V”—the common command for “copy and 
paste.”189 Kopimists argue that websites with these symbols are sacralized, and these inscriptions 
are included at the end of digital messages to signal membership to other Kopimists. Because 
worship consists primarily of information sharing, spreading the “holy symbols” across the 
internet is understood as one of the three primary duties of Kopimists. The second duty is to 
become an “op,” the Kopimist equivalent of a pastor whose duty is to provide counseling and 
pastoral care for other believers.190 Because “ops” are prepared to give pastoral care to Kopimists 
who may be serving prison time for computer related crimes, the Kopimist constitution is clear 
that “[in] repressive states where public electronic monitoring is taking place, encryption [of the 
communication between an op and a Kopimist] is recommended to ensure privacy of pastoral 
care. When an op is performing the secondary task, s/he should be clearly marked with a 
Kopimist symbol.”191 The third and final duty of a Kopimist, is to “drive public opinion against 
invasive surveillance” and copyright legislation.192  
The Kopimist Constitution, its central statement of doctrine, is, of course, a collaborative 
venture. All doctrine is open-sourced and remixing is encouraged. However, it is rare to find the 
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central tenants of the religion substantially changed. As the Constitution declares, “All 
Knowledge for All! Copying of information is ethically right. Dissemination of information is 
ethically right. The Internet is holy. Code is law.”193 Kopimists live a “correct” life through 
“sanctifying” these religious principles. The Kopimist Constitution is clear that these few “basic 
axioms” are rooted in the “strong defense of the intrinsic value of information” precisely because 
information itself is holy.194  
Copying, in Kopimist theology, is not understood merely as imitation, but as an animated 
process in which feedback and remixture are encouraged. The underlying assumption is that 
information fundamentally changes humanity, rebuilding and extending the physical body into 
the environment through a feedback loop between the informational code of the body (DNA) and 
that of the cosmos. To cultivate this feedback process, Kopimists encourage members to share, 
play, and build on information exchanges with no particular view toward an outcome. There is 
no identifiable information product at the end of the Kopimist telos. Information is only process.  
Kopimism makes no claims about gods, supernatural entities, or ultimate powers. The 
doctrine is also noticeably unfocused on the lives and moral policing of its members. Instead, 
Kopimist doctrine is almost exclusively oriented around a loose and collaborative theology of 
information itself. Everything else, including Kopimist understandings of the nature of the 
human, is derived from this theology of information. In an interview with the London based 
author Chris Baraniuk, Isak Gerson was pressed on how this understanding of information 
related to the individual practitioners: 
“What is the ultimate goal of this faith? What is the ultimate goal of your 
devotion?" [Baraniuk] asked. "To copy as much as possible," replied Gerson with 
characteristic frankness. "Is there not a point at which that becomes arbitrary? 
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Could you not just write programs to do that? Does it have to be an action carried 
out by a human being?" Gerson: "Well our religion is not that focused on humans 
so I guess it doesn't really matter if it's a human person or software that is 
copying.” 195 
This emphasis on copying information over all other concerns is rooted in the Kopimist 
belief that DNA is the key to understanding all forms of life. “Life as we know it originated with 
the DNA molecule’s ability to duplicate itself, irrespective of the original creation of the 
Universe” reads an informational section of First United Church of Kopimism website. “DNA is 
really just an information carrier…Reproduction is the very condition for cell division and life in 
the form we know it [therefore copying] is fundamental to life and runs constantly all around us. 
Shared information provides new perspectives and generate new life.”196 Finding meaning in 
DNA’s ability to duplicate itself, evolving in fits and starts as it is shared and copied, Kopimists 
argue that DNA reveals the centrality of information sharing in the construction and maintenance 
of the universe. Shortly after the 2012 Share Conference in Belgrade, the Church made this 
connection between information, DNA, and the sacred even more explicit. The Church proudly 
announced the Belgrade wedding on TorrentFreak (a popular file sharing site), stating:  
We are very happy today. Love is all about sharing. A married couple share 
everything with each other… Hopefully, they will copy and remix some DNA-
cells and create a new human being. That is the spirit of Kopimism. Feel the love 
and share that information. Copy all of its holiness.197 
To make the jump from biological necessity to ethical right, Kopimists invoke a 
perennialist move by identifying  major texts and leaders of world religions that can be read 
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through the lens of their own philosophy.198 Kopimists cite verses from the Bhagavad Gita and 
the Quran, and a particularly popular reference is borrowed from 1 Corinthians 11:1. This verse 
is commonly translated in the New International Version as “Follow my example, as I follow the 
example of Christ” or in the Authorized Version as “Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of 
Christ,” but Kopimists argue that the correct translation is “Copy me, my brother, just as I copy 
Christ himself.”199 In the words of Isak Gerson: “For the Church of Kopimism, information is 
holy and copying is a sacrament. Information holds a value, in itself and in what it contains and 
the value multiplies through copying.”200 For Kopimists, 1 Corinthians 11:1 affirms the principle 
of copying as sacrament. 
 
Kopimism and The Hacker Ethic 
 
Shortly after the MCK gained legal recognition in Sweden, Lauren Pespisa, a hacktivist 
(“hacker-activist”) known as “Splendid Spoon,” introduced the religion to the Massachusetts 
Pirate Party at PirateCon 2012. Standing in front of a projector displaying a black pirate flag with 
a white cutout of Massachusetts, Pespisa began her talk by announcing the introduction of a 
“non-theistic, non-exclusionary religion based on the idea that copying and sharing information 
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is a sacred virtue.”201 The crowd met her with laughter. Pespisa grinned before flipping to the 
next slide: an off-white screen with the emboldened title “Exploring Kopimism: The Bytes Must 
Flow.” 
“Basically, the idea,” Pespisa asserted, “is that copying and sharing information is sacred 
and holy and should be celebrated [because it] is ethically right.” She paused as the PirateCon 
crowd again erupted into laughter, this time accompanied by raucous applause. “I think that fits 
really well with what the pirate party thinks and what the internet thinks in general.” The slide 
behind her read, “What is Kopimism? You probably already are one.”202 This is a significant 
statement from Pespisa, and one that was received by laughter and applause at PirateCon 2012. 
Pespisa was able to make this connection because of the deep similarities of ethical commitments 
and aesthetic values between Kopimism and what has been more broadly identified as the 
“hacker ethic.” 
The hacker ethic was first explicitly compared to the Protestant Ethic in Pekka 
Himanen’s 2001 text, The Hacker Ethic and the Information Age. At the age of twenty, Himanen 
earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Helsinki. Since then, he has become a well-
known philosopher and has served as the director of the UC Berkeley Center for the Information 
Society, a counselor to the Finnish government, and a visiting professor at the Oxford Internet 
Institute. Since the late 1990s, he has been invited to speak at the World Economic Forum as 
well as the Technology Industry Leaders, a gathering of the CEOs of the world’s biggest IT 
companies. His most recent endeavor is Global Dignity, a non-profit organization co-founded 
with the HRH Crown Prince Haakon of Norway and American entrepreneur John Hope Bryant.  
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Himanen understands Global Dignity’s mission to be a synthesis of his earlier 
philosophical work. Much of this work pivots around the themes of The Hacker Ethic and the 
Spirit of the Information Age, redistributed in 2002 with the subtitle “a radical approach to the 
philosophy of business.” The Hacker Ethic describes itself as an ongoing collaboration among 
Himanen, Linux Operating System creator Linus Torvalds, and the sociologist and author of the 
Information Age trilogy Manuel Castells. The book is the product of collaborative research 
conducted in California in which Torvalds represented the “authentic” hacker perspective, 
Castells connected the work to broader theories of the information age, and Himanen provided 
social scientific analysis. 
Himanen’s text borrowed its title from a concept widely attributed to journalist Steven 
Levy, who in 1984 identified a set of implicit principles so common amongst hackers that he 
identified them as a “hacker ethic,” the bedrock values of hacking communities. These principles 
included a general ideological and material commitment to sharing and openness, a distrust of 
authority, the promotion of decentralization and the free access to computers, and a belief that 
computer technologies were uniquely capable of making the world a better place. Underlying 
these principles were two fundamental ideological and material commitments: (1) a radical belief 
in the freedom of information; and (2) a commitment to meritocracy, or the idea that hackers 
should be judged only by the quality of their work and not by race, age, sex, title, or any other  
qualification.203 Levy argued that these principles arise naturally from a dialectical relationship 
between new computer technologies and the people working with them. The hacker ethic, in 
other words, is a natural outgrown predicated on the recognition of an intimate and inextricable 
relationship between humans and machines, as each structured and was structured by the 
potentials and limits of the other.  
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Although Levy was responsible for articulating this ethic in a rather comprehensive form, 
the idea that humans and machines structure one another is, of course, not original to him.204 
Technologies are one way in which humans make the world—they are, as Ken Hillis argues, 
“ideas in built form.”205 As technologies are built and used, they alter human activities and 
institutions. They become woven into everyday existence, shedding their tool-like qualities to 
become part of the backdrop of human experience and imagination. 
Take, for example, the introduction of a robot to a workplace. The robot not only 
increases productivity (assuming all goes well), but also changes the processes of production by 
redefining what it means to work in that setting. These changes become habits, recurring patterns 
of life activity. It is the habitual nature of this codetermining that makes it difficult to recognize 
the extent to which humans and machines become entangled—in fact, science and technology 
studies scholar Langdon Winner argues that it is extremely difficult to see outside of the moment 
in which we directly encounter technologies.206 We have a hard time, in other words, 
understanding exactly how technology determines us, even as we determine it.  
For Winner, technical systems involving human operators always bring with them a 
reorganizing and reconstruction of social roles and relationships, as technological patterns are set 
out in the world and “new worlds are being made.”207 It is for this reason that Winner argues for 
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reconceptualizing technologies as forces that reshape human activity and its meanings, or 
“technologies as forms of life.”208 Information technologies provide a new range of what is 
possible both to do and to imagine—indeed, what it is possible to be.  
Levy’s hacker ethic is better understood as a metaphor rather than as a reality. After all, 
as Gabriella Coleman argues, Levy’s description collapses fundamental distinctions within 
hacking culture:  
To be sure, hackers can be grasped by their similarities. They tend to value a set 
of liberal principles: freedom, privacy, and access. Hackers also tend to adore 
computers…Foremost, hacking, in its different forms and dimensions, embodies 
an aesthetic where craft and craftiness tightly converge. Hackers thus tend to 
value playfulness, pranking, and cleverness…Hackers, however, evince 
considerable diversity and are notoriously sectarian…Yet almost all academic and 
journalistic work on hackers commonly whitewashes these differences, and 
defines all hackers as sharing a singular “hacker ethic.”209 
If the hacker ethic is a helpful (though limited) rubric with which to think about an emergent set 
of widely shared values connected to hackers and their machines, the question remains: who 
exactly are hackers, and why should religious studies scholars care about their ethic(s)?  
Gabriella Coleman describes hackers as “computer aficionados” who are “driven by an 
inquisitive passion for tinkering and learning technical systems, and frequently committed to an 
ethical version of information freedom.”210 This radical commitment to sharing information is the 
central element of hacking, and it is this commitment, with no other consistent philosophy or 
politics, that, Coleman argues, unites the members of Anonymous, the largest hacker 
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collective.211 Yet the hacker ethic extends beyond hackers themselves, informing the people 
reading, writing, and sharing hacker manifestos without necessarily practicing the technological 
craft of computer hacking. Gabriella Coleman and Christopher Kelty are instructive here when 
they expand these community boundaries outwards to include “geeks,” or those who are highly 
technologically literate and involved in these communities but not necessarily active participants 
in traditional hacking activities.  
According to Kelty, “geek” is best understood not as a form of identity but as a mode of 
thought and practice as it is expressed through technology.212 Kelty argues that geeks express 
themselves through technology, which in turn allows them to both actualize and shape culture 
(through reflection, identification, and alliances). Questions of technology, then, become 
questions of material culture and the material politics of cultural action. Technologies contain an 
“archeology of their history”: the ideas, cultural desires, and utilitarian purposes that propelled 
their development. Understood in this way, computer code both constitutes an ideological affect 
and has ideological affects, contributing to a general aesthetic or way of life.213  Other scholars 
believe that “hacking” and the hacker ethic can be extended even further, as a popular descriptor 
of any do-it-yourself, tinkering, or clever shortcutting of an activity (such as “productivity 
hacking”). Lifehacker, Wired, and TED Talks have all contributed to the extension of the notion 
of “hacking” beyond a relationship with information technologies. The concept of a “hacker 
ethic” can highlight the broader influences of the philosophical commitments that gave rise to 
hacker culture.  
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Protestantism as a “Usable Past”  
The Protestant Reformation has served as a surprisingly popular point of reference among 
hackers and geeks involved in the free and open source software (FOSS) movement. In his 
introduction to The Hacker Ethic, Himanen argues that the “digital generation” (which he never 
precisely defines) has moved beyond Max Weber’s notion of the Protestant work ethic, yet 
neither Weber nor Protestants are discussed at length by Himanen. Himanen argues that it is 
relatively self-evident that early Western capitalism was indeed marked by a Protestant ethic and 
that this ethic was subject to radical change as capitalism moved from its early to its 
contemporary forms. Like the Protestant ethic, Himanen asserts, the hacker ethic will extend 
beyond hackers themselves, eventually becoming the dominant marker for ways of being in 
societies heavily entwined with digital technologies.  
Himanen argues that “the hacker” possesses an ethic toward work that is parallel to, 
though distinct from, the Protestant Ethic described by Weber. Hackers, he asserts, demonstrate a 
set of five key ethical commitments: (1) passion, in which mundane or difficult activities are 
transformed into a sort of “intense play” emphasizing the joy of mastery and creation; (2) 
freedom, in which life is organized by “dynamic flow between creative work and life’s other 
passions” rather than a routine workday; (3) a money ethic, in which money is not supposed to 
serve as a primary motivator for action or creation; (4) a net ethic organized around “complete 
freedom of expression,” privacy, and “active pursuit of one’s passion;” (5) the creative 
surpassing of oneself through clever new modes and methods of mastery; and (6) anonymity, 
which frames the internet as central to the freedom of speech and information.214 Linus Torvalds, 
likewise, summarizes the hacker ethic as a reversal of the Protestant ethic: life should be spent in 
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creative pursuits marked by joy, rather than dutiful menial labor.215 It is this reaching out to joy 
that returns the hacker ethic to the Protestant past it seeks to replace. Himanen gives a telling 
example in the case study of a hacker named Tom Pittman, who exemplifies for him the kind of 
joy produced by creative computer hacking: “In that instant,” Pittman explains, “I as a Christian 
thought I could feel something of the satisfaction that God must have felt when he created the 
world.”216  
But the connections between the Protestant and hacker ethics go beyond the fact that 
similar language is occasionally used to discuss religion and hacking. Instead, Protestantism is 
connected to this story in two important additional ways: first, it routinely serves as what 
Christopher Kelty has identified as a “usable past,” and second, it is a structuring force in the 
kinds of secular and religious self-making that Himanen, as well as the Kopimists, are 
participating in.   
 In Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software, Christopher Kelty argues that 
hacker communities love allegories and stories about the Protestant Reformation precisely 
because the legacy of the Reformation allows them to make sense of the relationships between 
contemporary social actors (mainly the state, corporations, and themselves).217 Kelty connects 
this reflexivity to core practices at the heart of free and open-source communities, arguing that 
the community involved with FOSS is fundamentally a “recursive public,” vitally concerned 
with the material and practical maintenance and modification of the means of its own existence. 
As Kelty explains: 
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A recursive public is a public that is constituted by a shared concern for 
maintaining the means of association through which they come together as a 
public. Geeks find affinity with one another because they share an abiding moral 
imagination of the technical infrastructure, the Internet, that has allowed them to 
develop and maintain this affinity in the first place.218 
 
In other words, technology is not just a mechanism for producing particular effects but also a 
mechanism for creating publics. Refigured in this way, for Kelty the FOSS community is marked 
deeply by social practices committed to (1) sustaining the movement; (2) sharing source code; 
(3) conceptualizing and defining openness and open systems; (4) creating copyright and copyleft 
licensing that seeks to remedy copyright overreach; and (5) fostering practices of collaboration. 
Kelty argues that these social practices pivot around the core values of openness and 
modifiability, which by their very nature suggest the importance of continual reflection and 
adaptation. 
This leads to Kelty’s major contribution in Two Bits: the insight that “geek” is not an 
identity as much as it is a mode of thought and practice expressed through technology, which 
allows FOSS culture to be realized. The recursive nature of FOSS communities makes the 
prevalence of rhetorical turns to the Protestant Reformation that much more intriguing. Kelty 
argues that the Reformation serves these communities as a form of “usable past.” By this, Kelty 
means that the Reformation serves as a storytelling device, loosely combining facts and fiction 
not to adequately or accurately account for the past, but to make sense of these communities’ 
own contemporary social, political, and historical locations. Usable pasts therefore reflect 
communal attitudes and ways of thinking about the past but also about the present. Geeks use the 
Protestant Reformation because there are “no ‘ready to narrate’ stories that make sense of the 
practices of geeks today”:  
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The Protestant Reformation makes for good allegory because it separates power 
from control; it draws on stories of catechism and ritual, alphabets, pamphlets 
and liturgies, indulgences and self-help in order to give geeks a way to make 
sense of the distinction between power and control and how it relates to the 
technical and political economy they occupy. The contemporary relationship 
among states, corporations, small businesses, and geeks is not captured by 
familiar oppositions like commercial/noncommercial, for/against private 
property, or capitalist/socialist —it is a relationship of reform and conversion, 
not revolution or overthrow.219  
 
Because most geeks are not anti-capitalist, Kelty argues, they turn to the Protestant Reformation 
for its language of reform and conversion rather than revolution. In this schema, large 
corporations stand in for the Catholics, startups for the Reformers, and “sheep” for the laity. 
Figures like Linus Torvalds are configured in these narratives as modern-day Martin Luthers—
described as singular heroes who level the playing field of access and control to centralized 
information regimes.  
Kelty further identifies three metaphorical levels at work in FOSS community references 
to the Protestant Reformation. The first level makes use of the language and community 
assumptions underlying religious war. Here, largely atheist and anti-religious geeks lay bare their 
assumptions that religious differences are fueled by irrationality and superstition rather than 
practical or material grievances. This level of allegory is especially applied to sub-cliques within 
the community who wish to accomplish similar goals but believe that different technological 
solutions are needed. These competing loyalties are often seen as zealous and arbitrary, as 
“[such] stories imply that two technologies are equally good and equally bad and that one’s 
choice of sect is thus an entirely non-rational one based in the vicissitudes of background and 
belief.”220 
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The second level of metaphor at work in these references “makes precise use of 
Protestant Reformation details [allowing geeks] to see their struggles as those of Luther-like 
adepts, confronted by powerful worldly” actors.221 Just as Luther “freed” the Bible so that it 
could be accessed and modified (through personal interpretation) outside of priestly authority, 
many hackers imagine themselves as freeing information. In this way Luther is used to articulate 
the ways in which hackers position themselves as “watchers” who hold powers accountable, 
whether those actors are the state or corporations. Third and finally, Kelty argues that the most 
compelling way FOSS communities make reference to the Protestant Reformation is to position 
themselves as reformers rather than revolutionaries: “Geeks…see themselves as fighting to 
uphold Christianity (true capitalism) against the church (corporations) and to be reforming a way 
of life that is corrupted by church and monarchs, instead of overthrowing through revolution a 
system they believe to be flawed.”222 
By articulating a mode of creation that is driven by “joyful passion” and not money, the 
ethic Himanen identifies builds on the assumptions of a tradition of gendered labor that has 
haunted tech communities since the Second World War. As documented by historian Jennifer 
Light, computer programming has been depicted since the 1940s as joyful, tinkering, clever, and 
masterful work when it is demographically a male-centric occupation. When the same 
professional roles are fulfilled by women, that labor is re-classified as repetitive, menial, and 
secretarial.223 Job descriptions for programming and engineering work oscillated between these 
two poles as men left for the war and, later, came back home. Because women’s programming 
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work was historically described as more menial during the mid-twentieth century, women rarely 
gained positions of authority in technological fields. This further meant that women scientists 
working on information technologies often suffered from the Matilda effect—breakthroughs they 
made in their work were attributed to their male superiors or, at times, to the computers 
themselves (for example, pictures of key programmers in early computing projects described the 
women not by their names, but collectively as “refrigerator ladies.”)224  
Through tracing the development of occupational feminization during and after World 
War II, Light demonstrates how women were pushed out of computer programming—both in the 
historical record (women worked in male-owned laboratories, and therefore their research was 
published under the lab names rather than their own) and through the process of changing job 
descriptions that ensured women would be at a continual disadvantage in a career hierarchy. The 
resulting invisibility of women in the information technology workspace has resulted in 
measurable gaps in both scholarship addressing women’s contributions in these areas and the 
number of women currently employed in these fields today. 
This erasure of women has been so thorough that Douglas Thomas’s 2003 Hacker 
Culture described hacking communities as instances of “boy culture” in a postmodern age.225 
Today self-identified hackers are overwhelmingly white, heterosexual, and male—so much so 
that Gabriella Coleman explicitly figures the hacker as “he” in her monograph Coding 
Freedom.226 This is significant for Himanen’s claims that the hacker ethic, so thoroughly rooted 
in one particularly gendered way of being in the world, will extend out to colonize all subjects of 
information societies.  
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 Some critics also argue that Kelty’s concept of the recursive public serves to privilege a 
masculinist perspective. Indeed, as anthropologist Tom Boellstorff has noted about Two Bits, 
“Save for a single footnote admitting that the ‘question of gender plagues the topic of computer 
culture’ (p. 318) and the recounting of a dinner at which the sole woman present became the 
object of heterosexual male geek desire (pp. 243–244), Kelty never asks after the ramifications 
of the fact that nearly every named social actor in the book is male.”227 This exclusion of women, 
Boellstorff makes clear, undoes the “fantasy” of individuals with the capacity to form publics 
that function independent of other forms of constituted power (and we might also inquire about 
race, disability, and other forms of difference elided in the text). Boellstorff critique of Kelty and 
computer geeks extends to the Protestant Reformation itself. Citing the work of Stefan 
Helmreich and Carol Delany, Boellstorff connects his critique of this notion of a recursive public 
to the broader vision of agency he describes as inherent in the male-dominated Protestant 
Reformation and popular Protestant theologies that understand the Christian God to be an 
autonomous male entity who creates without female input or agency.228 Boellstorff is therefore 
critical of the Reformation, but ultimately agrees that its legacy haunts contemporary computer 
culture. The “geeks,” Boellstorff is suggesting, are the new Protestant Reformers, celebrating 
their own creative energies with no recognition of the communities or networks within which 
they exist. 
 The masculinist descriptions of the FOSS community in Kelty’s work largely reproduces 
the male domination of the actual FOSS community. FOSS programmers tend to celebrate a 
strict, Enlightenment-defined sense of rationality. Their community, meanwhile, is largely male; 
according to a wide-ranging 2017 survey by GitHub, a primary software development platform 
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for FOSS, “95% of respondents are men; just 3% are women and 1% are non-binary.”229 Kelty’s 
descriptions of these programmers are reminiscent of popular descriptions of “New Atheism,” a 
largely white and male form of atheism of the late 20th century that celebrates a rigid and 
truncated form of scientific rationality and assumes the existence of truth, autonomous 
individualism and “pure” logic.230 
 Himanen’s Hacker Ethic and Kelty’s Two Bits are important resources for understanding 
the context of the Missionary Church of Kopimism. Himanen identifies longstanding tropes 
about Protestantism and capital to argue that the hacker ethic also reflects shifts in the 
motivational and affective relations between work and money. Just as Weber argued that “the 
spirit of capitalism found its essentially religious justification in the Protestant ethic” but 
eventually moved beyond specifically Protestant material and ethical practices, Himanen argues 
that the hacker ethic will do the same in an era of late or changing capitalism.231 Both ethics are 
united in a loose and largely undefined commitment to information access (whether it be 
religious texts outside of priestly authority or information-writ-large).  
 Returning then to the Kopimists, what are we to make of their blending of these two 
cultural configurations (hacker and Protestant ethics)? What can they tell us about the larger 
movements of Protestant hegemony and hacker cultural ethics in the West? How has the 
discipline of religious studies responded to Kopimism more generally? 
 
Religious Studies Responds 
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As I outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, some scholars believe that 
information technologies have a distinctive capacity to generate new religious experiences and 
phenomena and that “digital religion” should be studied as something separate from, although 
adjacent to, “offline” religion. Gregory Grieve encapsulates this approach in his pivotal chapter  
“Religion” in Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds.232 
Grieve argues that digital religion is not simply “traditional religion packaged in a new media 
form,” but that “digital religion is unique because it addresses the anxieties produced in a liquid 
modern world by using new media’s technological aspects to weave together religious meta-
narratives and the ideology surrounding them.”233  
Grieve is enlisting Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of liquid modernity, which argues that the 
West is experiencing a continuation of modernity better described as “late” rather than as a 
“postmodern” break with modernity. Liquid modernity is a formation shaped by global 
capitalism, privatization, and the large-scale adoption of information infrastructures. It is “liquid” 
(here earlier forms of modernism where “solid”), in that Bauman believes that social change 
(motivated by social, cultural, technological, political, environmental, and economical factors) 
occurs at a faster rate than ever before, leading to a constant state of fluidity. Bauman identifies 
earlier, more “solid,” forms of modernity with hardware, and he invokes software as the 
structural metaphor for liquid modernity. We moderns are, the metaphor suggests, in a constant 
state of iteration. 
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 Liquid modernity is further characterized by the nomadic individualism of those caught 
in the continually shifting relations of a newly fomented “network” society.234 Because digital 
religion is constantly in flux, the argument goes, it falls short as a meaning-making apparatus in 
liquid modernity by failing to provide long term “solutions” and instead maintaining a reactive 
relationship to the world.  
Sean O’Callaghan builds on Grieve’s assessment in his 2014 essay “Cyberspace and the 
Sacralization of Information,” where he uses Kopimism as a prime case study to argue that 
cyberspace is best understood as a platform that is uniquely capable of generating new forms of 
religious expression. Sociologist of religion Stef Aupers argues that a broader explanation for the 
rise of digital religion is that the digital age is characterized by “opaque technology.”235 For 
Aupers, digital user interfaces are increasingly easier to operate, but the technology underlying 
the interface is made up of increasingly complicated technical layers, rendering our technology 
into what he, following Bruno Latour, calls a “black box.”236 While Latour’s concept of the black 
box is meant to draw our attention to the ways in which actor networks are momentarily 
congealed into technological artifacts (as I discuss in the introduction), Aupers uses the term 
instead to gesture to a technological phenomenon that has become fundamentally mysterious to 
the vast majority of users. Such users, when encountering any element of technology other than 
the user interface, are left lost between the technological layers—hence Aupers’ notion of 
“opaque technology.” 
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As technological objects become both smaller and more intangible, Aupers argues, they 
also become ever more opaque. This trajectory ultimately results in a pervasive feeling of awe, 
as users interact with technological devices that seem autonomous, impossible to understand, and 
increasingly ubiquitous.237 Drawing on Max Weber’s analysis of enchantment (discussed below 
in chapter four), Aupers contends that these feelings of awe ultimately allow technology to re-
enchant the secular sphere, inducing mystical and religious responses on the part of some users. 
Working against “the assumption that [technology and] technological experts are at the frontier 
of a progressive ‘disenchantment of the world,’” Aupers argues that “we are witnessing an 
‘elective affinity’ between modern computer technology and magic.”238  
If we understand Kopimism through Aupers’ and Grieve’s perspectives, the MCK can be 
seen as an organic religious and emotional response to the widespread adoption of information-
sharing technologies like the internet. Yet while aspects of this approach—such as the concept of 
opacity—are useful, it ultimately obscures more than it elucidates. If we are looking for 
convincing historical and cultural contexts for Kopimism’s claims, Aupers’ and Grieve’s 
conceptions of religion inadequate. Grieve’s use of Bauman’s notion of liquid modernity both 
essentializes a vaguely universal and trans-historical concept of religion and marginalizes digital 
religion as “lesser than” its offline counterparts. In doing so, Grieve employs a rhetorical and 
political trope commonly used against new religions, which have historically been treated as 
forms of inferior or “bad religion” when they are recognized as religion at all.239  
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 This notion of “bad religion” (discussed in more detail in chapter four) is, unfortunately, 
shared by the popular media. For journalist Chris Baraniuk, Kopimist’s close attention to legal 
language betrays the fact that “religion is a ‘cloak’” for the movement, a “helpful collection of 
signs which allows Kopimism to exist during our age” and to pursue its copyleft activism in 
peace.240 Isak Gerson, responding to similar assertions in a New York Times interview, has 
responded as follows: “For me it’s a kind of believing in deeper values than worldly values…I 
think we see it as a theological remix. Christianity took from Judaism and turned it into 
something new, and the Muslims did the same. We are part of a tradition…Our angle is not to 
mock religion. We recall that Christianity and the Gospels, with their collections of little stories, 
are examples of copying.”241 Focusing on issues of legality and authenticity thus gets us 
nowhere.242 
Dorien Zandbergen has delivered a pointed critique of these approaches. In her 2010 
article “Silicon Valley New Age,” Zandbergen argues that while it may be fine for religious 
practitioners to argue that technology is somehow inherently religious, it is quite another matter 
for scholars of religion and media to do so. Building upon Talal Asad’s fundamental critique of 
the category of religion, Zandbergen calls on scholars to analyze discourses of sacralized 
technology not as evidence that these technologies actually have spiritual characteristics, but 
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rather as “specific expression[s] of a social-culture climate that has a longer history of 
celebrating spirituality through high tech, and in which science and technology have become 
natural forces of life.”243 Scholars of religion risk reifying these discourses, Zandbergen argues, 
when they forget that the “possibility and authoritative status [of religious practices and 
utterances] are to be explained as products of historically distinctive disciplines and forces.”244  
My objective in this chapter has been to build on Zandbergen’s critique to analyze the 
discourses that have shaped Kopimism’s claims about the organic sacrality of information 
sharing online. These claims are not the result of any sort of “magical affinity” (as Aupers would 
suggest) between technology and religion but are instead deeply shaped by two conjoining 
cultural discourses: Protestantism and the hacker ethic.  The distinctive confluence of these 
discourses contributes to the rise of an ethics of circulation that borrows upon and further 
embeds Protestant assumptions and commitments about information and agency while claiming 
to be secular, post-protestant, and, at times, anti-religious.  
 
An Ethics of Sacred Access 
It is worth exploring the underlying notion that computer code, like language, creates 
newly structured worlds. Hackers, programmers, and “geeks” often argue that code (software 
programming languages) is itself speech. This assertion has led some MIT scholars to argue both 
that code, like language, creates the structuring possibilities for life activity even as it is itself 
modifiable through its use and that those who have the capacity to code act as a new class of 
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elites with special access to configure dominant new forms of subjectivity.245 By exploring how 
digital technologies may be related to the range of possibilities available for subject formation in 
the twenty-first century, we open up new possibilities for analysis of the connection between 
Protestantism and the hacker ethic.  
 In his essay “Do Artifacts Have Politics?,” political theorist Langdon Winner argues that 
technological objects have political properties in two primary ways. His first, less controversial, 
claim is that technologies are political through their positioning in culture. Using the example of 
city planning, Winner shows how objects are literal ways of building our social worlds and of 
settling affairs in particular communities.  For example, overpasses in New York were designed 
to limit racial minorities from accessing the best parks by causing public transit to circle, but 
never approach, those parks. Technological objects, by their very placement and use within 
societies, can serve as a pervasive factor in ordering social relations.246 
But Winner’s second claim goes much farther than this, as he argues that many 
technologies are inherently political. Leaning on Marx’s observations that material conditions of 
production produce a range of possibilities from which human subjectivies are crafted, Winner 
argues that humans are not simply determined by the structuring forces of objects but are instead 
actively involved as agents, and thus responsible for the ways in which changing the form of 
material objects changes the shape of ourselves and our environments.247 This argument works 
on two fronts: first, the adoption of a given technological system requires the creation and 
maintenance of the social conditions required to operate that system; and second, a given kind of 
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technology is strongly compatible with (though does not strictly require) certain relationships of 
power. Winner suggests, for example, that the atomic bomb, by its very nature, demands a highly 
ordered, hierarchical, and secretive set of maintenance structures. 
Technologies, Winner argues, are be inherently political because they are, fundamentally, 
ideas that have been built and put to use, causing significant alterations to human activity and 
institutions as they become widespread.248 In this way, technologies shed their instrumental tool-
like qualities, instead becoming woven into our everyday existence as social agents. 
Technologies, in this view, cease to be objects separated from subjects and instead become 
forces that help shape the possibilities of what it means to be human. They are both structured 
(they arise out of specific material circumstances in order to answer particular historical needs) 
and they, themselves, become structuring forces that help determine what it is possible to 
imagine. “In an important sense,” Winner argues, “we become the beings who work on assembly 
lines, who talk on telephones…who eat processed foods, who clean our homes with powerful 
chemicals.”249 With the adoption of new technologies, Winner argues, “new worlds are being 
made.”250 
With regard to digital culture, Winner is especially critical of what he has termed “the 
rise of mythinformation,” the “almost religious belief” in the ability of information access to 
effect total progressive transformations of society at all levels.251 The popularity of 
mythinformation, Winner argues, can be attributed to the widespread Western dependence on 
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computers and information technologies. The enormous demands of the management of 
information and data at such a scale means, for Winner, that the telos of modern society has 
increasingly changed to adopt information access, management, and distribution as its primary 
mission. This telos allows citizens to rationalize the widespread disruption of unemployment, 
deskilling, and other consequences of the information infrastructure—they become convinced 
that these sacrifices are worth it for the sake of access to information.252  
This ideology of mythinformation is deeply ahistorical. If improving society were just 
about information access, libraries would be our greatest successes.253 Yet programmers, geeks, 
and hackers do not invest their time and energy in libraries. Instead, Winner argues, 
mythinformation rests on the thin assumption that widespread access to computers will 
necessarily produce more democratic, egalitarian, and diverse societies simply through access to 
and dissemination of electronic information. The PC is re-figured as a great equalizer, ushering 
in decentralized authority and an equality of social classes in a new "global village."254  
 Winner’s critique of technology can be reductive. It seems to imply that if everyone 
were to just speak with one another (engineers, scholars, politicians), we could assert control 
over our technological futures. Winner’s analysis is sometimes reminiscent of media historian 
and social theorist John Durham Peters’ arguments in his classic 1999 book Speaking Into the 
Air: A History of the Idea of Communication. Peters’ argues that the “dream” of communication 
has long been structured by a religious longing for direct communion between souls, 
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unencumbered by time, space, and misunderstanding.255 For Peters, this dream has long been 
fueled by the increasing sophistication and powers of technological devices. In a similar vein, 
Kopimism’s quest for the free and unencumbered access and distribution of information reveals 
an ethic deeply shaped both by hacker commitments and by the legacy of Protestant Christianity. 
It is on the foundation of these two cultural formations that Kopimists declare their most sacred 
values: “Copying information is ethically right.  Sharing information is ethically right.  Remixing 
is the holiest act a person can undertake with data, as it validates the worth of the data as a 
foundation for new forms of data.  The Internet is holy.”256 
 
Conclusion 
 The prior chapter demonstrated the conflict between competing contemporary ideologies 
concerning the fundamental nature of information and the ethics of information access, 
particularly in the context of religious knowledge. This chapter has moved the argument forward 
by exploring how the fundamental ethical values shared by groups such as Project Chanology 
and Anonymous have been adopted and developed by the Kopimists and the authors of The 
Hacker Ethic. At a very basic level, this chapter has shown how Kopimists are not aberrant but 
instead build on widespread assumptions about information access, and I have argued that 
Kopimism should not be dismissed as fringe to the study of religion but rather central to it. The 
Kopimists demonstrate in an inventive fashion the intertwining two dominant undercurrents of 
our times: the pervasive hacker ethic and the deep cultural legacy of Protestant Christianity. 
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 The following chapter will turn to explore how a set of influential contemporary public 
figures, particularly Timothy Leary and Jason Silva, have configured the discourse of 
information freedom as more broadly religious, in a rhetoric that echoes the particular cultural 
residue of gnosticism. At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that the information freedom 
commitments of Anonymous, Open Source Scientologists, and the Kopimists extend in a 
pervasive and diffuse form. The following chapter will explore the surprisingly religious form 







An Ontological DJ  
 
 
Men have become like gods. Isn't it about  
time that we understood our divinity? Science  
offers us total mastery over our environment  
and over our destiny, yet instead of rejoicing we  
feel deeply afraid. Why should this be? 
— Edmund Leach, A Runaway World  
 
 
Our ability to create virtual future possibilities…  
to realize the freedom that we have to compose  
our lives—what Timothy Leary calls the ‘vertigo of  
freedom’—to realize that we are bound by no  
limits … we engineer, literally, our own divinity. 
Woah. 




Shots of Awe 
 Jason Silva cannot sit still before a camera. His hair is wild, his beard scruffed. He rocks 
back and forth, using his hands to propel his words forward. He delivers his monologue in a 
rapid, breathless clip, with the brute force of an energy that his body can’t seem to contain. On 
the greenscreen behind him a floating Buddha head drifts by, then an exploding star, then a 
cyberscape. He leans so far back in his chair that it threatens to topple, saved only by his sudden 
jump forward, a bodily motion that serves to emphasize his breathless name-dropping of 
philosophers, artists, scientists, and poets. Silva is weaving a story about divinity, information, 
and well, you, dear viewer. His videos, a long-running “minidocumentary” series called Shots of 
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Awe, are hosted on YouTube and have accumulated over 100 million views as of mid-2018. 
These videos have launched his career—propelling him onto television, onto the corporate stages 
of Silicon Valley, and into an Emmy-nomination.  
When asked to describe what it is that he does, Silva responds with a simple answer: 
“philo-poetry” (a portmanteau of “philosophy-poetry”).257 Indeed, as I show below, Silva’s video 
series builds on a lineage of poet philosophy popular in the 1960s counterculture, updating many 
of the same themes of liberation, mind-body dualism, and psychedelic freedom highlighted in the 
works of Timothy Leary, who he cites at length. Silva combines themes in Leary’s thought with 
the early career insights of religious studies scholar Erik Davis, who has published several well-
received pieces on the rise and impact of “techgnosticism” (a technologically-focused form of 
gnosticism that I detail below). Silva’s final product is a highly influential video series focused 
on the hidden-yet-innate, enchanting potentials of information technology, which—when 
recognized appropriately, Silva argues—provide literal “shots of awe” in an otherwise 
disenchanted world. Indeed, Silva is particularly fond of telling his audience that technology will 
(if acknowledged and harnessed appropriately) enable us to “become gods.”258 
Silva is illuminating for this dissertation for a number of reasons. First, he inherits, and 
advances, the same countercultural understandings of information that have already been at play 
in the ideologies of Anonymous, Open Source Scientology, and Kopimism. Second, Silva’s 
explicit reliance on the concept of gnosticism helps to put some of the implications of this 
countercultural discourse in heavy relief—in particular, Silva demonstrates how some ways of 
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thinking about the “freedom of information” serve to divide the body from the mind 
(reconceived here as the realm of information and information flows).  
Although it is a highly contested term (as I detail below), gnosticism has traditionally 
been framed in many of the same ways that Scientology frames information: secret knowledge 
that is highly protected and policed from access by anyone other than properly initiated elites 
(who can only comprehend such knowledge after moving through a particular and secretive 
process). The echoes of gnosticism that I identify in this chapter pose similar values as that of 
Scientology, but these echoes are reformed under the conditions of late capitalism. Information 
technologies, the mostly highly congealed and material products of capitalism, promise to open 
access to information for all.  The gnostic impulse to protect religious knowledge is almost 
reversed—sacred knowledge is shepherded out into the world, rather than protected from it.  
Through this chapter, first I will detail how Silva uses (and builds on) both Leary and 
Davis. I will then use Philip J. Lee’s Against the Protestant Gnostics to explore how Silva’s 
explicit use of the category of gnosticism further highlights the continued legacy of 
Protestantism on discourses of freedom of information. Together, these sections will demonstrate 
how this marriage of gnosticism and techno-philosophy, arising out of the American 
counterculture, infuses information with forms of agency while at the same time that robbing the 
human body of those same characteristics. The final sections of this chapter will argue that, for 
the thinkers examined here, access to information becomes politically and spiritually crucial 
because information is understood precisely as the medium that will allow us to foster our own 
divinity.  
 In chapter one, I set the stage for these questions by introducing competing definitions of 
information that have been particularly influential in American culture since the mid-twentieth 
century. I demonstrated how information and information freedom were at the heart of the 
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ongoing tensions between Anonymous, Open Source Scientology, and the Church of 
Scientology. In chapter two, I explored how many of the values espoused by Anonymous and 
Open Source Scientology have been further exemplified by the Missionary Church of Kopimism, 
but also extend out beyond the new religion itself. There I showed how certain configurations of 
the hacker ethic—the deeply entrenched values of open access and anti-surveillance, the 
celebration of the remixture and copying of data, a set of aesthetic and affective commitments 
that emphasize a highly playful, semi-ironic, but also utopian worldview that envisions an open 
information world to be a fundamentally better world—draw on, are informed by, and extend 
theological themes from the Protestant Reformation and the Protestant work ethic.  
 This chapter builds on chapters one and two by analyzing Jason Silva’s highly successful 
video project Shots of Awe. Silva is not a member or leader of a new religious movement, but his 
video series espouses a vision of technology and religion that is shared by the Open Source 
Scientologists and Kopimists. Silva’s success and speaking tours (before such audiences as 
Google, the Singularity Summit, and National Geographic) are a testament to the enthusiasm for 
his religiously-inflected, corporate-ready perspectives on the viability of technology to enchant 
an (assumedly) disenchanted world. He also demonstrates to a greater degree than the other case 
studies considered here what is at stake in this enchanted, but disembodied, worldview. Silva is 
important because he is thoroughly embedded in, and representative of, the firmament of people 
who are thinking about technology as sacralized but are doing so as members of the corporate 
world, rather than as members of new religious movements.  
 
Entering Godmode 
The National Geographic has described Silva as “some kind of Ontological DJ, 
[recompiling] the source code of western philosophy by mixing and mashing it up into a form of 
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recombinant creativity, which elevates understanding from the dry and prosaic, to a sensual 
cognitive romance.”259 The Atlantic more dryly describes him as “a Timothy Leary” for the 
digital age.260 Whatever it is that Silva delivers, it sells. He has been invited to talk at Google, 
TEDGlobal, and the Singularity Summit. His speaker profile lists him as a futurist who is “part 
Timothy Leary, part Ray Kurzweil” (the most famous transhumanist living today).261 He is best 
known for his work as a filmmaker and host of the National Geographic’s Brain Games (a 
popular television series). Silva’s most significant project is his long running web series, Shots of 
Awe. The two-to-three-minute documentary shorts are hosted on TestTube, an online channel for 
the Discovery Digital Networks, and on curated YouTube playlists. Shots of Awe invites 
audiences to watch Silva “freestyle his way into the complex systems of society, technology and 
human existence and discusses the truth and beauty of science in a form of existential jazz.”262  
Many of Silva’s videos—including his keynote presentation at the Festival of Dangerous 
Ideas in 2015—discuss enchantment and technology through the concept of “entering godmode.” 
Although “godmode” is a term that was originally coined to describe the use of cheat codes to 
gain invulnerability in a video game, Silva uses the phrase as shorthand for describing how 
technology breaks physical, cultural, psychological, and spiritual limitations. “The passport for 
the numinous lies within,” Silva tells his audiences, “and we can hack it.”263 He looks up into the 
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camera: “We are as gods,” he triumphantly states, “we might as well get used to it.”264 This idea 
is likely familiar to many of his older audience members, who first read these same lines in 
Stewart Brand’s highly influential opening of the inaugural Whole Earth Catalog in 1968: “We 
are as Gods, we might as well get good at it.”265 Indeed, Silva’s approach to godhood owes much 
to the counterculture in general, and to the thought of Timothy Leary in particular.  
Silva’s “Entering Godmode” video in the Shots of Awe series begins by drawing on a 
quotation from spiritual literature author Diana Slattery: “We are Ontological Engineers: hacking 
reality and constructing worlds.”266 Slattery’s book Xenolinguistics: Psychedelics, Language, 
and the Evolution of Consciousness builds on American mid-twentieth century traditions of 
psychedelics and mysticism to argue that the mind is uniquely responsible for creating reality, 
and it drawn on many of the utopian themes of the psychedelic revolution Timothy Leary 
attempted to establish in the 1960s. In “Entering Godmode,” Silva marries Slattery’s claim that 
that the mind is uniquely responsible for creating reality with technology: 
The word Entheogenic means God Facilitating. It’s this idea that tools and 
techniques can act as conduits, as mediation catalysts for encounters with the 
numinous… They are essentially “God-Hacks!” It’s this notion that we are able 
to tweak our subjective experience to catalyze a shift in consciousness that leads 
us to a kind of “God-Mode.” Do not give in to the astonishment. The realization 
that reality is but a matrix of perception that we can pierce that veil, that we can 
raise the stage is astonishing. It means we are ontological engineers.... Shamans 
were literally ecstatic technicians of the sacred. This notion that we are able to 
create conditions, to create spaces for all of us to become ecstatic technicians of 
the sacred. The passport for the numinous lies within. And that we can hack and 
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there is a “God Hack!” Boundaries are being dissolved and we are being reborn. 
It is our birthright, it is our birthplace.267   
 
Silva thus posits technological media as the new psychedelics: technology can, and 
should, be used to expand our consciousness, to (re)create the world around us by opening new 
conceptual realms, and to allow us to conquer these new frontiers. Silva conflates the 
unidentified, archetypal “shaman” with the inner potential of technology-users everywhere, 
thereby leveraging the cultural power latent in the image of the shaman to portray technology as 
an apparatus for magic. The shaman’s assumed magical power becomes a modernized 
commercial promise: the secret is within, provided you consume the technology necessary to 
access it.  
Silva draws on important strands of religious studies to make this claim. He finds 
inspiration in Erik Davis, describing him as one of a small group of “cultural luminaries or 
digital shamans, ecstatic technicians of the sacred,” as well as in Mircea Eliade, a canonical 
scholar now critiqued for his transhistorical and transcultural definition of religion.268 Silva 
conflates the two in his video Technologies of Ecstasy:  
So there's an amazing philosopher called Eliade, who wrote a book about 
shamanism, where he spoke of psychedelic drugs as technologies of ecstasy. 
Notice that he uses the term "technologies" here. He talks about them as 
mankind's cognitive toolkit, agents of psychic transformation. We've been 
engaging for tens of thousands of years to transform the perceptions of the body, 
mind.  Hacking our awareness and our perceptions, you know that effervescent 
flux of sensation and perception that is in a way of all we have and all we are, as 
Erik Davis says… And I think today, these modern digital shamans, these ecstatic 
technicians of the sacred [are trying to] unplug us and show us the bigger, wider, 
more far reaching universe that goes beyond what the eye can see.269 
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Silva connects Davis and Eliade to a countercultural lineage that embraced psychoactive 
hallucinogens primarily as a “technology of the sacred,” a tool for breaking out of the mundane. 
The most influential figure in this lineage is Timothy Leary, who is famously for his role in the 
psychedelic movement of the 1960s but who by the 1990s was arguing that network information 
technologies did everything psychedelics could do, but better.270  
 
Cyberpunks and Chaos Religions 
Before moving forward to consider how countercultural ideas about technology and 
religion have been reprocessed by Silva in his Shots of Awe video series, it is useful to explore 
some of the most prescient writings of Timothy Leary. In the 1960s, Leary connected the use of 
psychedelics to religious rituals of mind expansion. This link had already been forged in Alan 
Watt's influential essay, “Psychedelics and Religious Experience.”271 Borrowing from a 
psychology of religion that stemmed ultimately from William James, Watts argued that altered 
states of consciousness allow for “continuous process with God, the Universe, with the Ground 
of Being” or whatever else culture might call “the ultimate and external reality.” Watts blamed 
Western systems of logic and economic practices for the lack of acceptance of drugs as a primary 
route to connect with the divine, claiming that in the West drugs were “bad for business” and that 
Eastern traditions were much better suited for truths wrought from psychedelic experiences 
because those traditions were more open to personal experience (as opposed to external authority 
or expertise).  
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Leary’s psychedelic revolution popularized the belief that objects and tools could be used 
to free the mind from the prison of the normative behaviors that had worked on the body. Fused 
with a shallow, Protestant understanding of Eastern traditions, the psychedelic revolution was 
driven by the belief that the mind could connect directly to the divine, a glimmer of which 
remained trapped within the body itself.272 Beginning in the 1960s, the idea of the personal 
computer was transformed away from its status as a key symbol of the military-industrial 
complex. Until this point, computers were mainly used by the military to produce ballistics tables 
and to facilitate collaborative research on weapons systems. The counterculture emphasis on 
individual expression and liberation made the idea of the personal computer possible.273 
Positioned by Leary and others alongside psychedelics, the personal computer was re-envisioned 
as the ultimate technology of mind and spirit expansion.  
Part of this radical re-envisioning of the computer as a tool for personal enhancement, 
rather than military use, was due to the proximity of Silicon Valley to the heartland of the 
Californian countercultural scene. Engineers, programmers, and computer scientists who fueled 
the local economy by day through military research funding spent their evenings taking LSD, 
attending Grateful Dead concerts, participating in communes, and converting the most advanced 
computer science laboratories into nightly video arcades. Performance art and the innovative and 
playful use of electronic technologies were adopted alongside other countercultural tools to break 
out of, and otherwise augment, rational thought.  
Leary extended this connection between psychedelics and mind expansion to computer 
technologies.  He translated his vision into the terms of the digital age by leaning heavily on the 
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writings of communication theorist Marshall McLuhan. In both content and form, Leary evoked 
McLuhan by playing with typeface and constantly reminding his audience that the world was 
experienced through a series of mediations that were both formed—that is, historically and 
culturally situated, like the Gutenberg printing press or the internet—and forming—productive of 
a certain way of seeing and therefore relating to the world. Arguing that media technologies and 
institutions were structuring the potentials of the mind and brain—which he equated—Leary 
wrote, “You create the realities you inhabit…Far more than by weapons, society is controlled by 
multimedia, neurological imprinting. Marshall McLuhan reminded us that the medium is the 
message.”274 Informational networks, according to Leary, would finally allow us to transcend our 
flesh—giving way to the true dream of authentic, fully communicative meetings between 
individual minds.275 Readjusting to this new vision of life requires that individuals become 
“cyberpunks,” informational pilots able to manipulate and travel along the threads of data across 
the universe.276  
 Leary believed that traditional religions motivated certain technologies of consumption 
and that the technology of the Bible could be re-understood as an example of brain control in the 
most literal sense. The Bible, Leary argued, was not a manual that advocated for self-control and 
experiment, but one that spoke of a universe that was “operated” and “owned” by a bureaucratic 
figure.277 Like the Bible, traditional religions resonated with technologies that placed individuals 
in hierarchies. This was most represented in the television, and Leary spoke of television 
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audiences as unable to do anything other than consume.278 Alternatively, digital technologies like 
video games and the internet allowed individuals to take control and to be interactive – to mold 
and assume their own realities through access and participation in a truly networked and 
collaborative fashion.279  
 Leary outlined a tradition of “chaos engineers” who he believed had reached their 
pinnacle expression in the lives and works of contemporary computer scientists.280 Charting a 
network of influence that hit all the countercultural favorites, Leary outlined a lineage from 
Eastern yogi traditions, to the Tibetan Book of the Dead, to the computer sciences – all working, 
according to Leary, though a logic of saving chaos. “Saving chaos” for Leary was about 
encountering the world in its “glorious complexity.” Finding a metaphor in neurobiology, Leary 
argued that while science could be understood as chaos in the world, our brains are better 
understood as the chaos within ourselves—the goal is to learn how to expand and operate our 
brains.  
Leary mapped this tradition onto technological as well as religious history.  The 
television works in the same way as old “law and order” religions that misguidedly attempted to 
“order chaos” instead of allowing for the natural play of exploration.281 These technologies, 
broadly understood, dampen individual thought in favor of hierarchy and control. The internet is 
the definitive expression of the parallel but inverse human trend: “chaos engineers” who value 
play and experimentation.  
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 The Tibetan Book of the Dead was one such expression of chaos engineering, and for 
those readers familiar with his famous 1964 text, The Psychedelic Experience: A Manual Based 
on the Tibetan Book of the Dead, Leary’s attempts to analysis the tensions between control and 
experimentation will be all too familiar. The computer engineers at work behind early internet 
and Apple systems were Leary’s newest chaos engineers, his monks for the digital age.282 The 
key to understanding the utopic potentials of information technologies, according to Leary, was 
the ability of information networks to allow humankind to transcend flesh. 
As a form of chaos engineering, digital technologies could completely “rewire” the brain 
and, along with it, traditional modes of thought. After the failures of the commune experiments 
and the drug cultures to achieve a utopian form of social living, Leary began advocating for the 
adoption of information technologies as the “true” and “final” counterculture. Leary celebrated 
seekers who became “cyberpunks”—individuals who learned how to code and actively use 
information technologies to bypass the limitations of their physical bodies and traditional social 
and cultural boundaries of race, gender, and class.283  
Cyberpunks, Leary argued, would eventually bring about the true goal of the 
counterculture in a site he called “Cyberia”—a nonphysical leisure space in which mind/body 
would collapse into a truly egalitarian world. Cyberia was thus the ultimate expression of the 
commune experiments of the 1960s. Believing that digital technologies shared the same 
liberatory potential as psychedelics, Leary argued new technologies could completely “rewire” 
the brain and, along with it, traditional modes of thought. After the failures of commune 
experiments and drug cultures to achieve a utopian form of social life, Leary began advocating 
for the adoption of information technologies as the “true” and “final” counterculture.  
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Leary connected this potential to the interactivity of the computer versus the passivity of 
the television screen. The television is a “reality screen” that is primarily about consumption. 
Programming is consumed by families gathered as receivers in their living rooms night by night, 
presented with a false choice between programs. The television, much like traditional religious 
organizations and bureaucratic structures, works to control the consumer by dictating reality and 
preventing interactivity.  
 Conversely, the arrival of the internet has transformed users into producer-participants. 
“Cyberpunks” actively create their reality screens while at the same time working with their 
peers in networked relations that bypass traditional social and cultural boundaries of race, 
gender, and class.284 Cyberia is the “re-tribalized” global village of McLuhan. 
 
New Gods 
With Leary’s technological utopianism in mind, I now turn to explore the particular 
formulations of “religion” that have been most influential on Silva’s Shots of Awe series. Silva 
promises “rapture,” “awe,” “magic,” and “gods.” These are not neutral words, nor is Silva’s 
mysticism the bland universalism he implies. His philosophy of technology is deeply informed 
by his reading of Erik Davis, a former tech-journalist and now doctoral candidate in the religious 
studies program at Rice University. Davis’s Techgnosis: Myth, Magic, and Mysticism in the Age 
of Information (1998) is one of the most heavily cited texts in Silva’s Shots of Awe. It is Davis 
who introduces the language of techgnosticism into Silva’s videos. To understand Silva’s 
ideology of technology, it is important to grasp Silva’s use of Davis to anchor his videos in a 
theory of “techgnosticism,” leveraging the idiom of religious concepts to argue that the 
technological capacity for spiritual evolution is an important expression of the same deep “drive” 
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that produces all of the world’s important religious traditions. I will also analyze some of the 
fundamental assumptions about information and religion that underlie Silva’s theory.  
In his 2015 introduction to the most recent edition of TechGnosis, philosopher Eugene 
Thacker praises Davis for taking up the mantle of William James’s Varieties of Religious 
Experience and applying the spirit of that book to the 1980s and 1990s. Thacker writes: 
“TechGnosis was among a handful of books from the 1990s that…was unique in that it refused 
to see the development of new technologies as a purely secular phenomena. Where the ‘religious 
impulse’ cropped up could be in the most unexpected of places.”285 Indeed, Davis describes the 
crux of his project as attempting to answer the following paradox: “here we are: a 
hypertechnological and cynically postmodern culture seemingly drawn like a passel of moths 
toward the guttering flames of the premodern mind.”286 Throughout this text, Davis, like most of 
James’s commentators, treats religious variety as stemming from the same essential root, as 
deriving from the same fundamental impulses. This is the kernel that drives Davis in 
TechGnosis. Davis believes that different cultures at different points of history have expressed 
the same, essential, spiritual impulse in various ways. In a version of the secularization thesis 
(which will be explored further in chapter four), Davis argues that although this fundamental 
human drive has been suppressed in modern times, it has found recent expression through 
technology: 
More than any other invention, information technology transcends its status as a 
thing, simply because it allows for the incorporeal encoding and transmission of 
mind and meaning. In a sense, this hybridity reflects the age-old sibling rivalry 
between form and content: the material and technical structure of media impose 
formal constraints on communication, even as the immediacy of communication 
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continues to challenge formal limitations as it crackles from mind to mind…and 
information flow. By creating a new interface between the self, the other, and the 
world beyond, media technologies become part of the self, the other, and the 
world beyond.287 
 
Technology, rather than dispelling transcendent meaning, provides new resources for 
seeking it.  “The passport for the numinous lies within,” Silva tells the viewer, his beanie tilting 
precariously over the back of his head, uttering a claim that scholars have long associated with 
gnostic traditions.288 In other videos Silva attributes his use of the language of gnosticism 
explicitly to Davis. Techgnosis, Davis writes, is a “secret history” of the ways in which the story 
of technology in America has also always been a story about marginalized religions.289 Using the 
occult, psychedelics, and cases of the supernatural as his case studies, Davis argues that what ties 
these two stories together is the centrality of an essentially gnostic spirituality (here meaning a 
spirituality which crucially depends upon knowledge), which “naturally” finds an ally in the use 
of technological devices. Technology drives religion by providing new tools for meaning-
making, and religious impulses (in the form of the spiritual drive), Davis argues, have in turn 
fueled technological innovation. When asked for concrete examples, Davis is keen to gesture to 
any and all technologies. He reads all technological innovation as essentially, fundamentally, 
religious. As Davis explains in an afterword to his text, published by the LA Review of Books: 
I became seized by the McLuhanesque [sic] conviction that the history of religion was 
really just a part of the history of media. As a pagan dabbler, I grokked that the hermetic 
and magical fabulations that had gone underground in the modern West had returned, like 
Freud’s repressed hankerings, in technological forms both built and imagined, demonic 
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and transcendent, sublime and ridiculous. I began to track these secret histories, and my 
notes grew until they demanded to be a book.290 
 
As the world is increasingly structured by information, information technology has 
assumed a techgnostic role for Davis, becoming a powerful technology molding “the source of 
all mystical glimmerings: the human self.”291 Information technology transcends its “status as a 
thing” because it allows “for the incorporeal encoding and transmission of mind and 
meaning.”292 The spiritual drive captures and uses these potentials of information technology for 
its own purposes, so that in this sense, “technologies of communication are always, at least 
potentially, technologies of the sacred, simply because the ideas and experiences of the sacred 
have always informed human communication."293 
Underlying this argument are three fundamental assumptions about the nature of media, 
religion, and information. The first is an understanding of media influenced by Canadian 
communications theorist Marshall McLuhan. Following McLuhan, Davis understands media as 
extensions of the body that fundamentally transform how humankind interacts with and 
perceives the world. New interfaces and new technologies, in this view, are intimate: they 
change the self by mediating the interconnections between “the self, the other, and the world 
beyond.”294 Media encode human thought and experience into the technology itself, which in 
return makes new perceptions and new activities possible. Media become both a vehicle for self-
expression and an influencing structure that changes the very “nature of the self.” 
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The second assumption in Davis’s work is that digital information, which begins as a 
mathematical concept, acquires new power as it extends into information technologies. 
Technology, as Davis notes, tends to act against our wills and expectations. It is a trickster, 
producing unintended consequences and new opportunities not imaginable before its production. 
For Davis, this trickster nature combined with the conceptual pressures placed on information 
leads to information technologies being especially fruitful for appropriation and revision by the 
spiritual imagination.295  
Finally, Davis’s third assumption is that the spiritual imagination is made up of two parts: 
the soul, which he links to the creative imagination that finds itself in enchantment, and the 
spirit, which he describes as an impersonal spark that seeks clarity.296 For Davis, our earliest or 
most primitive resource to satiate this drive is religion. Different expressions of this drive 
account for the vast differences amongst religious traditions. Although Davis acknowledges 
some level of human construction of experience, including religious experience, he argues that 
those differences are always an expression of one same, essential drive.  
These assumptions, working together, enable Davis to argue that with new technologies 
new gods are created. Davis argues that the spiritual drive urges humans to find meaning and 
communion with one another. Because communion for him is fundamentally about 
communication, technologies are uniquely suited to spiritual ends. In fact, Davis consistently 
describes technology as disproving the secularization thesis. Rather than dispelling meaning by 
disenchanting the world, technology feeds the religious drive. “New technologies,” Davis 
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explains, “open up new spaces, and these spaces are always mapped, on one level or another, 
through the imagination.”297  
Hence, Davis argues that technology allows for new expressions of a fundamental, cross-
cultural spiritual drive. When new technologies emerge, there is a necessary gap in our 
understanding of them. They slip past our expectations, enforce their own limitations and failures 
and unexpected potential. “[Every] time culture succeeds in revolutionizing its cybernetic 
technologies,” Davis writes, “in massively widening the bandwidth of its thought-tech, it invites 
the creation of new gods.”298 This is, for Davis, “technomysticism,” or the proliferation of 
spiritual imaginings and possibilities in the face of newly adopted technologies.  
Therefore, for Davis, technology does not only become religious when religious people 
use it as a tool. Instead, technology is always-already latent with mystical possibility.  For Davis, 
the consequence of this understanding of the human is that, first, spirituality moves on its own 
accord, finding expression wherever it can, and, second, that spirituality loves expressing itself 
through the new worlds of possibility that attend emergent technologies. Davis calls this the 
“techgnostic drive” of humankind, and his book is an attempt to document some of the ways in 
which that drive has found particularly robust expression in American new religions: the 
Spiritualists and their telegraph; the ghostly, disembodied voices on the telephone; and the search 
for spiritual transcendence of individual cognition within the digital hive mind.  
 Davis attributes this mystical quality to the opaque, but omnipotent, powers of 
information. “There is so much pressure on ‘information’—the word, the conceptual space, but 
also the stuff itself,” Davis writes, “that it crackles with energy, drawing to itself mythologies, 
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metaphysics, hints of arcane magic.”299 This magic, Davis argues, does not stem from 
information’s compatibility with magical systems, as Stef Aupers (discussed in chapter one) 
would have it, but rather that information and data is itself serves as gnostic knowledge. In 
Flame Wars, Davis cites the early Christian gnostic theologian Valentinus (c.100-160 AD) 
claiming that, “What liberates us is the knowledge of who we were, what we became, where we 
are, where into we have been thrown, where to we speed, where from we are redeemed, what 
birth is and what rebirth is.”300 Davis builds on this to argue that information is the very heart of 
religious truth, that “Gnosis comes in the form of information: a sudden blast of immediate data 
which is identical with the abrupt recognition that such information exists.”301 
Davis’s vision of technognosticism modifies David Noble’s argument that Western 
technology is a religious project formed out of and inescapably tied to Christian millenarianism. 
Broadly, Christian millenarianism refers to the belief in the eminent coming of an ideal society, 
often ushered in by revolutionary action.302 Noble’s use of the concept highlights several specific 
characteristics: an imminent apocalypse that is prophesized in the Book of Revelation, the saving 
of an elite chosen by God, themes of transcendence and human redemption, the possibility of 
immortality, and the perfectibility of humankind.303 In particular it is this last clause (the 
perfectibility of humankind) that has resonance with the values of technology. Noble identifies 
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three guiding values of technology: progress, perfection, transcendence. These values are what 
roots technology so thoroughly to Christian millenarianism. Through technology, Noble argues, 
humankind seeks to restore themselves to Godliness, through the perfection of themselves, their 
societies, and the mastery of nature. They seek, Noble quips, to build a “new humanity.”304 
Religion and technology are spun from the same belief system.  
Noble argues that Christian beliefs—whether explicitly or implicitly held—have guided 
every major technological development since the Middle Ages and have contributed to the 
hegemony of Christian ideas and ideals even in self-identified secular countries. Noble defines 
technology as “the making and using of artifacts,” a definition that allows him to argue that 
religion itself is a kind of technology, “a maker and user of its own kind of artifacts.”305 For him, 
the key moment in technological history was when medieval monks decided that the practical 
arts were a good method for pursuing redemption. This, he argues, shaped technological 
imaginations for religious ends. In time, Christian millenarianism became the guiding principle 
for technology, and the use of technologies in the quest for human perfection became a central 
factor in the relationship between humans and their tech. The belief in human redemption, 
transcendence, immortality, the superiority of elites, and the perfectibility of humankind—
especially as they are repackaged in more secular notions of progress—all come from this 
merger of Christian ideals and the ideologies of technology. In the contemporary world, the 
explicit use of Christian theology has given way to the unthinking use of technology to pursue 
human perfectibility. Noble wishes to unyoke technology from this implicit religious directive 
and to champion responsibility and reflection in the creation and use of technologies, most often 
by critiquing the notion of progress.   
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Davis champions a version of Noble’s argument. They share the same project, which is to 
track the ways in which technology has served the religious imagination, but Davis believes this 
is a more broadly gnostic project (imagining saving religious knowledge to come from 
anywhere), not a specifically Christian one.  For Davis, the term gnosticism gestures toward an 
individually-experienced spirituality that begins in alienation and searches for meaning. This 
notion encompasses a communion that is marked deeply by "transcendence," a return or an 
overcoming of the state of alienation in the move toward one that is more "real" (though the real 
changes given different contexts, accounting for both techno-utopianism and techno-terror or 
dread).306  It is this disinterest in immanence and in worldly matters that has caught critical 
attention.  
 
Protestant Gnostics  
 The last two sections have provided important historical and intellectual context for many 
of Silva’s claims in the Shots of Awe series. I will now turn to set these influences against the 
framework of Protestant gnosticism as it has been articulated by theologian Philip J. Lee. Lee’s 
1987 book, Against the Protestant Gnostics, is a widely-cited condemnation of “crypto-
gnosticism” in Protestant Christianity.  
 Gnosticism is a controversial and much debated term. It was first coined in the eighteenth 
century to designate religious movements claiming special access to “gnosis,” a superior form of 
divine knowledge.307 Gnosis, most generally, refers to divine knowledge that is capable of 
awakening and returning fallen beings to divinity, hence it is often called a “saving knowledge” 
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as salvation hinges upon access to this type of knowledge.308 Scholars refute the term based upon 
the fact that most religious texts categorized as gnostic do not self-identity as such nor do they 
always contain the term gnosis.309  
I am not concerned with this important scholarly debate here, however, and am instead 
interested in how Silva and Davis use this term. Silva and Davis find use in the terms “gnosis” 
and “gnosticism” because of the ways in which it points to a saving knowledge. I am interested 
in the way their use of the term points to a set of ideological tendencies that are the very ones 
Silva identifies: information (conflated with knowledge) as salvific, a division between the mind 
and the body, a celebration of elite individuals who are capable of understanding and putting 
knowledge to use, and a view of the world as broken (so that the only way out is personal 
transcendence).  
Lee uses the term gnosticism to identify a perennial world-denying mood in Christianity 
that began with (but is clearly not limited to) the early gnostic that were condemned as heretics 
by the Christians who became Catholic and Orthodox. Lee’s project is theological and organized 
as an attack upon “Protestant gnostics”—Protestants who have succumbed to a gnostic way of 
thinking and being. Still, Lee is useful for this project because he connects a diffuse 
understanding of gnosticism (that is reflected in the writings of Silva and Davis) to the modern 
American context. Tracing the characteristics identified by Lee in Silva’s thought highlights how 
Silva and other thinkers enchanted by the spiritual potential of technology rely on an 
understanding of technology that is deeply informed by a diffuse Protestant worldview.  
Lee identifies several key characteristics of the discourse of Protestant gnosticism: a 
general “mood of despair” about the human condition, a great distance between creator and 
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created, and the proliferation of harsh binary oppositions between pairs such as the individual 
and the communal and knowledge and faith. Several of these characteristics result from an 
inward-looking self, who believes in its own abilities to detach from (and in Lee’s view 
“escape”) the surrounding world. In American Protestantism, Lee argues, these deep values have 
taken on a uniquely American modality, beginning with the early Puritan colonists.  
 Lee believes that seventeenth-century Puritans moved in what he characterizes as gnostic 
directions by individualizing the covenant with God and cultivating a generalized sense of doom, 
failure, and alienation. Lee argues that Puritan theological and affective changes brought New 
England theology “perilously” close to gnosticism on several occasions, particularly in what he 
believes was the Puritan concentration on the inward self as the site for salvation.310  The 
individualization of the divine covenant transformed American Protestant Christianity into an 
“essentially...private psychological event” within which the relationship between God and the 
believer is transformed from a communal contract of the Abrahamic tradition into a private 
transaction between the individual and God alone. Hence, self-knowledge became saving-
knowledge, offering an escape from the world and a discovery of God that occurs solely within 
the individual self.311  
This individual seeker-self is attended by the “gnostic mood,” or a sense of despair mixed 
with a potent elitism. The gnostic individual despairs because they know that the world is 
marked by limitations: time, death, and decay. With the potential for saving knowledge internal 
to the individual, the gnostic is naturally drawn to believe that, although the world cannot be 
saved, they themselves might.312 The gnostic, therefore, desires to escape, but, as Lee argues, the 
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escape is not outward but inward: “the escape the gnostic accomplishes is, in simple terms, an 
escape into the self… The search for God and the search for self, because of this ontological 
identification, become synonymous.”313 In the search for God outside of the world, inside of the 
self, Lee argues, the creator God also becomes unattached from the creation, abstracted away 
from the world of God’s making. 314 
Lee’s text has been criticized in two important respects. Lee defines gnosticism in the 
negative, and his text is a theological polemic that seeks to expose this hidden, parasitic threat to 
what he understands to be authentic Christianity. For Lee, the American colonial experiment 
latched onto the worst themes of Protestant gnosticism, producing a supercharged variant that 
has spread through American culture more generally. Influenced by Weber’s use of “ideal 
types,” Lee believes his conceptualizing of gnosticism as an ideal type allows him to trace a 
“destructive heresy” that has recurred perennially in Christian thought from ancient to modern 
times, but particularly in modern America. Because of this use of an ideal type, Lee is 
unconcerned with defining gnosticism in a historically-rigorous way. Sidestepping recent debates 
about the meaning and value of the term, Lee, in the words of one reviewer:  
sees gnosticism as a type of religion that arises from a cultural mood of despair. 
Profound hopelessness gives rise to a religious worldview with these 
characteristics: 1) metaphysical alienation, which regards this cosmos as a 
‘colossal error’ rather than a good creation; 2) affirmation of a saving gnosis that 
provides the key to escape from this prison-world; 3) focus on the true self or 
spirit within, and repudiation of the body, sexuality, and the material world; 4) 
elitism in the sense that only those who have spiritual understanding can be saved; 
5) syncretism, as Gnostics are ready to turn all ideas, whatever their origin, to 
their own purposes.315 
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 Despite these concerns, Lee remains useful because he is pointing to an important 
historical theme in American religious history, even if the contours of this theme are not as clean 
or as linear as Lee would like it to appear. The tropes that Lee identifies as gnostic resonate 
throughout the writings of thinkers who believe in the magical properties of technology. Framed 
in another way, this naturalized rhetoric of Protestant gnosis provides an important tool for 
understanding longstanding and pervasive discourses that attribute magical affinities to 
technology.  
 Jason Silva himself makes the connection between technology and Lee’s formulation of 
gnosticism explicit in several videos throughout his series. He does so most clearly in Cellphone 
Wormholes.316 Differentiating himself from thinkers who believe that technologies are merely 
tools used to expand creativity, Silva instead details what he believes to be a “hidden dimension 
to technology that’s actually metaphysical, that was explored brilliantly in the work of Erik 
Davis.”317 This understanding of technology, for Silva, emphasizes that technologies and humans 
construct one another: “we build the tool,” he explains, “and the tool builds us. We are designed 
by that which we have designed.”318 To him, the promise of progress and transcendence of the 
body that technology offers justifies an uncritical approach to consumption: “we should be 
sympathetic to the reason that we run in droves to buy the new smartphone...We’re literally 
getting a mind upgrade.”319 Cellphones—branded, surveilled, and crafted with planned 
obsolescence—become not our accessories, but our “mind-ware upgrades.”320 
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 In other videos, Silva draws the same connections that Leary did between technology and 
psychedelics. Technology, for both thinkers, is just another, more powerful type of psychedelic. 
Because Silva and Leary are both working with a definition of technology that emphasizes how 
technology extends and surpasses the physical body, they redefine technology as “outsourced 
cognition” that reaches its apex in information systems. In “Psychedelic Technology,” Silva 
makes the connections between his and Leary’s thinking explicit, arguing “the counterculture 
1960s ethos of expand your horizons, transcend your reality, make that cognitive leap is no 
different than the manifestation of our information technology.”321 
 This is where Leary and Silva meet most readily, with a theology of information and 
individual divinity that is based on the power of technology to surpass the human body and other 
physical limitations. Writing decades earlier, Leary articulated his view on the connections 
between spirituality and the digital: “Recite to yourself some of the traditional attributes of the 
word ‘spiritual’—mythic, magical, ethereal, incorporeal, intangible, nonmaterial, disembodied, 
ideal, platonic. Is that not a definition of the electronic-digital?”322 Silva is able to draw on these 
diffuse countercultural assumptions about information and spirituality, connecting the 
psychedelic revolution with information technologies and ultimately with the mission statements 
of technology corporations. “Google is the first psychedelically informed super power,” he 
argues, “its visions of inter-connectivity, inter-conductivity and repository of all of human 
knowledge becomes almost like Gaea, like a collective consciousness.”323 
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 Silva ties this vision of information to a commitment that nanotechnology and genetic 
engineering will continue to progress until “aversive experience” (sickness, death, but also 
sadness) will vanish from the living world. “Malaise,” he argues, “will be replaced by the 
biochemistry of bliss...Every moment will be autopoietic. It’ll be like creating God.”324 Godhood, 
he argues, is attained through technologically-assisted, individual enlightenment, knowledge, and 
transcendence. That technology can unlock awe lost in a secular age is, for Silva, a sign of its 
gnostic potential.  
 
Dis/embodiment 
 It is at this point that Silva calls for his viewers to embrace “secular religiosity.” Silva 
suggests that religious institutions understand something important that secular institutions do 
not—that human beings “long for [encounters] with the epic, to rub up against the numinous.”325 
I will now turn to explore the role of the body and materiality in Silva’s videos and to highlight 
the capacity for violence that this understanding of information can manifest. The disembodied 
nature of this understanding of information allows thinkers like Silva to ignore materiality and 
the concrete material conditions of human identity—fueling Silva’s penchant for global 
platitudes (“create your own possibilities!” “We are Gods!”) rather than acknowledging 
troublesome particularities. As critical theorist and communications scholar Kathryn Hayles has 
argued, popular theories of information are often the vessel for a twenty-first century revival of 
                                               
324Jason Silva, “The End of Suffering,” Shots of Awe, August 12, 2014, video, 1:51, 
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325Jason Silva, “Secular Religiosity to Experience the Transcendent,” Shots of Awe, August 20, 
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René Descartes’s argument that minds are fundamentally disconnected from bodies—only now, 
consciousness is reconceived as a flow of information.326 
 The bifurcation of mind/body, information/context, is realized for Silva in the idea that 
DNA is essentially information (an idea that will be very familiar to readers, as the Kopimists 
make this same claim, as discussed in chapter two). In particular, Silva argues that the essence of 
both body and mind is information:  
Even biology is made of language. Biology is code. DNA is code. It's software 
that writes its own hardware. The words come before the matter emerges. Just 
think about that, because it resonates in all kinds of transcendental ways, this 
notion that mind came before matter. That mind didn't emerge from matter, but 
rather that mind preceded matter. It's a wild idea, but it does seem to be that 
everything can be described in terms of words, whether it's music, whether it's the 
atoms that describe the laws of physics. It's all describable. It's all information.”327 
 
By defining DNA and biology as specific types of information, Silva bolsters 
a further link to Leary’s counterculture vision of humans as the gods of information. Writing in 
Cyberpunk Cyberfreedom, Leary argued that the “bio-computer brain” also housed the divinity 
latent within each individual person.328 Central themes in Silva’s Shots of Awe series—the 
denigration of the body, the celebration of the seeking individual, the search for knowledge that 
untaps the divinity within—are ways of thinking about information technology’s relationship to 
the metaphysical that build on Leary’s thought. Despite the ambiguities of the category of 
gnosticism, it is unsurprising that Silva would link his argument to Erik Davis’s interpretation of 
“techgnosis,” a gnostic, mystical dimension of technology that has otherwise been hidden. The 
central ties between Silva and Leary are also the same central ties that connect this understanding 
                                               
326 Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, 
and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
 
327 Jason Silva, “The World is Made of Language,” Shots of Awe, February 3, 2015, video, 1:49, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3V7DC5ywsU4.  
328 Leary, Cyberpunks Cyberfreedom, 93. 
 151 
of technology more generally to Lee’s version of gnosticism, as it has been understood (at least 
popularly) in the United States.  
Silva assumes that human identity is housed in the mind, not the body. This allows him to 
dismiss material specificity and limitation as fleeting. “The human mind lives in the liminal 
zone,” Silva argues, “It is not bound by time, by space, and by distance.”329 Virtual reality, or 
what Silva calls “real virtualities,” provides a faster way to realize this truth and to break out of 
the limitations of the physical body and the world it occupies. When we enter “real virtualities 
[the] mind unplugs from the body and is not bound in any capacity,” Silva argues.330 The mind, 
housing identity, creativity, and the soul, utterly transcends the body.  
  Silva’s vision of the disembodied, perfected mind borrows heavily from Leary. Leary 
refers, as many hackers and science fiction aficionados do, to the human body as the “meat bag” 
and strives to break free from the prison of the body in order to engage with one another as our 
authentic selves, that is, as pure minds. This vision of the self draws on a long tradition in 
Western thought with roots in Plato, Descartes, and, closer to Leary’s time, Spiritualism and 
New Thought. Leary’s innovation in this context is to read the mind as information: 
Plato, it turns out, was magnificently on beam. He said that the material, physical 
expressions are pale, crude distortions of the ideal forms that are fabricated by the mind, 
the brain, the ‘soul.’ We are talking about learning how to operate our minds, our brains, 
our souls. And learning the rudiments of mind-fucking, silky body juicy fucking, and 
brain-soul fucking.331 
  
 Leary does not suggest that the body has no value whatsoever, but his attempt to think 
through the importance of senses and of feeling good—themes important to both psychedelics 
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and drug cultures of bliss—remains muddled. He goes on to offer that sex of the mind will be 
more intimate because the participants will know what each other is thinking. Leary claims that 
“interscreening,” or sex between the mind interfaces (screens) of individuals, “does not imply a 
derogation or neglect of flesh interactions.”332 But he never fully resolves these contradictions, 
arguing elsewhere that “if you think about it, we are basically brains.”333 
 Leary builds on McLuhan’s understanding of media technologies as extensions of the 
human body and senses that augment and accelerate our bodily capabilities. Leary both under-
theorizes and over-loads the meaning of the body. The body remains abstract in Leary’s thought 
even though McLuhan’s idea that the “medium is the message”—which is otherwise a crucial 
concept for Leary—seems to imply that the body is a primary meaning-making component of the 
human self. In this sense, the medium makes different ontologies possible, reorganizing our 
relationships to everything around us and centralizing the body as the connective tissue of those 
networks. But Leary privileges the mind as the essential medium over the body. He attempts to 
maintain a stance that is not radically anti-body, but instead utilizes the language of evolution to 
suggest that information sharing is the part of the body that matters the most: DNA and the 
matter of the mind. “Interscreening does not imply a derogation or neglect of flesh interactions,” 
Leary argues.334 This is what allows him to imagine mind-sharing as a complement to physical 
sex, while at the same time ensuring that whatever makes the body special or gives us reason to 
care about the body is downplayed or ignored as extraneous. All utopian potential emerges from 
information and informational relationships alone.  
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 Making the body so abstract and secondary to information technologies fuels Leary’s 
imagination of the utopic potentials of information flows and of what mere exposure or access to 
information can do. Information becomes so completely abstracted from its context—so 
violently disembodied—that it becomes a metaphysical and essentialized agent, with 
characteristics that are independent of context: “Sticks and stones may break your bones, but 
information can never hurt you. Although it can, alas, totally control your mind.”335 
 For Leary, the complexity and scale of humanity collapses into a single, bumper-sticker 
truth: we are computer brains. As in the rest of his writings, Leary often oscillates between 
claiming that this slogan is a metaphor and claiming that it expresses a truth. At one point, for 
example, he argues that “there is no naive assumption here that the brain is a computer. 
However, by using cybernetic terminology to describe mind and brain functions, we can add to 
our knowledge about the varieties of thought-processing experiences.”336 At the same time, 
though, he pins all his claims on the idea that by “changing your brain” you can “change reality 
screens.”337  
 While the computer-brain metaphor is explored more fully above in chapter one, it is 
worth exploring how this metaphor serves Jason Silva in his embrace of gnostic tropes outlined 
by Lee. Silva cites Leary liberally in his Technologies of Awe series. Like Leary, Silva believes 
information technologies and psychosomatic drugs have the same kinds of effects on the mind; 
“The PC is the LSD of the 1990s,” Silva says, citing Leary.338 That is, both psychedelics and 
information technologies release the mind from the material cage of the body. Silva, like Leary, 
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believes humans should engineer their realities. “We need to go Carl Jung on our own brains 
using a cocktail of chemical technologies that will thrust the bodymind into liminal spaces of 
exploration,” Silva argues, “We need to engineer inception-like dream spaces to explore.”339 By 
collapsing psychedelics and information technologies into substances that “make manifest the 
mind,” Silva is able to decouple imagination from material realities and constraints.340 In the 
course of conflating technology with psychedelics, Silva dematerializes them by making them 
processes of our mind: “Is technology not,” Silva asks, “a manifestation of the human mind...the 
actualization, the rendering of our hallucinations into existence?”341 
 By centering all human identity in the power and movement of the mind, Silva goes 
beyond Leary to suggest that any division between humans and artificial intelligence will vanish 
once both humans and machines can grow beyond the physical structures that keep them 
connected to the earth (such as the body and the “bare metal” of computer hardware). Once the 
physical limitations of data storage and the body are overcome, Silva argues, humankind will 
have built “minds that create minds. Computers that build better computers.”  This statement 
echoes the transhumanist concept of the technological singularity—often called simply “the 
singularity”—a thought experiment about an anticipated utopic moment in which technological 
advances (particularly those connected with artificial intelligence) will occur so rapidly that there 
will be no way to predict or even fathom what kinds of changes will occur to human 
civilization.342 While some scientists fear the singularity out of a concern that it will spell the end 
of humanity, Silva believes that this event will permit humanity to evolve finally and fully into it 
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ultimate form: “The human era will have ended. We will have become our creations. They will 
be our children, but they will really be us. There is no reason to fear this. This is just 
evolution."343 The conflation of human and machine minds allows Silva to see the singularity as 
a promise of limitless progress. In it, he anticipates, there will be no distinction between the 
abilities of the human mind and the omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence attributed to 
God in Western religious thought.  
For Silva, this process has already begun in the “Internet of Things.” The Internet of 
Things is a broad network of physical items and software that makes those physical devices 
“smart” (so called because of the data gathering and communicating software embedded in 
them). The Internet of Things today includes everything from telephones to toasters to 
televisions—all of which now share data across both home wireless networks and the internet. 
Optimists believe that the Internet of Things will bring a more naturalized, interconnected 
physical and virtual environment tailored to users’ unique desires. (For example, a person with 
vision loss might be able to have their refrigerator recite its contents to them.) But fears about 
unlimited surveillance temper this optimism and raise the specter of what Elaine McArdle has 
described as a “Golden Age of Surveillance” in which our personal and private data is 
continually mined and shared.344 Some fear that this age of surveillance is already here. Domestic 
abuse victims, for example, have detailed to The New York Times how their abusers have used 
smart devices to control and surveil them in frightening ways. 345 
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 Silva believes that the Internet of Things will allow the full expansion of mind into the 
world, as everyday objects come to act as if they share the capabilities of the mind. “You walk 
into a room, and the room knows how you like the lighting,” Silva claims, “the computer will 
offer you a snack, the curtains will raise or lower according to your energy levels—your mind 
will be fully integrated with the information networks surrounding you in your home, and the full 
flourishing of these technologies will promise to blur the distinction between self and world. The 
entire world will have mind in it.”346 Because Silva believes that our technologies are extensions 
of ourselves, “when our tools start talking back...we will have fully spread our minds out into our 
universe.”347 These ordinary devices, now infused with mind, will become at the same time 
endowed with agency. Citing Erik Davis again, Silva continues, “when everything becomes 
linked with everything else, matter becomes mind.”348 Of course, this utopia is mediated by 
technologies that come with their own costs in money and privacy. Silva’s video praising the 
Internet of Things is sponsored by Norton Security, whose website guides the user to a variety of 
security products to safeguard these newly animate devices of the domestic sphere.349  
 Silva and Leary are thus deeply committed to a mind/body distinction that leans heavily 
on what they imagine to be the spiritual and enchanting possibilities of a mind that can transcend 
all physical limitations. Both envision technology to be uniquely capable of expanding and 
opening up human potential because they see technology as an extension of the mind. But unlike 
Leary, who attributes these potentials to a diffuse, New Age idea of the nature of religion and 
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spirituality, Silva instead anchors these same potentials to an essential transhistorical gnostic 
tradition that Davis outlined. Davis’s Techgnosis fosters this perspective and has deeply shaped 
the Shots of Awe video series that Silva writes and promotes.  
For Davis, it is a gnostic move to distance the divine from the creation and it is mirrored 
by an abstraction of the self from the body. This is one of the key ties between gnosticism and 
technology that Erik Davis describes in Techgnosis and that Silva adopts enthusiastically in 
Shots of Awe. “Gnosis is not just mystical transcendence,” Davis argues, “it is data.”350 For 
Davis, the search for saving knowledge perfectly mirrors an abstracted world of data flows, in 
which access to information is paramount and life-changing. The internet and information 
technology, Davis writes, has made communication increasingly intimate, immediate, and 
omnipresent. Data is shared in the background of our lives as, for example, our phones share our 
locations, contacts, activities to corporations that further disseminate our identities and data.   
Silva, Davis, and Leary advance a specific techno-spiritual discourse that reconfigures 
the nature of the individual and the individual’s relationship to an extremely abstracted form of 
divinity. All other particulars—geographical, historical, material—are disregarded, so the 
language of spirituality and technology that these figures use masks any actual people, places, 
things, or material conditions that may be negatively affected by the information economy. The 
crises of global e-waste, the exclusion of women from tech environments, and the weaponization 
of information for surveillance all pass without a mention in their works.  
This marriage of themes of gnosticism and a techno-philosophy arising out of the 
American counterculture also fosters the animation of information itself with agency. The 
supposed disembodied nature of information is paramount across these thinkers—it is, in many 
ways, what enables the discourse towards global platitudes rather than troublesome 
                                               
350 Erik Davis, “Techgnosis, Magic, Memory, and the Angels of Information,” 48.  
 158 
particularities. This is, as Kate Hayles has argued, a twenty-first century revival of Descartes’s 
argument that human identity lies in our minds and not our bodies, and that our minds are 
essentially information.351  
 
Conclusion  
 Access to information becomes politically and spiritually crucial, Silva argues, because it 
is precisely the material processes which will allow to foster own divinity. Yet there is a key 
tension here. Information technologies are arguably some of the most hardened material products 
of late capitalism. They require an enormous global political economy and material 
infrastructure. Silva, Leary, and Davis talk about information flows in deeply spiritualized ways, 
but the processes that make these technologies possible is a global network of machines, 
markets, and matter that has to be produced, sold, and maintained. The conditions of possibility 
that underlie Silva’s ideology is deeply material—upgrading your mind with the newest digital 
technology also deeply depends on global sweatshop labor, mineral mining, heavy metal 
pollution, and a class system that means some will be able to afford better, more elite 
technologies than others.  
Overlaying the material conditions of this ideology is the language of enchantment.  
Silva’s welcome video to the Shots of Awe series, posted to YouTube in May 2013, describes the 
videos as “a series of reflections on my current thinking on the human condition, the ways in 
which we use technology to transcend all previous limits. Think of them,” he continues, “as 
inspired nuggets of technorapture.”352 The language of technorapture is both specific and telling. 
Silva’s career has been built to a substantial degree on a liberal use of the language of re-
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enchantment. Shots of Awe, in fact, pivots around the idea that digital and information 
technologies serve to bring “awe” and “magic” back into the modern world. The videos are 
meant to serve as both literal and figurative, two-minute shots of awe for the disillusioned but 
seeking modern. Information flows and information technologies are central to the re-
enchantment of the world.  
Silva is capitalizing on a common assumption in the twenty-first century: that modern, 
industrial societies are deeply marked by a loss of enchantment and that this loss has been, at 
least in part, a consequence of the increasing urbanization and overreach of capitalism, science, 
and technology. Most famously expressed by Max Weber, this thesis posits a cultural shift 
toward investing authority in science over religion. As the secularization thesis explains, the 
social ills blamed on religion or “superstition”—the latter almost always serving as a shorthand 
for the differences of a colonized other—would be slowly eradicated, as humankind collectively 
succumbed to an Enlightenment formulation of rationalization that encapsulated many of the 
highest priorities, assumptions, and values of Western, white, masculine, and upper-class society. 
The world would be united, finally, by the ontology of the West under the neutral guise of 
science. Technology, it was assumed, as the practical medium through which science interacted 
with the world, would become one of the primary means through which secularization would 
spread, like the updated blankets of the colonizers, handed out with a smile. Religion would fade 
away through antiquation. 
 By the end of the twentieth century, it had become apparent not only that “religion”—
whatever was meant by that overly-allusive, and under-defined term—was not dying out, but that 
it remained as robust a social formation as ever. In light of this failed prediction, scholars turned 
new attention to how certain peoples’ beliefs, practices, affective networks, and traditions were 
excluded from Enlightenment-era definitions of “religion.” As discussed above in the 
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introduction, religion, science, and rationality were gradually recognized as far more entangled 
socially, historically, and conceptually than had been previously recognized. Furthermore, 
scholarship on the political inheritances and consequences of definitions, categorizations, and 
language applied further pressure on the easy assumptions of the secularization thesis, causing it 
to go out of fashion among scholars of religion and much of the rest of the humanities. Instead, a 
host of scholars became interested in thinking about the ways in which secular spaces (now 
plural) were attended by, and co-producing of, religious ways of thinking, being, and doing in 
the world.  
Yet the secularization thesis persists in popular discourses about technology and religion, 
often in surprising ways. Silva serves as an important case study precisely because he is a prime 
representative of an important strand of contemporary technological thought that attributes 
“reenchantment” to the powers of technological devices. Because Silva inherits the 
secularization thesis without critique, he provides a prime opportunity to observe how a number 
of important advocates of technology have advanced their claims, using the technological 
medium as the stage from which to launch their argument. Silva believes that the West has 
indeed become secularized and hyper-rationalized and thereby suffered a loss of what he 
describes as “awe.” Silva has made a prominent career identifying the ways in which technology, 
the very apparatus to which he believes others attribute this loss, instead holds the key to our 
rediscovery of the spiritual.  
 This chapter has shown how Jason Silva draws on many of the same understandings 
about the relationship between religion and the freedom of information as Anonymous, Open 
Source Scientology, and Kopimism. At the same time, Silva’s reliance on a broadly gnostic 
perspective bolsters his deeply spiritual and disembodiment utopic vision. The thinkers explored 
in this chapter assert that access to information is politically and spiritually crucial precisely 
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because it is conflated with who humans are, who some want to them to be (Silva’s “godhood”), 
and how they are able to imagine evolving in this gap. 
 In the following chapter, “Information Wants,” I will seek to explore how the language of 
secularization and re-enchantment has been at work through each of my primary case studies. I 
will analyze these discourses on technology by highlighting some of the key scholarly literature 
surveying new religions and the intertwined relations of magic, secularization, enchantment, and 
technology. I will also return to my argument that new religions are able to provide vivid insight 
into cultural change that is otherwise implicit.  Activism for a free and unrestricted internet 
collides with the discourses of religion and information freedom that have been at the heart of 








Information wants to be free. 
—Stewart Brand  
 
 
Information doesn’t want to be free.  
People do. 




“Indistinguishable from magic” 
In April 2018 I sat in the back of a darkened and crowded auditorium in the heart of San 
Francisco. I was one of seven thousand people (engineers, programmers, executives, and 
marketers) gathered for the Red Hat Summit.353 Ellie Galloway, a school-aged girl, stood on the 
center stage. Three looming screens enveloped her, projecting her small frame out into the 
auditorium. Ellie was in the middle of a live coding demonstration, standing on a sturdy box to 
reach the podium.  
Live coding demonstrations seem to invite any and all sorts of technological failure. 
Presenters must have nerves of steel and charisma to cover dead time on stage. Ellie typed on a 
laptop encased in a plastic cover with rainbow stickers, nervously explaining each step of her 
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code as she finished the lines. Her goal was to program a small piece of plastic jewelry to flash 
different colors depending on who was present in the room. Her anxiety, projected first onto her 
face and then onto the screens encircling the audience, betrayed the fact that she was struggling. 
Twice the audience caught their breath, as Ellie became frustrated and choked up. Eventually the 
jewelry worked, and the code was successful. The tense atmosphere cracked. Where it had been 
still and silent, as if to bolster her confidence in even the smallest of ways, the mood was now 
boisterous and joyful. The audience gave Ellie a standing ovation. 
What is remarkable about this scene is the juxtaposition between this very emotional 
demonstration of an effort to include women and girls in the male-dominated tech world and the 
framing that preceded and then accompanied it on the massive projection screens in the 
auditorium. The earlier presentation slides had contained detailed quantitative information about 
the STEM and tech fields, gender and age demographics, and corporate return-on-investments 
(ROI). But during the live coding demonstration, the slides settled for several minutes on a single 
dominating image. Stretched out dozens of feet to cross the entire stage, bright blue and shining 
in the darkness, a single white-lettered statement declared: “Any sufficiently advanced 
technology is indistinguishable from magic.”  
 This chapter explores the ways in which the language of secularization and re-
enchantment has been at work in recent debates over the nature of information and information 
access. I will analyze this discourse using some of the key scholarly literature that considers 
technology and the intertwined relations among magic, secularization, and enchantment. I will 
also return to my argument that new religious movements can provide invaluable insight into 
cultural change that can otherwise remain hidden.  The religious groups analyzed in the prior 
three chapters are best understood as vivid, living examples of Bruno Latour’s argument about 
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the impossibility of secular modernity.354 These groups use debates over the value of information 
and the right to information access in ways that shed important light on the very notion of 
modernity, demonstrating that there does not exist any coherent differentiation between religion 
and secularism, religion and technology, or even subjects and objects. These movements are 
what Bruno Latour calls “hybrids”—they exemplify the instability of the binaries at the heart of 
the Western myth of secular modernity.  
 As I will show, the writings of the co-founder of Wired magazine, Kevin Kelly, and the 
distinctive slide at the Red Hat Summit both reflect a broad and pervasive cultural formation that 
interweaves notions of religion and technology. This intriguing formation builds on a distinctive 
cultural history, even as it transforms our understanding of each of these categories. The new 
religions explored in this dissertation have been part of that same formation and exemplify a 
much broader cultural mood about the power, ubiquity, and movement of information.  
 To explore these issues, I will first reflect more on the slide at the Red Hat Summit. I will 
then introduce Kevin Kelly and offer a brief history of the famous (or perhaps infamous) slogan 
“information wants to be free” (attributed to Kelly’s mentor Stewart Brand, founder of the Whole 
Earth Catalog). I will then turn to key scholarly literature about the relation between technology 
and enchantment in order to consider the relevance of religious studies scholarship to 
contemporary conversations about information freedom.  
 
Algorithmic Gods 
 I opened this chapter by noting a memorable quotation from a slide at the Red Hat 
Summit: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Readers of 
science fiction will recognize that quotation as one of Arthur C. Clarke’s famous “three laws.” 
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Clarke, a well-known author and futurist, penned the laws in his 1962 essay “Hazards of 
Prophecy: The Failure of Imagination.”355 The first two laws encourage scientists and 
technologists to think beyond the conceptual limitations of their peers. The third law, quoted 
above, is the most famous of the three. Clarke stated the set of laws as follows:  
1. When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible he is 
almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is very 
probably wrong. 
2. The only way of discovering the limits of the possible is to venture a little way 
past them into the impossible. 
3. Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.356 
 
What are we to make of the inclusion of this third law at a large corporate event? Perhaps 
the use of this third statement struck audience members as a soft marketing flourish—a piece of 
text accompanying a demonstration that is evocative but otherwise airy and unanchored to any 
serious meaning. In this view, the slide is a little less than metaphorical, a tactical maneuver used 
to elicit an affective mood and to invite audience participation in feelings of joy and wonder. If 
this is the case (which it surely was, at least in part), it must also be pointed out that a slide about 
wonder, joy, and playfulness accompanying a demonstration of the creativity of women and girls 
was an unfortunate gesture given the long history of women in tech being dismissed as 
inferior.357  
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 But as this dissertation has demonstrated, there is another way to read the 20-foot neon 
blue slide celebrating the affinities of magic and technology at an otherwise secular, corporate, 
capitalist event. Discourses of the secular and religion, of technology and magic, are deeply 
intertwined. This corporate slide functions both as an affective tactic and also as a reflection of a 
pervasive sensibility about the relation between technology and religion. The Church of 
Scientology, Open Source Scientology, the Missionary Church of Kopimism, Jason Silva—all 
have demonstrated how technology and technological metaphors can resonate with religious 
images, doctrines, and practices, and vice versa. As I have shown, religion and technology have 
served as two components of the same cultural assemblage for these movements. 
The language of magic and religion has provided a useful set of metaphors for scholars, 
journalists, and bloggers attempting to describe shifting understandings of what technology is 
and does. Consider Nicholas Carr’s argument in his Pulitzer Prize shortlisted book, The 
Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brain.358 There, he attributes the rise in 
contemporary language that describes our brains as computers to a historical pattern of using 
technology to describe ourselves to ourselves: “When the mechanical clock arrived, people 
began thinking of their brains as operating ‘like clockwork.’ Today, in the age of software, we 
have come to think of them as operating ‘like computers.’”359 Technologies are compelling 
metaphors because explaining our present circumstances through capitalist industries and 
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products grounds our metaphors in familiarity, and thus, as media studies scholar Ian Bogost 
argues, “they feel convincing.”360  
Oftentimes, however, metaphors about religion and technology hinge on contested 
understandings of enchantment, rationality, and science. Consider, for example, a 2015 article 
for The Atlantic in which media scholar Ian Bogost argued that technology has becomes so 
diffuse (and, in his view, “pervasive and distorted”) that technology and its infrastructures have 
begun to serve as a “new type of theology.”361 Lamenting this “theological reversal of the 
Enlightenment,” Bogost explained his concerns: 
Here’s an exercise: The next time you see someone talking about algorithms, 
replace the term with “God” and ask yourself if the sense changes any. Our 
supposedly algorithmic culture is not a material phenomenon so much as a 
devotional one, a supplication made to the computers we have allowed to replace 
gods in our minds, even as we simultaneously claim that science has made us 
impervious to religion.362 
 
Using religious imagery to explain science would appear to be a cardinal sin in secular 
modernity, and this particular category violation appears to explain Bogost’s frustration and 
contempt for these metaphorics when religion is used to explain science.  
As I will show in my discussion of Ludwig Feuerbach below, one of the defining aspects 
of secular modernity has been an effort to establish the superiority of science over religion 
(framed, as Latour explains below, in terms of knowledge over belief). Bogost’s discomfort 
appears to come from his displeasure that the constitutive religion/science binary is being 
disrupted by our metaphors.  
                                               
360 Ian Bogost, “The Cathedral of Computation,” The Atlantic, January 15, 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/01/the-cathedral-of-computation/384300/.  
 
361 Bogost, “The Cathedral of Computation.” 
  
362 Bogost, “The Cathedral of Computation.” 
 
 168 
As I argued in the introduction to this dissertation, it is important to understand religion 
and/as technology—that is, religion and technology is a false binary, so our attention is better 
spent on the production of hybrids at this constructed intersection. Religion and/as technology re-
orients us to regard the two categories as long-standing, culturally formed and culturally forming 
tropes in a much broader historical assemblage. This analysis requires very close attention to the 
terms of the discussion (magic, religion, technology). To place the Clarke’s Law presentation 
slide at Red Hat Summit into its cultural context—as reflecting a long-standing association 
between the awe-inspiring powers of technology and magic—is to contextualize these 
metaphors, to place them within a wider discourse of enchantment, religion, and technology.  
 
Nerd Theology 
 The examples discussed above demonstrate how enchantment and magic have served as 
guiding metaphors for our relationship to technology, as seen in the popularity of Clarke’s third 
law. For some, though, the language of enchantment and technology is not merely an affective or 
tonal flourish. Indeed, Corey Doctorow, a leading copyleft activist and prolific author on online 
information freedom, bemoans the fact that some information freedom advocates have based 
their arguments on quasi-mystical or spiritual grounds—what he calls the “information wants to 
be free” crowd.363 The claim that information wants to be free “is a good Zen koan,” Doctorow 
argues, but “the ‘desires’ of information are totally irrelevant…Information doesn’t want to be 
free—people do.”364  
 The phrase “information wants to be free” has become so interconnected with internet 
culture that it has been described as “a battle cry for the relentless march of the Internet,” “the 
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single dominant ethic” in information activism, and “the defining slogan of the information 
age.”365 The slogan appears to have first emerged in a conversation between Apple co-founder 
Steve Wozniak and Whole Earth Catalog founder Stewart Brand. As the two debated how for-
profit information technology companies chose which products to fund and which to defund 
according to market demands, Brand stated: “On the one hand information wants to be 
expensive, because it’s so valuable. The right information in the right place just changes your 
life. On the other hand, information wants to be free, because the cost of getting it out is getting 
lower and lower all the time.”366 Those lines about the paradox between technological innovation 
and business logic took on a far-flung life of their own. As literary agent John Brockman states, 
the phrase about information freedom “became a mantra, it became an ideology, for some it’s a 
religion, for others it’s a cashbox for stock or speaker fees.”367 
When Brockman states that “for some it’s a religion,” he is likely making a veiled 
reference to the co-founder of Wired magazine, Kevin Kelly, and similar thinkers (including, 
most directly, Jason Silva). As Stewart Brand’s student, Kelly translated countercultural values 
onto the pages of Wired magazine, and he has shaped a type of tech journalism that is fueled by 
religious affinities, sympathies, and imagery. Kelly has been published in The New York Times, 
The Economist, Time, Science, GQ, and Harper’s Magazine. His books were given to actors in 
the film The Matrix to help shape the atmosphere on the set, and he served as a “futurist adviser” 
on Steven Spielberg’s film Minority Report.  Highly influenced by both Marshall McLuhan and 
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Timothy Leary, Kelly is a convert to Christianity who argues that information technology is a 
living, dynamic, and agentive force. His 2016 book The Inevitable: Understanding the 12 
Technological Forces that Will Shape Our Future asserts that technology has innate 
“trajectories,” essences-by-design that mold their paths into the future. Kelly argues that 
humanity’s best hope is to ally with what information technologies “want” rather than to resist 
them.  
In June 2016 I interviewed Kelly for Religious Dispatches, and in our conversation I 
asked how he envisioned the relationships among technology, secularism, religion, and 
enchantment.368 He responded as follows: 
I definitely see a spiritual dimension to technology...the origins of technology [go] 
back to the Big Bang, the very beginning of the universe. The roots of technology 
are actually governed by exactly the same dynamic, self-organizing force that has 
made life. That it is, in some ways, an extension and acceleration of those forces 
of life…Therefore, I place it in the cosmic realm as being on its same trajectory 
that the other self-organizing forces that we see at work in the galaxy and the 
universe and life on this planet, and that technology is the latest and the most 
recent realization of those forces, so that it's deeply connected to the other things 
that we find interesting. Intelligence, life, the presence of the galaxies and all 
these other self-organized structures.369  
 
Kelly thus believes that technology is a recent realization of what he is calling a “life force”—an 
organizing principle that is capable of structuring other cosmic forms of life. It is this 
formulation of technology that allows Kelly to define information as something that is animate 
and living.  
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Elsewhere Kelly describes this phenomenon as the “technium,” the idea that technology 
is a living, cohesive system greater than the sum of its parts.370  “A spoon or shoe does not have 
any lifelike attributes,” he explained to me, “but all the technology in the world together 
does.”371 If you cast your conceptual net beyond the plastic of your telephone to the thousands of 
other technologies that must be in place in order for the telephone to be constructed (mining 
equipment, electricity, etc.), Kelly argues, you approach something much closer to the life force 
of technology. “The digital internet,” he explains, “exhibits many lifelike patterns, even though 
none of the pieces are living…The spoon is not alive…but if you take the entire network of all 
these things that are interrelated, that that [sic] network…does exhibit lifelike behaviors.”372 
 It is this lifelike aspect of technology that Kelly connects to religion. “I think that 
technology is a reflection of the divine,” he states, before more pointedly bemoaning, “It's not 
uncommon for Christian theologians at least to wrestle with the role of nature and God and man. 
[Where’s] that stewardship...almost nobody is asking the [correct] question, ‘What's the 
relationship of technology to God?’”373 Indeed, since the 1990s Kelly has attempted to carve out 
a connection between information and Christian theology, going as far as to formalize his 
assertions in the short article “Nerd Theology” for Technology in Society in 1999.374  
 In “Nerd Theology,” Kelly argues that information is a particularly malleable concept, 
allowing it to easily stand in for God: 
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Nerds know that this stuff we call information is as weird and as intangible as 
prayer in many ways. When you hear people talk about information, they could be 
talking about the Holy Spirit. We use the same kind of vague vocabulary. In truth 
we have no idea what information is. There is no theory of information that really 
withstands scrutiny, yet we have a whole culture and economy based on this 
metaphor. It is curious that many people who do not believe in God somehow 
believe in information. Dig down into atomic matter as deep as you want, and you 
find information at the bottom.375 
 
Information, Kelly is arguing, has become central to our contemporary cultural and media 
environments, but it is not precisely defined. Two central characteristics—omnipresence and 
abstraction—allow information to serve in a wide variety of roles. Not only is the data that your 
telephone shares about you “information,” but so is your DNA, as is the content of your 
conversations, as is text, as is electricity. Information, conceived in this way as both everything 
and nothing, becomes the basic element of all matter, all life forms, and all forms more 
generally. Kelly asserts that the true nature of information, understood as the basic building 
block of all forms of life, is precisely what makes information sacred.   
Those who work most closely with information technologies, Kelly argues, are able best 
to comprehend information’s existence as a dynamic and living force. It is this conclusion that 
allows him to proclaim that “computer hackers, geeks, and nerds are developing a unique 
theology, a theology coming from the wired street” that will eventually affect Christianity and 
other organized religions more broadly.376 In this vein, Kelly echoes Himanen’s claims about the 
telos of the Hacker Ethic, as well as the argument I have made about how Open Source 
Scientologists ally with Anonymous, and how Jason Silva spreads counterculture spirituality to 
hundreds of thousands of YouTube followers.  
All of the religious advocates considered in this dissertation have used debates over the 
nature and value of information—and particularly religious knowledge—to critique the 
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fundamental differentiation between religion and technology, a differentiation that has been 
foundational to the ideological myth of secular modernity. To better understand how these new 
religious movements have contributed to the cultural evolution of the notion of “religion,” I will 
now turn to important themes in recent scholarship on religion, technology, and enchantment. 
 
Frauds in the Machine 
 Many prominent voices in contemporary culture argue that technology is at odds with 
“authentic” religious practice, that technological artifacts are empty and inert.  One of the key 
corollaries of this perspective is that anyone who believes otherwise is a dupe or a fraud: there is 
no deus ex machina.  
 The idea that technology is entangled with religious frauds is a venerable one. Leigh Eric 
Schmidt has described the distinctively American deployments of this notion in detail in his 2002 
monograph Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and the American Enlightenment.377  Schmidt 
explores how since the eighteenth century new technologies could serve as tools of 
demystification, used in the service of secularizing the American public and moving it away 
from what Robert Orsi has described as “bad religion” (religious practices, performances, and 
beliefs that were configured as abnormal or otherwise disruptive to mainstream society).378  
The Enlightenment was characterized by dramatic developments in science, philosophy, 
society, and politics. In the United States these included the adoption of political democracy, the 
bifurcation of religious and secular governmental authority, and the formal disestablishment of 
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older, hierarchical class systems with the promise that capitalism could give people control over 
their own futures and fortunes.379 As a series of social, political, scientific, and technological 
revolutions through the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Enlightenment can also be 
understood through the cluster of ideals it organized itself around: freedom and equality, human 
reason, progress, democracy, and individualism. Science was invoked to undermine older 
religious understandings of the cosmos that had placed the earth (and humanity) at the center of a 
religious narrative.  
 Science’s new potential for rationally explaining the natural world also transformed the 
historical relationship between Christian theology and natural philosophy. Until the 
Enlightenment, science could be seen as the “handmaiden of theology,” serving an apologetic 
role supporting the dominant religious doctrines of the time.380 The Early Modern Period saw a 
shift in this role, as scientific inquiry was un-yoked from this role to become an independent 
source of knowledge and authority, working under new moral, ethical, and ideological 
constraints different from those of the church.   
 One important Enlightenment project was a concerted effort to debunk or expose the 
assumed frauds and impostures of what was dubbed “superstition.” As Schmidt details in 
Hearing Things, technology—popularly understood as the neutral application of new scientific 
tools—was put to use to monitor and police sense perception. By this, Schmidt means that 
technology was used to civilize the superstitious, to change how their bodies interacted with the 
world by disciplining them into practices deemed to be rational and empirical. New notions of 
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science were deployed to teach the superstitious how to become citizen scientists—detached and 
demystified in their observations and evaluations of the world around them.381  
 Schmidt argues that socially dominant groups came to believe that the senses were a 
problem for general citizenry—untrained sense perception contributed to superstition, 
irrationality, and “excessive” religiosity. To combat these tendencies, empirical observation and 
the scientific method were put to work to train the citizenry to cultivate (correct, improve, 
extend) their senses in ways that could be deemed precise and discerning. This was a civilizing 
project aimed at the broad American public. Its goal was not only to make the population 
scientifically literate, but also to prevent the public from participating in socially disruptive 
forms of religious thought and practice—to prevent them from being “duped” or “conned” into 
ways of religious life that were at odds with bourgeois and genteel society.382  
This was a period of internal scientific colonization, in which technologies were used to 
demystify and debunk popular religious ideologies. In particular, Schmidt argues, this was a 
process of dulling—quieting the heavenly and demonic voices of popular religious enthusiasm 
by demonstrating, through technology, their fundamental absence or unreality.  These tactics 
were employed against common religious practices particularly during America’s two Great 
Awakenings (1730-1750 and 1790-1820).383 
 Schmidt argues that the enthusiastic Protestant revivals of the Great Awakenings were as 
much reactions against the Enlightenment as they were embodiments of specific Enlightenment 
ideals (free-thinking, individualism, etc.). He points to the emphasis on the informal training of 
ministers, lay participation, and the popularity of religious enthusiasm among huge numbers of 
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people attending meetings, who embraced charismatic religion as a sign of authentic spiritual or 
religious practice. While enthusiasm could represent a type of democratizing of religion, 
according to Schmidt, it could also serve as a protest against the sanitized style of religious 
practice that many saw in scientifically colonized forms of Christianity.384 Revival meetings 
were noisy, smelly, and emotional.385  
 Lurking as a backdrop of the First Great Awakening was the rise of new forms of natural 
philosophy. Setting the stage for the emergence of modern science, natural philosophy was often 
invoked to convert America from a “Land of Spirits” to a genteel America, one that was tamed 
and civilized to the standards of an imagined genteel democracy.386 Auditory perception—
hearing—was seen as particularly unstable and especially in need of management: it was easy to 
hear things that were not there. To illustrate his argument that technologies played a key part in 
the demystification of “bad religion,” Schmidt follows the touring schedule of the Acoustic 
Temple. The Acoustic Temple was a French machine, designed by William Frederick Pinchbeck 
and brought from France to the United States around 1804. The machine was designed to imitate 
the sounds of ancient oracles, featuring a disembodied female voice and the sound of distant 
trumpets. Pinchbeck marketed the machine as an illusion, evoking magic in order only to dispel 
it, in order to allow people to see how their ears could deceive them. Pinchbeck described the 
device as having been designed to “open the eyes of those who still foster an absurd belief in 
ghosts, witches, conjurations, demoniacs,” as well as to “enable the attentive observer to form a 
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just idea of the artifices [that charlatans have used against] the superstitious, in this and former 
ages.”387  
 Schmidt ‘s work here shows the construction of a differentiation between good and bad 
religion quite similar to the one Robert Orsi has detailed in his monograph Between Heaven and 
Earth. In his concluding chapter “Snakes Alive: Religious Studies Between Heaven and Earth,” 
Orsi argues that new religions are often registered as “bad religions,” as ways of being religious 
that are overly-visible and enthusiastic. Bad religion is positioned against “true religion” or 
“good religion,” which Orsi details as: 
...epistemologically and ethically singular. It is rational, respectful of persons, 
noncoercive, mature, nonanthropomorphic in its higher forms, mystical (as 
opposed to ritualistic), unmediated and agreeable to democracy (no hierarchy in 
gilded robes and fancy hats), monotheistic (no angels, saints, demons, ancestors), 
emotionally controlled, a reality of mind and spirit not body and matter. It is 
concerned with ideal essences not actual things, and especially not about 
presences in things.388 
 
Bad religion is irrational, disrespectful, coercive, immature, anthropomorphic, undemocratic, 
polytheistic, emotional, and invested in objects that do not remain properly inert.  
At the heart of the project of modernity has been an effort to define and police forms of 
religion that are properly contained and decorous.  New religious movements are commonly 
portrayed as overly emotional and irrational.  But at the same time, they can also be depicted as 
violating the constraints of rationality in other ways. For example, the media has portrayed the 
Kopimists as hyper-rational and logically disingenuous. In this narration, the Kopimist cannot 
really believe that information is sacred because they are (at least potentially) religious frauds, 
cleverly (and humorously) attempting to game the legal system to defend their (otherwise 
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secular) activities.389 In a similar manner, Jason Silva is not accused of outright irrationality, but 
he is aligned with shallow modes of New Age spirituality, understood as relatively harmless but 
not really religious.390 Open Source Scientologists are collapsed in with Scientologists more 
broadly—they believe too much, too ridiculously, and are therefore not rational at all.391  
As I discussed in the introduction, the category of religion is always a political category. 
As Orsi shows, scholars regularly invoke the category to demarcate between what are seen as 
socially appropriate forms of believe and practice and those that seem to run counter to socially 
sanctioned notions of self and society.392 Bad religions are border crossers. They blur the 
boundaries of what is understood to be authentic, real, or otherwise worthy of serious scholarly 
study. 
The case studies I have explored in this dissertation are doubly fixed in the category of 
bad religion. Not only are they new religions (deemed fraudulent by their novelty), but they also 
seem to transgress one of the fundamental and constituent principles of capitalist modernity, the 
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basic division between the religious and the secular, as they assert that there are real, animated, 
essences within the mechanical materials of technological objects. While embracing the 
technologies of science, they configure those very technologies to pursue and buttress a 
worldview and ethics of awe. They disregard the cultural logic that demands that technologies 
disenchant. To better understand the nature of this transgression, I will now turn to examine 




The idea that technology is linked to the process of secularization remains a dominant 
narrative in the academy. Secularization here is defined as the historical and cultural process 
through which religious authorities are replaced with non-religious ones, including the social 
processes by which religion (loosely defined in both its influence and scope) becomes 
increasingly limited and contained.393 From this perspective, technology is understood as the 
practical apparatus extending the logic of quantification outside of the realm of science to 
consume all forms of life and as one of the primary methods though which secularization is 
accomplished. 
For our purposes here, let me invoke the nineteenth century philosopher Ludwig 
Feuerbach as exemplifying the modernist perspective that seeks to demystify and debunk the 
cultural residue of religion. As Feuerbach would argue, it is precisely because we fail to 
understand how technology works that technology can enchant. Feuerbach’s explanation for 
mystification is echoed in a number of contemporary popular and scholarly understandings of 
religion and technology. Popular especially amongst engineers and scientists, this perspective 
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asserts that technology can appear enchanting only because of basic ignorance about how the 
technological process works—technology inspires awe or is otherwise seen to be magical simply 
because it is misunderstood. 
The logic Feuerbach used in his 1841 The Essence of Christianity in his efforts to 
demystify Christianity fits well with current debates about technomysticism, and it provides 
contemporary thinkers a ready-made path to demystify the workings of technology. Feuerbach 
sought to explain the origins and operations of religion through his account of a process of 
objectification, projection, and forgetting. Strongly influenced by Hegel, Feuerbach argues that it 
is humanity’s dialectical relationship to objects that allow humans to become acquainted with 
themselves. “We know the man by the object” Feuerbach argues.394 
 The problem, for Feuerbach, begins when humanity loses track of this dialectical 
process—subjects and objects are misapprehended. This misapprehension is vividly 
demonstrated in the creation of religion, which is produced in the misunderstanding of our own 
projections. Humanity objectifies its highest ideals and projects those ideals onto the divine, a 
product of the human internal dialogue. Religion thus becomes “man’s earliest and also most 
indirect form of self-knowledge.”395 In Feuerbach, the divine projection, the God of Western 
Christianity, is configured as exemplifying the best, most perfected human attributes (so that, for 
instance, God looks and acts a lot like the ultimate king). But humanity comes to mistake this 
projected God as having an objective existence—we desire those ideals to be real, so we make 
God real—because humanity forgets and misapprehends the nature of this process of projection. 
“Man...projects his being into objectivity,” Feuerbach argues, making himself into an object for 
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submission under the gaze of “this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject.”396 
Humanity falls under the sway of the “highest subjectivity” of God only by splitting itself into 
subject and object.397 
Feuerbach is arguing that religion is the imaginary product of humanity. Objectified and 
alienated human values and desires are projected out in such a way that humans fail to recognize 
their role in the constructive process. But Feuerbach’s contribution is not merely to argue that 
religion is an illusion. He also emphasizes the formative role of emotions and affect in the 
origins of religion; the processes of objectification and projection are driven by emotional desires 
and misapprehension. 
For our purposes, Feuerbach exemplifies a deep cultural logic that resonates through 
many contemporary debates about technology, religion, and secularization.  We can see this 
logic at work in the recurring suggestion in popular media that internet use is linked to 
secularization. As an example, let me focus on one particular instance of this story that circulated 
online in April 2014 and then re-emerged in 2018 (though there are numerous other examples). 
On April 4, 2014, the MIT Technology Review ran a story titled “How the Internet is 
Taking Away America’s Religion,” with a subheading stating that “Using the Internet can 
destroy your faith. That’s the conclusion of a study showing the dramatic drop in religious 
affiliation in the U.S. since 1990 is closely mirrored by the increase in Internet use.”398 This story 
was prompted by a computer data study performed by computer scientist Allen Downey at the 
Olin College of Engineering (using data from the General Social Survey, a University of 
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Chicago sociological survey carried out since 1972). Downey asserted that “correlation does 
provide evidence in favor of causation,” and he concluded that the widespread adoption of 
information technologies (and internet access in particular) appeared related to a significant 
decline in religious affiliation. As he stated it: “Internet use decreases the chance of religious 
affiliation.”399 
Four days after the original MIT Technology Review story, on April 8 The Guardian 
picked up the story, re-summarizing Downey’s arguments in Andrew Brown’s “Is the internet 
really killing religion in the US?”400 Brown agreed with the MIT Review, and he did little to 
question Downey’s conclusions, largely because the idea that technology disenchants seemed 
comfortable and obvious to Brown. “What keeps religious affiliation alive,” Brown argues, “is 
practice, or ritualized belief...and someone online is almost by definition not performing 
collective religious acts.” For Brown, technological activity cannot be religious activity precisely 
because, in his mind, it is inherently secular. “What kills American religion isn’t argument,” he 
continued, “it’s Facebook.”401 By April 10, the story had reached the national section of the 
Washington Post, where the Religion News Service Kimberly Winston recapitulated Downey’s 
findings alongside some soft push-back from University of Southern California communications 
professor Stephen O’Leary. As a specialist in the study religion online, O’Leary asked for 
nuance in Winston’s piece, arguing that internet use must be understood as part of the wider 
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secularizing effects of the “religious marketplace” and new options for religious affiliation (and 
de-affiliation) since the 1960s.402 
By April 28, the story came full circle. Jared Keller of the Pacific Standard directly 
confronted Downey’s arguments in his own, bluntly titled essay “No, the internet is not killing 
religion in America.” Keller’s no-nonsense subheader reads, “The decline in religiosity in the 
U.S. is accompanied by a rise in Internet access. But the factors determining faith are far more 
complicated than a Wi-Fi connection.”403 Unfortunately for Keller, and what is instructive for 
my argument here, is that this fundamental story about technology as a secularizing force is a 
very common one. In January 2018 the cycle repeated, when PsyPost published the findings of 
yet another research study published in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. The 
headline for this coverage, written by blogger Eric W. Dolan, read: “Increases in internet use 
linked to a loss of religious affiliation, study finds.”404 
These news cycles illustrate the common assumption that technology is linked to the 
processes of secularization. Feuerbach’s fundamental logic is used both to demonstrate that an 
increase in knowledge and self-awareness will lead to demystification and to explain why some 
people mistakenly persist in perceiving technology in religious terms. This logic provides critics 
of technomysticism with an explanation for the phenomenon, while at the same time positioning 
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the critics as superior, rational citizens of secular modernity, performing their scientific duties of 
debunking and purifying their realm.  
Yet as the new religious movements I have analyzed here have shown, the modernist 
ideology that Feuerbach and his progeny promote has always been fallacious. The secularization 
thesis, championed by so many, falters again and again as religious energy and creativity never 
seem to wane. The commonsensical binaries of religion and secularism, subject and object, are 
foundational to the ideological myth of Western modernity. But key terms in the formulation of 
this “modern constitution” have never been stable; they have never worked in the ways that 
Feuerbach would have desired. As Bruno Latour has famously asserted, “we have never been 
modern,” and the case studies at the heart of my project here provide rich and vivid confirmation 
of Latour’s fundamental claim.405 
 
 
Either / Or 
 Bruno Latour has repeatedly argued that the fundamental binaries on which Western 
modernity has been founded—binaries between subject and object, the human and the natural, 
the religious and the secular, religion and technology, and many more—are merely the product 
of a particular modern logic.  He argues, for example, that discourses about whose objects are 
animated (and when) pull on different, historically situated, relationships of power (i.e. Spanish 
colonizers believe indigenous beliefs in objects are bunk, but that their own use of objects is 
rational).  
Debates about technomysticism reflect larger disputes about the relationship between 
science and religion. New technologies are the prestigious legacy of science, its most highly 
developed products, expanding human capabilities in unimaginable ways, while their opacity 
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obscures the social networks within which they are produced. Latour is illuminating for this 
dissertation because he challenges important ideologies of science and the vision of secular 
modernity that those ideologies uphold. 
 Traditional modern science and religion debates have posed each side as ontologically 
separate from the other. On the one hand, Latour explains, these debates have defined religion as 
the realm of belief—it is “supposed to deal with the far, the vague, the mysterious, the personal, 
the uncertain, and the unknowable.”406 Science, in contrast, has been “defined as the grasp of the 
visible, the near, the close, the impersonal, the knowable.”407 The religion/science binary is set 
up so that each side has its kingdom.  Religion assumes rule over belief (the supernatural, inner 
authenticity, sentimentality). Yet as has become a well-tread argument in the scholarly study of 
religion, religion is more than belief—and, perhaps, not even very much about belief at all.408 
The supposed attributes of religion are not stable, cohesive, or essential. They are the products of 
a very particular cultural history of the notion of religion, formed in the West under the shadow 
of Christianity.409 
 In a similar manner, modern science itself does not simply observe the visible and 
identify (unproblematically, easily, and without contestation) a series of facts guided by 
rationality. Science is also the product of a very particular cultural history. It is created through 
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processes that involve peer review, laboratories, individual personalities, funding, complex 
technologies, and much more. As Latour explains, science relies on theories that build 
“extraordinarily long, complicated, mediated, indirect, and sophisticated paths so as to reach the 
worlds [that are invisible except] through concatenations of layered instruments, calculations, 
and models.”410  
 The traditional science and religion debate that understands each side as an ontologically 
separate realm of life serves to mask and preserve deep cultural assumptions about the nature of 
religion and science that are actually historically contested and unstable. Even those who wish to 
valorize the culturally inferior term of the debate (religion) are only able to do so in a confused 
way, since the very terms of the debate reduce religion to a caricature and segregate it from the 
broad networks within which it actually functions. Latour describes these participants of the 
science/religion debates as “Camp David diplomats drawing lines on maps of the Israeli and 
Palestinian territories. They try to settle disputes as if there was on single domain, one single 
kingdom to share in two.”411 Latour bemoans, “[I almost prefer] naturalistic accounts than with 
this sort of hypocritical tolerance, which ghettoizes religion into a form of nonsense, specialized 
in transcendence and feel-good inner sentiment.”412  
 Latour challenges the fundamental logic of secular modernity while seeking to show how 
complex the broad network of material relations actually is. The ideology of modernity has 
sought to bifurcate the world in an attempt to purify itself, to distinguish itself from lesser, 
impure, irrational, pre-moderns.413 Instead of distinct social forces and modes of knowledge, 
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transhistorically, transculturally, and ontologically separate, Latour argues that there have only 
ever been actants (both human and non) influencing one another through larger and larger 
networks.414 
So how might Latour respond to the logic of Feuerbach and his progeny? Latour argues 
that complex techno-social relations are congealed within the “black boxes” of technological 
objects. “Society and technology are not two ontologically distinct entities,” Latour asserts, but 
instead social groups are deeply transformed by, and go on to innovate and re-transform, the 
non-human actants (like technology) with which they are embedded.415 The computer screen 
before us appears oblique—it hides the mining work needed to take the rare minerals out of the 
earth, the workshops that slice casings and blast chemicals to condition the hardware, the 
environmental tolls of electricity production and e-waste, the historically gendered labor among 
engineers, programmers, and sales teams, the circuits of global economic exchange that produces 
a single machine with parts from around the world, and the code and information technology 
infrastructures that steadily streams information between your device to the network of devices 
that gives yours the ability to function.  
This Latourian perspective helps us understand that no one—not the engineers, or the 
programmers, or the techies who can do far more with a single machine than most mere 
mortals—can fully comprehend the social and material networks congealed behind the dim 
glimmer of a stained laptop screen or a worn keyboard. To re-read Clarke’s third law in a 
generous way, in the spirit of Latour, we could then argue that technology is perceived as 
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magical precisely when the social relations and control that crafted the device become so opaque 
that the machine seems to work and move and do on its own, beyond any human capacities. 
But discourses of magic are, of course, not themselves neutral either. In fact, the rhetoric 
of magic—and especially magical thinking—is closely tied to colonial projects that privilege 
Western, enlightenment forms of rationality over other modes of thought.416 Latour is instructive 
for our purposes, though, because of his interest in objects. In his 2015 essay “Fetish-Factish,” 
Latour centers objects within the story about magic and moderns. He describes an imaginary, 
loosely historical encounter between the conquering Portuguese and several West Africans from 
the Gold Coast. Confronted with the religious objects of the Africans, the Portuguese insist that 
they themselves have no objects that “speak back” of their own accord—they know the 
difference between subjects and amulets. A thing is a thing, in other words, and a subject a 
subject. Latour describes this as a harsh choice—is the divinity of the object real, or is it fake? 
But what particularly frustrates the Portuguese is not necessarily even the existence of the 
amulets, but their inability to communicate their distress to the Africans. Latour explains: 
Whatever root we may prefer, the either—or choice remains the one the 
Portuguese insisted on and the Blacks rejected: “Who is speaking in the oracle? 
Is it the human being, or the fairy-object itself? Is the divinity real or artificial?” 
“Both,” the defendants reply at once, since they are unable to grasp the 
difference. “You have to choose,” say the conquerors, without further 
hesitation.417  
 
This imaginary dialogue, Latour argues, highlights something essential about modern 
identity. Noting the Catholic artifacts the Portuguese carry on their travels, Latour suggests that 
what we actually see in this episode is “one group of people covered with amulets scoffing at 
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another group of people covered with amulets.”418 This is because, ultimately, “a Modern is 
someone who believes that others believe” —modernity claims to have knowledge, and it 
projects belief onto the non-modern.419 In other words, the language of enchantment (here 
represented by what the Portuguese see as the fetish objects of the Africans, in distinction to their 
supposed rational objects of Catholicism) simply marks important points of friction in an 
existing social network. “Belief,” Latour argues, “is not a state of mind but is a result of 
relationships among people.”420 The question then is not whether we should believe objects are 
enchanted or not (for the very same reasons that most religious studies scholars long ago stopped 
asking about the sincerity and authenticity of religions) but rather why moderns need “so badly” 
to believe that others believe.  
If the Portuguese can get the Africans to admit that they fabricate their own fetishes (or if 
they refuse), the Portuguese’s own sense of superiority over the Africans is confirmed. On the 
one hand, if the Africans do admit fabrication, the Portuguese confirm that the Africans are but 
the latest in a long line of “manipulators of popular beliefs.”421 If the Africans refuse to admit 
fabrication, than the Portuguese can feel superior in their knowledge that the Africans are merely 
dupes, conned by bare materials that they have themselves forgotten that they animated. This is 
the “either / or” choice that Latour speaks of, and it is the same rhetorical device that Feuerbach 
extends to other religious peoples. “From the mouths of the Fontenelles, the Voltaires, and 
Feuerbachs of the world,” Latour explains, “the same either-or alternative keeps spewing 
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forth.”422 Either you’ve pulled the strings, or you are being pulled. Either you’ve built it, or it’s 
real. Technology, as crafted matter, cannot be both.  
Latour is useful for the purposes of this dissertation because of the way in which he 
illustrates how these binaries, so formative to the ideology of modernity, collapse when you look 
at them closely. Indeed, rather than reflecting or enforcing any stable and convincing distinction 
between science and religion, religion and technology, the new religious movements explored in 
this dissertation represent vibrant, living examples of hybridity, the inevitable mixing of religion 
and science, religion and technology. Latour argues that beneath the rhetoric of binarism and 
purity, the moderns have only ever produced hybrids. The religious creativity of these new 
movements demonstrates that even the most seemingly secular, inert, and neutral products of 
science—these technological artifacts—are haunted by the religious.  
We can carry this exploration of technology’s role in dis/enchantments a step further by 
turning to Jason Josephson-Storm’s The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the 
Birth of the Human Sciences.  Josephson-Storm seek to reposition the discussion of enchantment 
at the heart of his proposed method for the study of religion: “reflexive religious studies.” With 
Latour and Josephson-Storm, I will argue that a nuanced perspective that acknowledges 
entanglement rather than hard binaries is the most productive way to understand the case studies 




In the introduction of this dissertation, I argued that the “and/as” model Jeremy Stolow 
puts forward for the study of religion and technology is particularly illuminating in exploring the 
questions that have motivated my research. Religion and technology are not two separate, 
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ontologically distinct formations but are instead social forms that emerge in specific contexts 
(geographically, historically, culturally), occur in multiple instances and with multiple 
formations, and are always radically entangled. Latour gives scholars a theory with which to 
understand the hybridity produced at the intersection of religion and/as technology, as well as a 
way to understand the importance of hybridity in Western attempts to assert a narrative of 
secular modernity. Jason Josephson-Storm moved this conversation forward by describing how 
secularism has always been haunted. Not only are the religion/secular, religion/technology, 
enchantment/disenchantment binaries impossible to maintain, they were never successfully 
conjured up in the first place.  
Modernity, quite simply, has never been disenchanted. This assertion is not new; it 
echoes Latour and a number of other recent scholars.423 But Josephson-Storm is particularly 
helpful for my analysis because of his focus on the issue of technology. As we will see, the 
religious creativity of the groups I have analyzed here offers a vivid demonstration of Latour and 
Josephson’s fundamental argument that the religious/secular binarism at the heart of modernity is 
inevitably and essentially unstable. Pointing to Max Weber’s theory of disenchantment, 
Josephson-Storm traces the ways in which modernization has regularly been “equated with the 
rise of instrumental reason, the gradual alienation of humanity from nature, and the production of 
a bureaucratic and technological life world stripped of mystery and wonder.”424 Echoing Leigh 
Schmidt, Josephson-Storm highlights how many scholars have commonly identified the demise 
of religion and magic as a key element in the effort to make capitalist societies modern.425  
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These processes of disenchantment are regularly linked to processes of objectification. 
Rational and systematic epistemologies colonized nature, turning it into an object to be 
conquered and controlled. It was a logical next step, then, when enlightenment ideology 
extended the domination of nature into the domination of “humans over each other,” 
transforming human and natural life “into abstractions—mere numbers and statistics.”426 
It is worth pausing to consider how Josephson-Storm is here responding to an historical 
narrative highly influenced by Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology (1954). There 
Heidegger outlined a theory of technology in which instrumental reason becomes the primary 
mode of being for humanity in a technological world, or rather that in “the context of the being-
question, [technology] does not name a human comportment but a manner of the essential 
swaying of being.”427 
To clarify his argument, Heidegger uses the example of a hydroelectric plant that has 
been placed on the Rhine. The river, Heidegger argues, had once been the subject of poetry, of 
wonder, and of awe. The hydroelectric plant collapses these possibilities, transforming the Rhine 
instead into a mere supplier of electrical power.428 This “monstrous” conversion corrupts the 
river, spoiling nature and humanity alike by reducing a source of wonder to a commodity now 
designed for exploitation. Heidegger argues that this episode exemplifies the technological mode 
of being—a logic of instrumentalism that is not peripheral to a world with technological 
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infrastructure, but that defines it.429 By making humanity essentially measurable, technology 
reduces beings to not-beings; it makes subjects into objects. What is worse, for Heidegger at 
least, is that this process is marked by an abandonment of awe and wonder that we do not even 
realize we suffer—we are indifferent to the loss, as the world becomes disenchanted.430 
This fundamental narrative is what Josephson-Storm seeks to overthrow, demonstrating 
through The Myth of Disenchantment how the type of absence or lack on which Heidegger’s 
account depends was actually never felt, never proved, and certainly never fully established. 
Josephson-Storm’s case studies demonstrate “that reason does not eliminate ‘superstition’ but 
piggybacks upon it; that mechanism often produces vitalism; and that often, in a single room, we 
can find both seance and science.”431 The West, in his view, was never uniquely disenchanted, 
and it surely does not stand apart from a world Western anthropologists and scholars have so 
regularly described as superstitious, enchanted, and magical. (In a 2017 interview with Religious 
Dispatches Josephson-Storm states that an alternative title for his book was “Magic Never 
Vanished”).432 Josephson-Storm is, in his own words, “challeng[ing] the most widely held 
account of modernity and its break from the premodern past.”  
 
Conclusion 
“Sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Clarke’s law, 
stretched out upon the looming screen at the Red Hat Summit, is of the same world as the people 
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considered in this dissertation. Clarke did not conjure his law from nowhere. Instead, religion 
and technology have existed as interrelated components of the same, enduring cultural 
assemblage. There has never been a coherent separation between religion and secularism—both 
are categories that are deployed to produce social effects (rather than to reflect essential 
essences). This dissertation identified unexpected and concrete contemporary examples of 









The Fight for the Future of the Internet  
 
Ethan Dodge is the lead engineer and technical adviser for a network of new web-based 
communities: MormonLeaks, FaithLeaks, and their parent organization the Truth and 
Transparency Organization. For the first year and a half of his work with MormonLeaks, Dodge 
worked under the pseudonym Privacy P. Pratt, a play on the name of Parley P. Pratt (1807-1857), 
an early leader in the Mormon Church and one of the original members of the Quorum of the 
Twelve Apostles. In August 2018 I travelled to Las Vegas in part to see Dodge’s presentation at 
“Skytalks.” Skytalks is a shadow conference that runs parallel to, and is loosely affiliated with, 
DEF CON (the world’s largest and longest running hacker conventions). Skytalks is hosted by 
the anonymous hacker collective 303 and is not sponsored by any official organizations, in part 
so that it can feature hosts and topics that are too controversial for other venues.433 During 
Skytalks presentations, electronic and recording equipment is expressly forbidden to protect 
speaker’s safety and confidentiality. Hall monitors patrol the audience searching for offending 
recording equipment (including cell phones), which is publicly smashed with a mallet at the front 
of the room. The lines to attend Skytalks wrap around the building, often taking several hours 
with no guarantee for entrance.  
 In 2018 Dodge spoke as a follow-up to his presentation the year before.  Both talks were 
about his works with MormonLeaks (formerly Mormon Wikileaks). MormonLeaks began in 
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October 2016, when founder Ryan McKnight published fifteen confidential videos of Mormon 
leaders (most of whom were leaders in the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, a high ranking and 
secretive organization in the church) in private conversation. The videos included audio of 
church leaders discussing marijuana, the “homosexual agenda,” and the specifically relevant 
issue of whether the church should be worried about a WikiLeaks style disclosure campaign.434  
 These videos had been leaked and distributed first on the Reddit forum r/exmormon for 
Mormon apostates seeking community, guidance, and support as they break their ties with the 
Church. After the New York Times covered the leaks, Ethan Dodge had reached out to McKnight 
to establish a more secure technological mechanism for protecting leakers and hosting 
controversial content about the Mormon church. Within several months, MormonLeaks had a 
formalized name, website, and policy statement. A few months later, FaithLeaks was created to 
host sister content from other ex-religious members who wanted to leak secret or otherwise 
controversial material. By late 2017, both organizations were joined under a parent project, the 
Truth and Transparency Foundation (TTF).435 
 The mission statement of the TTF asserts that “increased transparency results in fewer 
untruths, less corruption, and less abuse within religion and other faith centric organizations.”436 
Through providing technical tools and protections of whistleblowers (in the form of anonymous 
distribution), TTF supports “citizen journalists for starting and expanding news reporting, public 
commentary, and criticism related to religion and faith,” and it aims its disclosures squarely at a 
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three-pronged target: finances (where money comes and goes), policies (particularly policies that 
adversely affect Church members), and statistics (reporting on sexual abuse, legal cases, 
membership demographics, attendance records).437 
  MormonLeaks, FaithLeaks, and the TTF are quite different from the case studies 
explored in this dissertation because they argue for the freedom of information (in the form of 
whistleblowing and leaking) for the explicit purposes of critique and reform rather than on the 
basis of any metaphysical arguments about the nature of information and information freedom. 
MormonLeaks and its related organizations represent an important aspect of the struggle for 
information freedom—they believe information has the power to bring social change. They use 
information to assert the values of transparency and responsibility between religious institutions 
and their members. These organizations are performing important political work, but they do so 
in a way that conforms quite easily with the dominant narrative of religion and secularism in 
Western modernity. They are using information to debunk and to enlighten. In this way, they 
offer a compelling but unsurprising cultural formation of religion and technology. They 
configure the relationships among information, religion, and technology in a way that fits well 
with the promises and projects of secular modernity. 
The religious movements I have analyzed in this dissertation are up to something more 
transgressive, something that reveals deeper tensions and shifts underlying contemporary life and 
its values, assumptions, and lineages. These religious movements are hybrids.  Their religious 
creativity—anchored in debates about the value and nature of information—reveals important 
and surprising insights into the ongoing cultural development of the concept of religion, into 
changing cultural perceptions of technology, and into the fragile, mythic nature of modernity. 
These religious movements demonstrate how information access has been configured as a 
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religious right and how the control and freedom of information has been used to legitimize and 
delegitimize new forms of religious expression. 
The Church of Scientology, Anonymous, and the Open Source Scientologists 
demonstrate how the very concept of information itself is contested in ways that shape and 
reconfigure fundamental debates about the nature of religious knowledge and access. These 
competing beliefs about information—and the accompanying values of open access, 
modification, and distribution—fuel Scientology’s struggles online.  Copyright and copyleft 
activism provided the context for these debates, the practical effects of which leave a particularly 
thorny ethical conundrum for scholars of Scientology. Increasingly, copyright law is used to 
police religious dissent, potentially making Scientology’s troubles the canary in the coal mine.  
The Missionary Church of Kopimism recasts the ethical commitment to radical 
information freedom as its core religious imperative, reformulating theological themes deeply 
rooted in the Protestant Reformation. The Kopimists have combined a longstanding and deeply 
held religious tradition that individualizes access to religious knowledge with the cultural values 
of new hacker subcultures. The Kopimists claim to represent a much broader, latent spiritual 
reality of twentieth and twenty-first centuries culture. They demonstrate in a highly inventive 
fashion the intertwining of two dominant undercurrents of our times: the hacker ethic and the 
cultural legacy of Protestant Christianity.  
Jason Silva draws on the work of Timothy Leary and Erik Davis to reconfigure these 
debates yet again, this time in ways that echo a set of distinctively gnostic directives. These three 
public figured demonstrate the prevalence of the religious framing of information access as 
religious knowledge, but they do so in more extreme and eschatological ways. They argue that 
information itself is salvific, and they carry the strand of Protestant theology identified in chapter 
two in peculiarly gnostic directions by articulating a hyper-spiritualized and individualized 
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investment in information. Because of the opacity of contemporary capitalism, those who think 
that technology (highly formed capitalist products) will provide liberation to everyone appear 
most prone to these gnostic echoes. Yet this confidence in the salvific potential of information is 
deeply paradoxical—these thinkers want to democratize the benefits of information access while 
at the same time preserving the special status of technological elites.  
The religious movements explored in this dissertation have focused on one of the central 
questions underpinning contemporary society: what is the nature of information? This is a key 
question, becoming more and more significant as we see information flows and technologies 
shaping our world and ourselves in unimaginable new ways. Pervasive data collection and 
monitoring have become the conditions upon which our contemporary global economy and its 
telecommunications infrastructure have been built. It should surprise no one that the nature of 
information—so fundamentally material yet so abstract, so deeply eminent and at the very same 
time so transcendently powerful—has been a key site for religious creativity. New information 
technologies appear to be omnipresent and omniscient, so they can easily be configured in the 
religious language of Western monotheism. This is not to argue that information and information 
technologies actually are sacred, or omniscient, or omnipresent; technologies fail, and their 
powers are often completely mythical (my iPhone, for instance, breaks every two years—not 
much of a mind upgrade). But these debates about the nature of information are at their core 
debates about the nature of modernity. They allow us to see, in real time, the impossibility of any 
stable differentiation between the religious and the secular.  
The practices, ideologies, and activism of the Open Source Scientologists, Anonymous, 
the Missionary Church of Kopimism, and Jason Silva are all configured around a free and 
unrestricted internet (one in which all peoples are guaranteed access to all information). The 
Church of Scientology argues the exact opposite, mounting a defense for the tight control of 
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information based upon the need for regulation of esoteric religious knowledge. All parties 
formulate these debates in such a way that that they are actively transforming what the very 
categories of the religious and the secular might mean. In their fight over information flows on 
the internet, they are reworking the mythological contours of modernity. They undermine the 
modern myth of disenchantment, and they confirm that there can never be any stable 
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